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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis contends that holistic, community-based treatment is preferable 
to carceral options for offenders with fetal alcohol conditions, presents 
emerging support for this contention, identifies barriers to the 
implementation of community-based treatment, and culminates with 
analyses of ways of influencing policy reform or of legally mandating non-
carceral treatment options.  Potential avenues that will be examined 
include: 
 
• Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15, including an analysis from 
Eldridge, Law, and Auton, based on the duty to accommodate 
disabilities; 
• Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35 and its recognition and affirmation of such 
relevant treaty right as the alcohol ban, particularly as the ban operates 
as a contextual factor in a s. 15 Charter analysis as applied to affected 
treaty beneficiaries; and 
• Articles 23, 24 and 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights,  particularly as they influence the s. 1 analysis under the 
Charter. 
 
A remedy mandating a positive state obligation to provide community-
based treatment likely would require favourable cost-benefit analyses, as 
well as evidence of effectiveness of the treatment (the latter to be studied in 
a subsequent interdisciplinary Ph.D. program using qualitative research 
techniques).  The implications of a finding of disability and mental disorder 
related to fetal alcohol conditions will be examined.  The present research 
topic is at the interface of health and justice, and indeed is multidisciplinary 
in nature as fetal alcohol influences every aspect of affected individuals’ 
lives.  Moreover, the problem is situated in its historical, ideological, global, 
and trans-disciplinary context. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Underlying Contention of the Thesis 
 
The present research is based on the contention (for which there is emerging support) 
that, for fetal alcohol offenders, holistic, community-based treatment is preferable as a  
sentencing option to incarceration. The contention is supported inter alia by an 
understanding of the nature of the syndrome itself.  Because of a reduced ability to think 
abstractly due to the damage that alcohol inflicted on their developing brains in utero, 
fetal alcohol affected individuals do not understand cause/effect relationships, including 
appreciation of the consequences of their actions, nor are they able to generalize what 
they learn in one situation to another.1  Moreover, their judgment is poor, and they are 
easily influenced by others.2  Although they may function fairly well in the structured, 
carceral environment, any useful coping skills learned there are not readily transferable 
upon release to noncarceral settings and must be largely relearned on the outside.3  
Because of impulsivity and obliviousness or blindness to consequences, fetal alcohol 
offenders are liable upon release to reoffend regardless of the length of the period  
                                                 
1  R. v. Steeves, [1998] B.C.J. No. 3151 (BC Prov. Ct.) at para 12-15, expert witness testimony of Dr. 
Diane Fast, cited in R. v. M.L., [2000] S.J. No. l7 at para. 34. 
2 Ibid. at para. 15 (Steeves).   
3 R. v. M.(B.), [2003] SKPC 83 (Sask. Prov. Youth Ct.) at para. 43-44, citing A. P. Streissguth, A.P., Fetal 
Alcohol Syndrome:  A Guide for Families and Communities (Toronto:  Brookes Publishing, 1997) at 238-
243. 
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of incarceration, making recidivism rates high for this population.4  The sentencing 
principle of deterrence does not function well for individuals whose ability to appreciate  
consequences is limited.5  Statistics demonstrate repeatedly the disproportionately high 
rates of incarceration of Aboriginal people,6 with fetal alcohol conditions a concomitant 
factor.7   
 
It should be clarified that fetal alcohol is not solely an Aboriginal, but a global problem, 
found particularly where populations have been subjected to damaging effects of 
colonization or globalization, including grinding poverty.8  Significantly, individuals 
with fetal alcohol conditions are highly susceptible to negative peer influences which 
carceral situations present, as well as being, in such setting, vulnerable to 
victimization.9  Such factors render carceral situations, artificial settings removed from 
the natural world, inappropriate for them.     
                                                 
4 Conry J. and Fast, D.  Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and the Criminal Justice System (BC Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome Resource Society:  Vancouver, c2000) at 104.     
5 R. v. M.L, [2000] S.J. No. 17 (Sask. Youth Ct.), at para.46b. 
6Canada Centre for Justice Statistics, Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, retrieved July 30, 2003, from the 
World Wide Web:  http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/85F0033MIE/85F0033MIE01001.pdf. 
7 Supra note 1, at 2 (Steeves & M.L.) citing Streissguth et al’s (1996) longitudinal American study of fetal 
alcohol affected youth, which found that 60% of the cohort aged 12 years or older had experienced 
trouble with the law;  National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), “Strategic Plan to 
Address Health Disparities,” (Bethseda, Maryland:  Feb. 8, 2001): “Children with FAS often develop 
behavior problems that increase their risk of becoming involved with the Criminal Justice System.”  
8 Tait, C. L., Aboriginal Health Research Team, National Network of Aboriginal Mental Health Research,  
“Fetal Alcohol Syndrome among Canadian Aboriginal Peoples:  Review and Analysis of the 
Intergenerational Links to Residential Schools,” (Montreal, Quebec:  Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 
2002), at 113-117; and Gibson, F.  Home is My Road (Toronto:  Playwrights Canada Press, pending 
2003).  First produced in 2003 at Toronto’s Factory Theatre Mainspace, April 12 to May 11, 2003, and 
the topic of a CBC radio interview with author, Florence Gibson, April 15, 2003, 10:00 p.m. on “Between 
the Covers”. 
9 Supra note 4 at 69-71(Conry & Fast); and United States v. Lee, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5967, No. 97-
2830, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  In Lee, a “vulnerable-victim enhancement to 
sentence” was applied to an offender who plead guilty to sexually abusing a minor.  The offender “knew 
or should have know that the victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to … mental condition,” 
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 3A1.1(b)(1997). The victim of the sexual abuse had fetal 
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 Further, in comparing carceral and community-based options, there is a cost factor to 
consider.  Keeping one youth out of a correctional facility saves $46,000 per year; and 
keeping one child out of foster care saves $16,000 per year.  A child with fetal alcohol 
syndrome costs an estimated $1.5 million over its lifetime.10  Cost of prenatal to age 
three intervention programs, such as the Manitoba “Stop FAS Program,” is but $3400 
per woman.11   On the bases of the cost factors and the previous discussion, one can 
tentatively conclude that not only are community-based intervention programs less 
costly, they are also likely to be more effective in terms of their outcomes, than are 
carceral options.  Therefore, it cannot be deemed reasonable, from a cost-benefit 
analysis, to persist with the status quo. 
 
Although it is true that community-based intervention is generally considered more 
effective than incarceration by experts in the field, there is a gap in the research related 
to the effectiveness of particular community-based interventions.12  What works best, 
and how to implement such effective interventions for individuals with fetal alcohol 
conditions is not fully determined.  Appropriate interventions per se will be likely topics 
of future qualitative study.  The present thesis investigates threshold topics to the noted 
                                                                                                                                               
alcohol syndrome and was unusually vulnerable for her age.  The offender was sentenced to 21 months 
imprisonment and two years supervised release, which was affirmed on appeal.  
10 Streissguth, A. P., Aase, J.M., Clarren, S.K., Randels, S.P., LaDue, R.A. and Smith, D.F. “Fetal 
Alcohol Syndrome in Adolescents and Adults.” (1991) 165  JAMA, 1961-1967. 
11 Ridd, D., Manitoba Health, Pregnant Addicted Women:  Manitoba’s Experience, ‘”Stop FAS:  Cost 
Savings”  (3rd Annual Face Roundtable, FAS:  When the Children Grow Up, Sept. 9, 2002, accessed 
September 30, 2002,  http://www.knowtv.com). 
12 Streissguth,  A. P.   Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, A Guide for Families and Communities (Toronto: 
Brookes Publishing Co., 2001), at 279. 
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future qualitative study, including legal, ideological, historical, and policy issues that 
are impediments to community-based treatment.  The thesis culminates in an analysis of 
potential avenues to mandate such treatment through the courts, or alternatively or in 
addition, through the avenue of policy reform.  Only when community-based treatments 
become more extant can conclusive empirical analyses of their effectiveness take place. 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Ideological and Historical Roots of Law and Justice,  
Including Post-Colonial and Restorative Perspectives13
 
 
Conceptions of the very nature of law and justice can differ from one society to another, 
and in turn, influence the lives of its citizenry, especially those most marginalized and 
vulnerable to the imposition of sanctions.  The nature of the system of law and justice 
conceived could itself be a barrier to the implementation of community-based treatment 
of offenders with fetal alcohol conditions. As the British-based system of criminal law 
evolved, such barriers developed in a number of ways.    
 
For example, a movement occurred a millennium ago, in such system of law, away 
from customary rules that dealt with any wrongdoing at the community level, to more 
                                                 
13 This section, pages 4-9 is an abridgement of a 40-page unpublished paper submitted to Professor M. 
Benson for the Graduate Legal Theory Seminar, December, 2001, entitled “Criminal Justice Paradigms, 
Centralization of Power and Relativity of Values:  Historical and Ideological Origins, and Continuing 
Dialectic.” 
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centralized, bureaucratic systems that viewed crime not as a civil wrong, to be redressed 
by compensation, but rather as a wrong against the king and later the state, a  
public wrong, subject to punishment.14  Public wrong was eventually conceived of as 
deserving of penitentiary time, separating the wrongdoer from his or her roots in the 
community.15  Eventual reintegration therein was not viewed with much concern.16   
Moreover, in the main, laws were no longer natural laws, evolving from the collective 
experience of the community, but, rather, were artificial and arbitrary, so-called positive 
laws, selected and imposed by the authority of the central state.17  
 
Hobbesian theory, the precursor of the “western, liberal, rational enlightenment,”18  
provided the underlying ideology for the evolution of the centralized state and 
                                                 
14 Cayley, D.  The Expanding Prison, the Crisis in Crime and Punishment and the Search for 
Alternatives, (Toronto:  House of Ansansi Press Limited, 1998) at 167-9. 
15 Supra note 14 at 137-140 (Cayley).  Penitentiaries were instituted in Christian monasteries in the 
Middle-Ages where solitary confinement was imposed on monks who broke their vows; it was 
considered a penance or earthly atonement for sin or for defiance in breaking the Church’s laws, and thus 
the name, penitentiary.        
16 Ibid. at 137-140. (Cayley) 
17 Austin, J.  Lectures on Jurisprudence, or, The Philosophy of Positive Law, abridged from the larger 
work by Robert Campbell (London:  J. Murray, 1909) at 106; and Kelsen, H. General Theory of Norms, 
translated by Michael Hartney (Oxford, Eng. Clarendon Press, c. 1991.) at 58.  Positivists like Austin and 
Kelsen concerned themselves solely with what law “is,” not what law “ought to be”.  As positive laws 
had no absolute basis, moral or otherwise, relativity of values emerged.  Taken to the extreme, under the 
notion of positivism and relativity of values, Nazi laws, selected and imposed by the state, although 
reprehensible, were legitimate laws.   
18 Honderik, T., Ed. (The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1995, 
at 236-7, Enlightenment, and at 483, Liberalism.  The Age of Enlightenment or the Age of Reason 
which arose in Western Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, contrasts with the religious (sometimes 
superstitious), customary ideals and traditions of the Middle Ages.  Hobbes wrote his famous Leviathan 
in the aftermath of the English Civil War, Cromwell’s successful rebellion against Stuart King Charles I.  
Rather than engaging in endless religious wars and prosecutions, under the enlightenment, man was urged 
to employ his reason to become truly free from past authorities.  Liberalism is the ideology that attaches 
great importance to individual liberties to pursue one’s own values (such as life, liberty, and property) as 
long as they do not intrude on another person’s corresponding rights.  These replaced the web of mutual 
obligations which bound people together in ethnic, religious or other communities, and substituted 
individualism and competition.  Alienation and crime may be evidence of a resultant lack of social 
supports. 
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positivism or state-made law, denuded of an intrinsic morality, with only force to 
legitimate it.19  Hobbes contrasted the ”modern” civil state to the anarchic state of 
nature,20 commencing the dichotomy of civilized and savage, the “other” whom it was 
permissible to dominate,21 as happened through the colonization process.22  Locke, in 
turn, recognized three natural rights, life, liberty and property, otherwise freeing 
individuals to choose their ends in a self-interested manner.  The state purportedly was 
to select, in a neutral manner, the minimum of laws which would apply to everyone.23  
Implicitly, Locke’s model tends to benefit competitive, aggressive, acquisitive 
individuals more than those with communal values of sharing.24  Those whose values 
                                                 
19 Hobbes, T. Leviathan [1651], Edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
at 121-129.   
20 Ibid. at 89-90.  According to Hobbes, man in the state of nature (including the Aboriginal of North 
America) is savage and violent, in a constant state of warfare and disorder, a “war of everyman against 
everyman.”  Without a strong central government, people would live in a state of anarchy and 
depradation.  Property would not be secure and civilization would not progress. 
21 Hegel, G. W.F.  The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller, with analysis of the text and 
forward by Findlay, J.N. (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1977) at 124.  Hegel maintained that the strategy of 
opposites diminishes and oppresses both parts of the duality, whether it be self/other, master/slave, or 
civilized/savage.  For instance, in the master/slave dichotomy, both are diminished as the master becomes 
dependent on the slave and the slave, in turn, is subjugated to the will of the master.   
22 Memmi, A.  The Colonizer and the Colonized, trans. by Greenfield, H. (New York: Orion Press, 1965) 
at 126.  A similar relationship exists between the master/slave and colonizer/colonized; one dominates 
and one is subjugated, and in the process both are diminished. 
23 Locke J., Two Treatises on Government [1689], Ed. By Laslett, P. (Cambridge, U.K.:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1965), Book II, at c. 8, paras. 95 and 106.  Locke’s ideology is thought to underpin the 
American Revolution of 1775-1783 and the resultant republican constitution of 1789. 
24 Fuller, L.L., The Morality of Law, Revised Edition (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1969) at 181-
186. Communal values of sharing are addressed by Lon Fuller.  According to Fuller, communities are 
based on shared values and purposes, which form the law in and for that community, and give that law 
“an inner morality;” Unger, R. M. Knowledge and Politics (New York, N.Y.: 1984) 236-295.   Roberto 
Unger proposed “organic groups” (groups bound by shared values and face-to-face consensus, with a 
natural harmony between the needs for community and autonomy).  Such groups are based on Fuller’s 
concept of shared values, but lack the domination that traditionally occurs in communitarian societies;   
Henderson, J.S.Y., “First Nations Legal Inheritances in Canada:  The Mikmaq Model,” (1996) 23 Man. L. 
J., 1-31. Sakej Henderson asserts that prior to colonization, traditional, Aboriginal communities were 
organic communities, based on shared values (such as peace, kindness, sharing and trust) and principles 
of non-domination.  In contrast to some communitarian societies, Aboriginal communities governed 
themselves on a consensual basis.  Alienation from the community was rare.  Problems were dealt with 
face to face, in an inclusive context, with an emphasis on healing and reconciliation, not punishment.  
Restorative justice, as we now conceive it, had its roots in such traditional, Aboriginal communities;  
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differ from the dominant culture are more likely to be marginalized and to suffer legal 
sanctions such as incarceration.25  Both Hobbes and Locke conceived an apocryphal 
model of state authority, theorizing that citizens gave up some power to enter social 
contracts forming civil states which would create law and order, and by so doing, 
protect citizens and avoid the anarchy of the state of nature.26
 
 
The retributive model of justice suited the needs of centralized states as it provided a 
uniform and efficient manner of dominating widespread and diverse populations, 
through force and spectacles of punishment which were to deter all citizens.27  Kant, 
Hegel, Hart and others ideologically justified this view of punishment.   Kant and Hegel 
saw crime as absolute wrong that had to be atoned for or annulled by punishment.28  
Hart tempered this harsh view, holding that punishment was justified, but only were the 
                                                                                                                                               
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples:  Special Report,  Bridging the Cultural 
Divide: A Report on Aboriginal People in the Criminal Justice System, Part I, Aboriginal Concepts of 
Law and Justice—The Historical Realities (Ottawa:  Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at  1-25.  Oral 
evidence is presented by Aboriginal groups of early traditions of restorative justice practices in their 
communities; and Roche, D.  Accountability in Restorative Justice (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
c2003), at p. 2 and 12-13.  Declan Roche presents a similar, less utopian view of early indigenous 
communities and their restorative justice practices.  He acknowledges the positive aspects, but includes a 
cautionary note as regards the need for internal and external accountability mechanisms.  According to 
Roche, accountability is critical as community-based, restorative justice practices have the potential to 
become punitive and stigmatizing, rather than forgiving and reconciling. 
25 Kennedy, D., A Critique of Adjudication (fin de siecle) (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University Press, 1997) at 224-226. The state and the courts hold an implicit value system evident in the 
types of laws they legislate, adjudicate or enforce, and thereby privilege some individuals, giving them 
power over others.  Not value-free after all, Locke’s positivistic laws tend to empower one group over 
another, creating social stratification, of which disproportionate incarceration rates are a reflection. 
26 Supra at notes 19 and 23. (Hobbes and Locke) 
27 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison, trans. By Alan Sheridan (New York:  
Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 1996) at 3-6l. 
28 Kant, I. Philosophy of Law, trans. W. Hastie (Clifton, N.J. and Edinburgh:  Augustus M. Kelly, 1974) 
at 195-198; and Hegel, G. W. F., Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M.Knox (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1952) 
at 69. 
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offender responsible, acting voluntarily and possessing the necessary mental element.29  
However, rather than favouring punishment, in the view of the present writer, it would 
be more ideologically consistent to systems of positive or pure law which lack absolute 
values, to conceive wrongdoing as breaching the social contract and, therefore, subject 
to contractual remedies such as damages or specific performance. 
 
Restorative justice, in a community context, is proposed as a way of recapturing the best 
of what has been lost from the context of customary, community-based law and as a 
means of undoing the alienation and recycling of crime that seems a legacy of a 
retributive approach.30  Paradoxically, restorative justice is based more on contractual 
                                                 
29 Hart, H. L.  Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1968) at 44, 183-4, and 152.  
For example, the objection to punishment for wrongful actions undertaken while sleepwalking, even if 
such punishment were to promote overall deterrence of crime, is that such punishment is grossly unjust to 
the genuine sleepwalker who happens while asleep to inadvertently break the law.  It is unjust to punish 
those who have not voluntarily broken the law:  “What is crucial is that those whom we punish should 
have had, when they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental for doing what the law requires 
and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities.  Where these 
capacities and opportunities are absent, as they are in different ways in the varied causes of accident, 
mistake, paralysis, reflex action, coercion, insanity, etc., the moral protest is that it is morally wrong to 
punish because ‘he could hot have helped it’ or ‘he could not have done otherwise’ or ‘he had no real 
choice.’ “(p. 152) 
30 Supra note 14 at 170-175 (Cayley).  One format for dispute resolution in restorative justice is the 
consensual circle, where everyone has a chance to be heard, in an unhurried, caring community 
atmosphere.   The circle may include the offender, victim, family members, friends, neighbours, police, 
elders, as well as representatives from school, social services, health and justice.  The complete story of 
the offender, the victim, the entire circumstances of the offence and the involvement of the community 
come to light.  Responsibility can be taken for harm done to others, apologies proferred, plans made to 
make amends to the victim, and critically, approaches discussed to reintegrate the offender into the 
community.  Community support is offered where needed.  The success of the model depends on holistic 
implementation; if a healing or sentencing circle is appropriated and used outside an inclusive community 
structure, it is less likely to succeed.  This model has been partially implemented in family conferences 
for young offenders in New Zealand, and in diversion programs in Canada and Scandinavia; and Roche, 
D. Accountability in Restorative Justice (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, c 2003) at 2.  More recently, 
according to Roche, restorative justice approaches have expanded into the United States, Europe, 
Australia, South Africa, Argentina, Papua New Guinea, and Singapore (p. 6).  However, Roche 
emphasizes as a cautionary note that accountability issues, both internal and external, be addressed for 
restorative justice programs, as such community-based forms of justice have become, on occasion, in 
earlier times, and more currently, vigilante groups (p. 2 and p. 12-13).   
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remedies than is the retributive justice resorted to under the ideological legacy of social 
contractarians. 
 
Principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code31 reflect both the retributive and 
restorative approaches.  Implementation of restorative approaches is impeded by the 
legacy of retribution and consequential breakdown in traditional community structures.  
No longer tolerable in a post-colonial era,32 the legitimacy of positivism and retribution 
wanes in favour of more pluralistic approaches which emphasize social justice for all 
classes, races and cultures, including those individuals that may be disabled. 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Historical Origins of Alcohol Use Among the Aboriginal Populations of 
Western Canada33
 
A discussion of fetal alcohol conditions, and the resultant problems of Aboriginal 
peoples in Western Canada who suffer disproportionately from such conditions, cannot 
be undertaken properly in an ideological-historical vacuum.  Consideration must be 
                                                 
31 Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 718 and 718.2. 
32 The colonial age is contemporaneous with the age of discovery and empire-building engaged in by 
European nation states.  Indigenous peoples the world over were exploited and subjugated by the 
European colonizers. Post-colonialists contest the premises of superiority on which colonization was 
based, and attempt to repair the harm done by colonization. 
33 Section 1.3, “Historical Origins of Alcohol Use Among the Aboriginal Populations of Western 
Canada,” and Section 1.4 “The Treaty Alcohol Ban, pages 10-30, were submitted originally to Professor 
N. Zlotkin for the Advanced Native and Aboriginal Law 801.3, January, 2002, as a part of an unpublished 
paper entitled “Charter, Treaty, and Constitutional Solutions Proposed as Remedies to Obtain 
Interdisciplinary, Non-Carceral Treatment for FAS/E Offender.”  Editing, revision and extension of these 
sections have been undertaken.  
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taken of European colonization and related influences over these Aboriginal peoples.  
The colonial age is contemporaneous with historical events of the 16th through the 19th 
century.  European colonizers used their enlightenment ideology, albeit unconsciously, 
to justify acting in a self-interested manner under state sanction, while harming and 
exploiting Indigenous Peoples beyond Europe.  A vehicle by which this self-interest 
was pursued was the North American whiskey trade.  The whiskey trade may have 
affected all peoples of the west, and perhaps all of North America, promoting a culture 
of consumption, and increasing the power of the liquor cartel.34  Colonization itself has 
been aptly described in the following passage penned by a Western Canadian scholar: 
Colonization refers to an actual historic process which occurred before, during 
and after England asserted sovereignty over various areas in Canada.  It refers 
to the actual dispossession of land, and the imposition of one legal system over 
another, the amalgamation of autonomous political entities and gradual 
assimilation of the colonized.  It is the continual process of “bringing into 
subjection or subjugation” people who are living in a territory being colonized 
by Europeans.35
 
 
Post-colonial thinkers emphasize today’s need for decolonization, the political and 
cultural liberation of peoples formerly colonized by European powers.  They contest the 
premises on which colonization was based, including Eurocentric and racist 
misconceptions that Aboriginal societies were less “advanced” than those of western 
Europe.  Aboriginal peoples, viewed as the savage “other”, at the periphery of culture or 
civilization, were considered dependent on the superior culture of western Europe, seen 
by its emissaries as the centre and apex of human development, diffusing or spreading 
                                                 
34 The power of the liquor cartel may be seen today in the resistance to product warning labels in Canada,  
inadequate funding for prevention of addictions and fetal alcohol conditions, and lack of funding for 
treatment of individuals with fetal alcohol conditions, all of which could mitigate the ravages caused by 
alcohol. 
35 Bell, C.  “Metis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1),” (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. (No. 1) 180, at 9. 
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progress and civilization to that periphery.  Forced dependency on the colonizer left 
Aboriginal peoples largely deprived of their languages and culture.  Thus marginalized, 
such victims of colonialism became alienated and powerless.  Assimilation, 
appropriation and extermination were common practices of the colonizers.36  Such 
practices have produced the intergenerational trauma of residential schools, alcohol 
abuse, poverty, dislocation, family and community breakdown, and cultural genocide, 
rendering Aboriginal peoples vulnerable to encounters with a retributive justice system, 
and subject to state sanctions such as imprisonment.37    
Much of the history of the 19th century whiskey trade in the north western plains of  
North America aptly exemplifies colonization and its effects on Aboriginal peoples.   
In treaties negotiated during this period, Indian peoples eventually attempted to include 
redress for the problems that colonization had created among their peoples.  These two 
divergent threads, one colonial is nature (the whiskey trade), one post-colonial (the 
treaties), will be traced through the following historical analyses. 
 
Distilled alcohol was introduced into the north west plains on a large scale during the 
whiskey trade of the mid- to late- 19th century.  Before this, liquor had been used since  
                                                 
36 Blaut, J. M., The Colonizer’s Model of the World:  Geographical Duffusionism and Eurocentric 
History (New York:  Guilford Press, 1993).   
37Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.  Special Report, Bridging the Cultural 
Divide, Part 2,Current Realities:  The Failure of the Justice System; The Root Causes of Over-
Representation and Aboriginal Crime (Ottawa:  Supply and Services Canada, 1996), 39-53, at 47-52;  
R. v. Fleury, [1998] S.J. No. 538, citing the expert evidence of Dr. John Hylton, including various 
documents such as The Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, Aboriginal Over-
Representation; The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Injustice Personified-
Aboriginal Over-Representation; and the Saskatchewan Indian Justice Review Committee, Social and 
Economic Indicators, at paras. 15-17.   
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the 1600-1700s as part of ceremonial trading rites at coastal trading forts termed 
“factories.”  When the fur trade moved inland along the rivers, liquor was used to trade 
with designated band members.  As early as 1821, when it merged with the North West 
Company after years of cutthroat competition involving prodigious use of liquor as a 
trade good, the Hudson’s Bay Company had adopted an official policy prohibiting the 
sale of liquor to Indian people, a policy adopted because of adverse experience with the 
evils of alcohol abuse by American Indians.  Pivotal events affecting the development 
of the large scale use of distilled alcohol occurred between l863-1870.  In 1863, 
Hudson’s Bay Company partners, long absorbed in the fur trade, sold their shares to 
investors interested in land sales and railroad exploration.  By 1870, after years of 
negotiations, these new owners of the Hudson’s Bay Company had sold Rupert’s Land 
(which included all land north of the American border draining into Hudson Bay) to the 
Canadian government.38  For a time during and after these events, there was a vacuum 
of authority in Rupert’s Land, as Canada was a small country, relatively unprepared to 
deal with this vast, undeveloped territory.    
 
With asserting jurisdiction problematic, Canadian surveyors arrived in 1869 in the Red 
River area of Rupert’s Land.   Metis39 settlers became concerned regarding security of 
title to their plots of land which extended several miles back from narrow river 
frontages.  Little was done to alleviate these suspicions.  The resultant Red River  
                                                 
38Kennedy, M. A. The Whiskey Trade of the Northwestern Plains, A Multidisciplinary study (Peter Lang: 
New York, 1997) at p. 12. 
39 Ibid. at 17.  Whenever and wherever the fur trade was active, children of European and Native mixed-
blood ancestry appeared.  The term ‘Metis’ is used to refer to all such mixed-blood people, although 
French ancestry was most common, English, Scottish, Irish, German, and other Europeans also took 
native partners. 
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Rebellion, led by Louis Riel, culminated in the Manitoba Act, 1870.  The Canadian 
northwest, other than the provinces of B.C. created in 1871 and postage-stamp 
Manitoba carved out in 1870, was left as the North West Territories under federal 
suzerainty, until after the turn of the twentieth century.  Treaties 1 and 2 signed by the 
Government of Canada in 1871 with the Indians of Manitoba,40 were followed by 
others involving lands farther west.   Scrip was issued to some Metis to extinguish their 
Aboriginal title, if they did not wish to accept treaty and live as Indians on reserves of 
land set aside for their use.  However, unscrupulous land speculators were able to 
exploit many Metis for their scrip, leaving them landless and poor.41   Some Metis 
sought a new life, moving to the North Saskatchewan River in the l870’s near present 
day Batoche, recreating their long river plots, and, as much as possible, the way of life 
of Red River.42   
 
With the advent of steamers on the upper Missouri in the 1830’s, transportation of large 
quantities of buffalo robes to eastern U.S. markets became for the first time 
                                                 
40 Morris, A., Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, Facsimile 
reprint of the 1880 edition published in Toronto by Belfords & Clarke, (Saskatoon:  Fifth House 
Publishers, 1991), at 313 and 316.  Treaty No. 1 was signed on August 3, at Lower Fort Garry, with the 
Chippewa and Swampy Cree.  Treaty No. 2 was signed on August 21, at Manitoba Post with the 
Chippewa.  
41 Giraud, M. “The Western Metis After the Insurrection,” Vol. II, No. 2 Saskatchewan History, 1-15, at 
2.4, translated by C. M. Chesney, from the book Le Metis Canadien. Son role dans l’historie des 
provinces de l’Ouest (Paris: 1945). Giraud was a professor or history at the College de France in Paris.  
His book is based on exhaustive examination of Hudson’s Bay Company materials, church archives, and 
public records in Canada, Great Britain, and France.  In addition Professor Giraud visited all the chief 
Metis settlements in the Prairie Provinces, gathering information on social conditions as they existed 
before World War II.     
42 Giraud, M. “Metis Settlement in the North-west Territories,” Vol. II, No. 1 Saskatchewan History, 1-16 
at 1-11, translated by C.M. Chesney from the book Le Metis Canadien. Son role dans  l’historie des 
provinces de l’Ouest (Paris: 1945).  
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economically feasible.43 The York boats and canoes of the Hudson’s Bay Company 
oriented to the beaver trade via Hudson Bay could not compete well with these 
steamers.   
 
Indeed, at first the Hudson’s Bay Company had little desire to enter this trade in buffalo 
robes.  It was when, contemporaneously, the popularity of silk hats reduced the demand 
for beaver felt for European hat production that all traders became oriented less to the 
beaver and more to the bison of the plains, away from the rivers and hills of the Shield 
and the western mountains, where the Hudson’s Bay Company, as well as the American 
Fur Trade Company beaver posts, had been built.  These changes in the fur trade meant 
overall that the position of the large, old companies deteriorated in the competition with 
the flexible, independent entrepreneurs termed “free traders.”44   
 
Taking advantage of the vacuum of authority left in the wake of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company sale of its fur monopoly and its rights of governance in Rupert’s Land, 
American traders, mobile, entrepreneurial, and in some cases unscrupulous, moved 
north from Fort Benton, Montana territory, in the early 1870s, glad to escape 
jurisdiction of American law.45 Metis middle men from Red River and Montana roamed 
the plains of the N.W.T. in their Red River carts, either hunting themselves or trading 
                                                 
43 Supra note 38, at p. 5-6.  (Margaret Kennedy) 
44 Ibid. at p. 8. 
45 Ibid. at p. 25 and 41. The U.S. government had passed the Intercourse Act in 1834, prohibiting the 
importation of liquor into Indian Country.  In addition, the U.S. government did not want arms and 
ammunition traded to the Sioux, because of the hostilities between them and the latter’s resistance to 
moving onto reservations.  With both sides armed, the inevitable confrontation occurred at the Battle of 
the Little Bighorn in June of 1876, annihilating General George A. Custer and much of the 7th U.S. 
cavalry. 
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with Indians for cured buffalo robes.  Trains of Red River carts, some several hundred 
to a thousand long, would form for the well-organized, biannual buffalo hunts of the 
Metis.46  The late spring hunt of early origin was mainly for meat, the source of 
pemmican, although robes were also taken, whereas the robes were thicker and more 
valuable during the fall-winter hunt or hivernenant47.  American veterans from the U.S. 
civil war turned to opportunities in this buffalo robe trade, as did groups of disappointed 
miners from the 1860s Gold Rush to Helena and Virginia City, Montana.48   As Indian 
Treaties involving the Montana area had been made in 1855, 1865 and 1869, the 
confining of Indians to reservations was well underway there.  Movement to reserves 
did not begin north of the 49th parallel (the Indian’s proverbial “Medicine Line”) until 
after the buffalo disappeared around 1879-80, though treaties contemplating reserves 
had been negotiated a few years earlier.49   The focus of the traders, American and 
Canadian, then moved north to the Canadian plains where Indian hunters were more 
free-roaming, buffalo robes thicker and more numerous, and constraints of law largely 
non-existent. 
 
Alcohol (often poisonously adulturated)50 once again became a trading staple of both  
free traders and Metis.  American traders tended to have better quality, variety, and 
prices of manufactured merchandise, direct from eastern U.S. factories, than did the 
Hudson’s Bay Company and Canadian independents, including the Metis, relying on 
                                                 
46 Ibid. at. 18-19. 
47 Ibid. at 18 and 44. 
48 Ibid. at p. 9 and 20. (Whiskey Trade) 
49 Ibid. at 17. 
50 Ibid. at  98. 
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stodgy, distant British suppliers.  American traders had greater dependence on the 
Indians as hunters and hide processors than did their Canadian counterparts.   As Indian 
women did much of the painstaking work of scraping, tanning and stretching the hides, 
polygamous practices, that facilitated Indian hunters having their kill efficiently 
processed, proliferated.51  Such practices upset Christian missionaries, Fr. A. Lacombe, 
o.m.i, for example, already concerned over the horrendous impact alcohol was having 
on the Indians.52   
 
Without much law and order in the area, whiskey forts had sprung up, such as Fort 
Whoop-Up, just north of the 49th parallel, at the confluence of the Belly (now the 
Oldman) and St. Mary Rivers, in what is now southeastern Alberta. Similar forts 
proliferated in the area that is now southwestern Saskatchewan.   Liquor, the cheapest 
means of purchasing furs from the Indians, was used with abandon.  The Indians, not 
used to distilled liquor, became, in many cases, very addicted to it.  The results included 
increased drunkenness, death by freezing in the harsh winter climate, alcohol poisoning, 
family conflict, unruly tribal members that chiefs and elders could not subdue, inter-
personal violence within families and communities, increased inter-tribal hostilities 
(especially between the Cree and the Blackfoot),53 and inter-racial conflicts (especially 
between the Blackfoot and the white miner-traders), with consequent fatalities.54  
                                                 
51 Ibid. at  8-9. (Whiskey Trade) 
52 Hughes, K., Father Lacombe, The Black Robe Voyageur (Toronto:  McClelland & Stewart, 1920) at  
195-200. 
53 Supra note 38, at 14.  (Whiskey Trade) 
54 Ibid. at 39.  Jean L’Heureux, who lived and travelled with the Blackfoot as a kind of “priest,” recorded 
in his 1872 census that 89 Indians died from drunken brawls in that year alone:  three among the 
Blackfoot, 46 among the Blood, 13 among the North Peigan and 27 among the South Peigan. 
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Awareness of these troubles, notably the Cypress Hills massacre in 1873, where twenty 
members of an Assiniboine Band were ambushed and slaughtered by American 
whiskey traders and wolfers angered by theft of their horses, albeit by another tribe, 
gradually filtered to Ottawa.   Prime Minister John A. MacDonald was prompted to 
create the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) and to send them on their long trek 
west in 1873-74.55 MacDonald wanted peace in the west and treaties made with its 
Indians to free up the land.  He planned to build a transcontinental railway, to unite 
Canada and hold the west, settle it with farmers, and prevent feared American “manifest 
destiny” expansionism north of the 49th parallel.   
 
Indian leaders, in the main, although initially wary, soon accepted the NWMP in the 
hope of ending the whiskey scourge and its devastating effects upon their 
communities.56  Fort MacLeod, with Indian acquiescence in its location, and then Fort 
Walsh, were established by the NWMP to take control of the border area frequented by 
the whiskey traders.  That trade was soon eliminated.  In 1876, Sitting Bull and his 
band, pursued by American Forces, were received peacefully by NWMP Commissioner 
Walsh at Fort Walsh.  The victorious Sioux had slaughtered General Custer at the Little 
Bighorn, Montana, in June of that year.  These additional mouths to feed, as the number 
of buffalo declined, did not improve the situation north of the 49th parallel where tight-
fisted federal policies kept Indians impoverished and angry over broken promises of the 
federal government about land, farming and food. 
                                                 
55 Ibid. at 6 and 39-40.  (whiskey trade) 
56 Ibid. at 40. 
 17
 At the height of the whiskey trade and its perils, had come simultaneously both the 
smallpox plague and the rapid decline of the buffalo.  Smallpox was brought by 
increased contact with traders,57 and the decline of the buffalo through their all out 
slaughter.  The rapacious demand for buffalo robes and hides in eastern American 
markets and in Europe,58 combined with a desire in the United States to force nomadic 
tribes to reservations by eliminating their free roaming principal source of food, brought 
about this obscene slaughter.   First Nations entered into Treaties with the Crown in an 
attempt to ensure their continued survival, to deal with the problems of the whiskey 
trade and sicknesses such as smallpox, and with the passing of the buffalo, to find new 
ways of life through agriculture and education.59  Treaty No. 3 signed in 1873 at the 
North West Angle of the Lake of the Woods, had ceded 55,000 square miles of land to 
the Canadian Government.60  Treaties four, five, six and seven, covering most of the 
                                                 
57 Ibid. at 31-22.  In 1870, Oblates traveling across the plains to the south (in the South Saskatchewan 
Region) witnessed camp after camp of the dead and dying.  It was estimated that 676 Blackfoot, 630 
Blood, 1080 Peigan, 200 Sarsi, 123 Assiniboine, 468 Cree, 335 St. Albert metis, and 40 Ste. Anne metis 
had died by February, 1871, reducing native societies in the upper Saskatchewan by about 50% of their 
number.  However, the smallpox outbreak led to an end of the Cree-Blackfoot hostilities; they made 
peace after some preceding confrontations. 
58 Ibid. at 46.  Buffalo robe shipments out of Fort Benton between 1865-83 were in the tens of thousands 
per year, with 75,000 shipped in each of 1875, 1876 and 1878, indicative of the massive slaughter.  By 
1884 there were only 3000 robes to ship.  Additional robes were also shipped from Red River to St. Paul, 
Minnesota.   
59 The alcohol ban, the pestilence and medicine chest clauses, and the provisions regarding agriculture 
and education (the school house clause) were negotiated as part of Treaty 6 at the insistence of the 
Indians. 
60 Savino, V. and Schumacher,E.,  “’Whenever the Indians of the Reserve Should Desire it’”  An Analysis 
of the First Nation Treaty Right to Education,” (1992) 21 Man. L.J. 476-497 at para. 17.  Treaty No. 3, 
the North West Angle Treaty, included the Ojibway and the Saulteaux in the region north of the 49th 
parallel between Lake Superior, Lake of the Woods and Hudson’s Bay.  Also in Supra note 10 at 320-
321. (Morris) 
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Canadian west, were signed in the years 1874, 1875, 1876, and 1877 respectively,61 
transferring some 400,000 square miles of land to the Canadian government.62  Metis 
issues, including uncertainties over secure land tenure along the Saskatchewan River, 
remained largely unresolved.  The reluctance of Prime Minister MacDonald to seek 
solutions to this land conundrum contributed to the Saskatchewan Rebellion of 1885, 
the execution of Louis Riel, and subsequently the gradual dispersal and social 
disintegration of the Metis people.  It was not until the 1950’s that the Metis were to 
begin formal reorganization, a painful process that is ongoing.63      
 
For the Indians, 1885 accelerated their confinement to reserves and the marginalization 
of their way of life.  Treaty implementation stalled, and they were made subject to the 
paternalistic Indian Act, which had been enacted in 1876.64  Indian Bands were created 
and white Indian Agents appointed to administer reserves.65  Enacted under 
amendments to the Indian Act in 1884,66 anti-potlatch laws forbade many Indian 
                                                 
61 Supra note 40, at 320-375.  Treaty No. 4, the Qu’Appelle Treaty, was signed at the Qu’Appelle lakes, 
with the Cree and the Saulteaux of that area.  Treaty No. 5, The Lake Winnipeg Treaty, was signed at 
Berens River and Norway House with the Saulteaux and Swampy Cree.  Treaty No. 6 was signed at Fort 
Carlton and Fort Pitt with the Plains and Wood Cree.  Treaty No. 7, the Treaty with the Blackfeet, was 
signed in southern Alberta at the Blackfoot Crossing on the Bow River, with the Blackfeet, Blood, 
Piegan, Sarcee, Stony and other Indians of the east central range of the Rocky Mountains.   
Adhesions to Treaty No. 4 were signed in 1874 (2), including the Fort Ellice Adhesion with the 
Saulteaux, and 1875 (2).  Adhesions to Treaty 5 were signed in 1875 (2).  Adhesions to Treaty 6 were 
signed in 1877 (3), 1878 (4),1879, 1882, 1889, 1944, 1959, 1954, and 1955.  An adhesion to Treaty 7 was 
signed on Dec. 4, 1977. (Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the 
Northwest Territories, 1991) 
62 Morris, A., The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North West Territories, 1880  
(Coles Publishing Company:  Toronto, 1971) at 320-375.  
63 Supra note 41, at 1 and 6 - 9.  (Marcel Giraud, “The Western Metis After the Insurrection”)  
64 Indian Act,  S.C., 1876, c.18.  
65 Ibid. at s. 4 and s. 3(11). 
66 An Act further to amend “The Indian Act, 1880.” S.C. 1884, c. 27, s. 3. 
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ceremonies in Canada for nearly seventy years, a prohibition ending only in 1951.67  
Other repressive measures included a prohibition on raising money or retaining a lawyer 
to advance land claims,68 the “pass” laws whereby Indians required the permission of 
the Indian Agent to leave a reserve for any reason,69 an interdict on producing or selling 
goods without the permission of the Indian agent,70 and loss of status and entitlements 
for such things as receiving a university education71 or for a woman marrying a non-
Indian72 (the latter not repealed until Bill C-31 in 198573). In addition, Indians, not 
considered citizens, but rather wards of the Crown, were not allowed to vote in Federal 
elections until 1960.74  Prior to this enactment, they were subject to losing their tax 
exemption status as Indians if they voted.75  In 1970, federal government prohibitions 
against the use of alcohol by Indians were repealed.76   
  
The interplay of the intergenerational effects of alcohol and the treaty provisions  
continue today, and await full resolution.  Aboriginal alcohol consumption patterns 
continue largely unabated from their origins during the whiskey trade.77  Effects on 
health, accidents, mortality, including suicide, family breakdown, poverty, employment, 
                                                 
67 Indian Act. S.C. 1951, c. 29, s. 123.    
68 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1906, c. 81, s. 149A [en. S.C. 1926-27, c.32, s. 6]. 
69 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,  Looking Forward, Looking Back, 
vol. 1, “9.10 Pass System,” (Ottawa: The Commission, c1996) at 296, citing F. L. Barron, “The Indian 
Pass System in the Canadian West, 1882-1935,” 13 Prairie Forum no. 1  (Spring, 1988), p. 27-28.  
Although the pass system was official policy, there was never any legislative basis for it.  It arose from a 
suggestion by the Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs to Prime Minister MacDonald in 1886.   
70 Indian Act. R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, s. 40 and 41. 
71 Supra note 64, s. 86(1).   
72 Supra note 70, s. 14.   
73 Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5, s. 6(1)(c) [en. R.S.C., 1985, c. 32 (lst Supp.) s. 4]. 
74 Canada Elections Act, S.C., 1960, c. 39, s. 14. 
75 Indian Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 23, s. 14(2)(e).  Veterans were exempted from this harsh disqualification. 
76 Indian Act. R.S.C. 1970, c.I-6, s. 96 and 98.  
77 1996 NWT Alcohol and Drug Survey, NWT Bureau of Statistics, retrieved February 10, 2003 from the 
World Wide Web:   <http://www.stats.gov.nt.ca/SWtatinfo/Health/alcdrug/report.html>. 
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and alcohol teratogenicity such as fetal alcohol conditions are the results.78   Since 
colonization, Aboriginal women have been particularly adversely affected by restrictive 
and sexist legislation and policy, which has tended to differentially exclude them from 
status, band membership and governance, and concomitant benefits.79  As well, 
interference occurred with the exercise of their maternal function through residential 
schools and child protection policies.  Such devaluation often rendered them subject to 
domestic violence at home and to racism and sexism in the larger community, leaving 
them traumatized and vulnerable to alcohol abuse and addictions.80  Prevention, as 
addressed in treaty times through the alcohol ban, and continuing currently, to some 
extent, through such initiatives as education about responsible alcohol use, and 
treatment of addictions cognizant of those factors which lead women to addictions, is 
part of the solution.  Resolution of the problems of those involuntarily affected in utero 
needs to be addressed through the establishment of multidisciplinary, community-based 
treatment for offenders with fetal alcohol conditions. 
 
 
 
 
1.4  The Treaty Alcohol Ban 
                                                 
78 Health Canada, A Statistical Profile on the Health of First Nations in Canada (Ottawa, Canada:  2003), 
retrieved January 30, 2003, from the World Wide Web:  <http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/fnihb/sppa/hia/publications/statistical_profile.htm>. 
79 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples:  Perspectives and Realities, vol. 4, 
“Chapter 2:  Women’s Perspectives,” (Ottawa:  Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 21-53. 
80 Ibid. at 62-71, and Supra note 148, retrieved October 25, 2003, from the World Wide Web:   
<http://www.pwhce.ca/sharing.htm>.  
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 Treaty rights recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,81 
particularly the alcohol ban, present potential solutions to acquiring access to 
interdisciplinary, community-based treatment for individuals with fetal alcohol 
conditions who are also beneficiaries of the relevant treaties containing this provision.   
The avenues of potential impact of constitutionally protected treaty clauses include:  
policy reform and legal redress, on their own merits, or as contextual factors in s. 15(1) 
Charter82 analysis.  The last avenue will be considered in Chapter Three of this thesis 
through a contextual analysis of s. 15(1) Charter rights.  Other treaty rights, such as the 
medicine chest and the pestilence and famine clause (restricted to the text of Treaty No. 
6) and the education clause (found in various forms in Treaties No. 1 through 10) may 
be applicable in terms of fashioning interdisciplinary treatment programs in health, 
social services and special education for individuals with fetal alcohol conditions who 
are beneficiaries of the relevant treaties containing these clauses.   However, the full 
application of the medicine chest, pestilence and famine, and education clauses await 
significant adjudication as to their scope and extent.   
 
                                                 
81 Being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11. 
82 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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Because of the risks attending treaty litigation83 and the paucity of explicit 
constitutional remedies provided,84 it is deemed at this time more practical to pursue 
breach of relevant Charter rights, such as s. 15, to obtain noncarceral treatment 
remedies for offenders with fetal alcohol conditions.  The broad, discretionary remedies 
provided in s. 24(1) of the Charter seem more effective for non-statutory breaches.  
Moreover, anyone (including Metis and non-Aboriginal claimants)) whose rights under 
the Charter have been infringed or denied, may apply to a Court of competent 
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances, whereas treaty rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act are limited to 
those with treaty status under the relevant provisions.  Section 24(1) Charter remedies 
in the past have included inter alia:  stays, reduced sentences, costs, damages, 
declarations, directions, injunctions and mandamus.   Treaty rights can be used as a 
point of negotiation, to fashion a policy argument, or to provide the context of a Charter 
analysis, but unless a statutory breach is involved, and a strong case exists, the risks of 
                                                 
83 R. v. Badger [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 (the Sparrow doctrine of infringement-justification applies to treaty 
rights as well as aboriginal rights); R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (laws which define the extent of a 
right are not subject to justification, but rather are subject to unilateral Crown regulation:  e.g. the right of 
the Mikmaw to fish was restricted in definition by the Crown to the right to fish commercially and that 
right was further limited in definition to a moderate level of livelihood); and  R. v. Mitchell [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 911; and R. v. Benoit [2003] FCA 236 (in both Mitchell and Benoit, the trial judges were found on 
appeal by the Crown to have misapprehended or overlooked material viva voce and historical evidence.  
Palpable and overriding errors of fact occurred and thus the decisions favouring First Nations were 
reversed for insufficient evidence).  Even though oral evidence is admissible, it is to be subject to 
objective standards of reliability, corroboration and critical scrutiny, circumscribing the usefulness of the 
testimony of elders required to establish the full meaning of treaty rights such as the medicine chest, 
alcohol ban and school house clause. 
84 An explicit constitutional remedy is provided under s. 52 of the Constitution Act in the case of statutory 
breaches, where impugned statutory provisions are declared of no force and effect to the extent of their 
inconsistency with s. 35 rights.  In the case of FASDS, however, no such statutory provisions are 
involved; rather, it is a matter of the Crown not applying positively the constitutionally protected treaty 
rights to provide community-based treatment for individuals with FASDS.  
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more restrictive court interpretation of a treaty right and paucity of remedies limit the 
usefulness of pure treaty litigation in the present judicial climate.  
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, the alcohol ban is a broadly-based treaty clause 
which has been adjudicated recently at the appellate level (appeal to the Supreme Court 
denied), and is at the crux of the causal factor for fetal alcohol conditions.  A similarly 
worded alcohol ban is included in the text of the numbered treaties one through six, 
inclusive, encompassing the geographic areas of Manitoba, the southern half of 
Saskatchewan, the midsection of Alberta, and the southwestern portion of Ontario.85   
However, by the signing of Treaty No. 7, Crown assimilative practices prevailed, and 
the alcohol ban in the treaty text was discontinued then and thereafter.   Treaty No. 6 
also included inter alia a medicine chest clause, relief in the event of famine or 
pestilence, and an education clause.  This was part of the “bounty and benevolence” 
promised to the Indians of the Treaty 6 area, in order, not only to acquire their consent 
to surrender to the Crown 121,000 square miles of Aboriginal title land in present day 
Alberta and Saskatchewan, for the purposes of immigration and settlement, but also to 
ensure the peace and good will of the Indians in this territory when the settlers did 
arrive.86
 
                                                 
85 Reiter, R.  The Law of Canadian Indian Treaties (Edmonton, Alberta:  Juris Analytica Publishing Inc., 
1995), p. 29-212. 
86 Ibid. at 87.  (Preamble to Treaty No. 6.) 
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In R. v. Wolfe,87 Jackson J.A., had occasion, in the context of a sale of wildlife sting 
operation,88 to examine the historical background to the alcohol ban on reserves 
enumerated under Treaty  No. 6,  as well as to rule on its current, substantive meaning.  
The clause in Treaty No. 6 establishing the alcohol ban provides: 
Her Majesty further agrees with Her said Indians that within the boundary of 
Indian Reserves, until otherwise determined by Her Government of the 
Dominion of Canada, no intoxicating liquor should be allowed to be introduced 
or sold, and all laws now in force, or hereafter to be enacted, to preserve her 
Indian subjects inhabiting the reserves or living elsewhere within Her 
Northwest Territories from the evil influence of the use of intoxicating liquors 
shall be strictly enforced.[Italics added.]89
 
An expert historical witness, Dr. John Elgin Foster, testified regarding relevant 
circumstances of the signing of Treaty No. 6, along the lines previously discussed in 
pages 10-20.    When Treaty No. 6 was concluded in 1876, not only were its reserves to  
be “dry”, but Indians were not allowed to receive or to purchase alcohol in any form.90  
Whether this prohibition exists off-reserve, as well as on-reserve is not known, as the 
geographic scope of the treaty alcohol ban as yet has not been fully adjudicated.  The 
issue was not squarely raised by the fact situation in Wolfe, which transpired solely on 
the Onion Lake Reserve.  For the purposes of the present analysis, the conservative 
assumption is made, pursuant to the fact situation in Wolfe, that the treaty alcohol ban is 
limited to on-reserve consumption.   
                                                 
87 [1995] S.J. No. 502 (Sask. C.A.); [1995] S.C.C.A. No. 487 (leave to appeal dismissed).  (Wolfe)  
88 In wildlife sting operations, undercover conservation officers attempt to induce Indian hunters to 
illegally sell their wild meat, and subsequently charge them.   In Wolfe, alcohol was part of the sting or 
inducement used by the undercover agents.    
89 Supra note 40. Treaty No. 6 Between Her Majesty the Queen and the Plain and Wood Cree Indians and 
Other Tribes of Indians at Fort Carlton, Fort Pitt and Battle River Adhesions.  Treaty No. 6 was signed on 
August 23, 28, and September 7, 1876, with adhesions signed in 1877, 1878, 1879, 1882, 1889, 1944, 
1950, 1954 and 1955 by the Cree, Assiniboine and Dene Nations. 
90 Ibid. at para. 40.   
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 The Court of Appeal in Wolfe held that, regardless of changes in the Indian Act and the 
introduction of Band by-laws, there was no change in the Crown’s treaty obligation 
regarding the alcohol ban.91  It is not uncommon for a band in the Treaty 6 area (and 
other treaty areas) to enact a by-law under section 85.1(1) of the Indian Act in addition 
to the Treaty provision banning alcohol.  Whatever effect the by-laws have and whether 
or not they are enforced, as Madam Justice Jackson held in Wolfe, such by-laws do not 
impair the full force and effect of the Treaty ban.92
 
Evidence was presented in Wolfe of the pandemic of alcohol problems among Indian 
people.93  The alcohol abuse that led to the insertion in the nineteenth century of the 
alcohol ban provision continues to be significant, contributing to poor health, accidents, 
and criminogenic statistics.94 Ryan Rempel, in his “1995 Survey of Decisions of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal” at p. 25, commented as follows: 
Given the history of the treaty obligation and the current conditions on the 
reserve, the treaty breach was a serious one.  Alcohol had played a considerable 
role in the investigation.  No major trafficking ring had been uncovered, and the 
fines imposed were likely to be served by time in jail.  The Court concluded 
that this all amounted to an affront to fair play and decency that was 
disproportionate to society’s interest in the prosecution of the cases.95
 
The Court decided, through the interaction of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and 
Treaty No. 6, absent access to the Charter remedy under s. 24(1) of a stay of 
                                                 
91 Ibid. at paras. 43-44. 
92 Supra note 87 at para. 44.  (Wolfe) 
93 Supra note 87 at paras. 45-46. (Wolfe) 
94 Ibid. at paras. 47-51. (Wolfe) 
95 (1996), 60 Sask. L. Rev. l. 
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proceedings for the Indian hunter-traffickers, to grant a common law stay for charges 
under the Wildlife Act.96   A similar common law stay had been used in the context a 
provincial wildlife act, in R. v. Horseman,97 in a situation where serious unfairness 
otherwise would have resulted.   
 
Applying Wolfe, the full implications of the Treaty No. 6 alcohol ban seem to imply that 
it would be illegal for the Crown to provide alcohol to the signatories of the Treaty or to 
their descendants on the reserve.   However, Lt. Governor Morris at the signing of the 
Treaty 6 at Fort Carleton and Fort Pitt commented, without geographical limitation: 
The police force were to prevent the selling or giving of liquor to the Indians.  
The Queen has made a strong law against the fire-water; . . .98
 
 
The treaty alcohol ban may apply, by policy at least, to all descendants of bands 
signatory to the Robinson and numbered treaties, even if not included in the treaty texts 
(not solely to Treaties No. 1 through 6 where the alcohol ban is explicitly mentioned in 
the treaty texts), as bands were to have been treated equally: 
Another thing I want you to think over is this:  in laying aside these reserves, 
and in everything else that the Queen shall do for you, you must understand that 
she can do for you no more than she had done for her red children in the East.  
If she were to do more for you that would be unjust for them.  She will do no 
less for you because you are all her children alike, and she must treat you 
alike.99
 
                                                 
96 S.S. 1979, s. W-13.1; and Supra note 87 at paras. 56-67. (Wolfe) 
97 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 at para. 73 . (Horseman)  Mr. Horseman had shot a bear that was attacking him, 
and, later, when in need of money, sold the bear hide, presumably to buy food for his family, contrary to 
the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA), Constitution Act, 1930, 20-21, Geo. V., c 26 (U.K.) 
and to the Wildlife Act, R.S.A., 1980, c. W-9.   
98 Supra note 40 at 218. (Morris, A., 1991, Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the 
Northwest Territories)   
99 Ibid. at p. 20 (Alexander Morris, Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West 
Territories, 1991). 
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This assumption, however, is yet to be adjudicated, and remains a moot point, although 
one often honoured in practice, as with the extension of medicine chest benefits to all 
treaty beneficiaries, not solely to those of Treaty No. 6.  For the purposes of this 
analysis, erring on the side of caution lest over-extension weaken the argument, it is 
assumed that the treaty alcohol ban applies to on-reserve consumption in the geographic 
area of Treaties No. 1 through 6.   Particularly reprehensible in the fact situation 
analyzed is that agents of the Crown, held out as the champions of the alcohol ban at 
treaty signing, were those later engaged in breaking it. 
 
A breach of the Crown’s obligation in implementing and enforcing the alcohol ban 
treaty provision may qualify for a remedy in other contexts, including treatment and 
compensation to ameliorate the ravages of fetal alcohol conditions.  The prime equitable 
remedy sought in Aboriginal rights and treaty litigation is a judicial declaration of 
existing rights.  Other remedies include constructive trusts,100 compensation,101 and 
injunctions.102  Judicial declarations of existing rights can have a beneficial effect in 
promoting “good faith” consensual negotiation between or among parties, sometimes 
serving to help resolve an issue without recourse to further litigation.103  Parties, 
                                                 
100 The court could order that certain lands be transferred to Aboriginal people by way of a constructive 
trust, as suggested by Deane and Gaudron JJ. in dissent in Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 66 A.L.J.R. 408 
at 453, and in a general context by La Forest J. in Lac Minerals Ltd. v. Corona Resources, [1989] 2 
S.C.R. 574 at 676ff. 
101 R. v. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.  Compensation was awarded for the Crown’s breach of fiduciary 
duty in their leasing of Musquem land to a Vancouver golf club. 
102 Roach, K. Remedies in Constitutional Law (Canada Law Book Inc. Aurora, Ontario, 2001) 15.590- 
15.850.  
103 Dumont v. Canada (A.G.) (1990), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 159 at 160 (S.C.C.).  In this case, involving Metis 
land claims, the S.C.C. refused to strike out a claim for declaratory relief based on allegations that land 
grants between 1871 and 1886 violated the Manitoba Act, 1870.  The Court recognized “that declaratory 
relief may be granted in the discretion of the court in aid of extra-judicial claims in an appropriate case.” 
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especially governments in Canada, have a tradition of voluntary compliance with 
judicial declarations.104   Declarations may be delayed, or may involve transition 
periods,105 but in the case of treatment for offenders with fetal alcohol conditions, as 
with the autistic plaintiffs in R. v. Auton,106 where plaintiffs are vulnerable and time is 
of the essence due to narrow windows of opportunity for treatment, delays would be 
inappropriate.  Equitable remedies contain a further benefit over more restrictive tort or 
contract principles, that of allowing greater flexibility in the calculation of damages. 
Greater financial awards may be obtained than would be granted under the common 
                                                 
104 Mahe v. Alberta (1990), 68 D.L.R. (4th) 69 at 106 (S.C.C.).  Mahe dealt with s. 23 of the Charter, 
minority language rights.  Like Aboriginal rights, what is required in every case in order to ensure that the 
minority language group has control over those aspects of education which pertain to its minority 
language rights and culture, is better dealt with by the parties involved, with the court describing in 
general terms the requirements mandated by s. 23.  Negotiations between governments and communities 
can determine the best means to implement the general principles of the declarations.  Courts can retain 
jurisdiction over a case to ensure that their declarations are in fact implemented; and in Delgamuukw v. 
B.C. (A.G.) (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) (B.C.S.C.) 185 and (1993) 104 D.L.R. (4th) (B.C.C.A.), the plaintiffs 
asked for a declaration of the scope of their Aboriginal rights to land and self-government, and the extent 
of restrictions to such rights that could be used by the province.   The declaration was declined in [1997] 
3 S.C.R. 1010, as a new trial was ordered to take into account and give proper weight to the oral evidence 
of elders, in order to determine the issue of rights. 
105 R. v. Powley, [2003] S.C.C. 43 at para. 52, did not reinstate the Court of Appeal’s expired one-year 
stay or delay, reasoning that enough time had been allotted for collaboration, and that there was no 
pressing need for another stay.  As background, in R. v. Powley (2001), 196 D.L.R. (4th) 221 (Ont. CA), 
the Metis hunters were acquitted and a one year stay of judgment granted to allow the province and the 
Metis Nation of Ontario time to consult and develop a new moose hunting regime consistent with s. 35 of 
the Constitution, 1982.  In this way, the ruling was prospective in nature.  The Court at para. 177, quoted 
Professor Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (Aurora, Ont.:  Canada Law Book, 2000) at 15.80 
and 15.70:   
In the first instance, courts should design their remedies to facilitate negotiations between 
First Nations, governments and other affected interests.  The aim of this negotiation process 
should be consensual decision-making or treaty making. [15.80] [A] temporary transition 
period would allow the difficult and interconnected problems of devising a new relationship 
between the parties to be achieved through negotiation, a process that is much more flexible 
than adjudication.  Governments would be given reasonable opportunities to comply with 
court’s constitutional rulings.  More importantly, First Nations would participate in the 
formulation of the remedy, something that is consistent with the purpose of aboriginal 
rights.” [15.70]. 
106Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2002] BCCA 538. 
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law.107  Nor are equitable claims subject to statutory limitation periods which can bar 
other claims; rather, the more flexible equitable doctrine of laches applies.  In 
Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), the Court held under 
the doctrine of laches that any reason for delay must be considered with due regard to 
the historically vulnerable position of Aboriginal peoples.108  Taking into account this 
historically vulnerable position, Aboriginal equitable claims would in all probability 
succeed notwithstanding lengthy delays.  Declarations could be applied as an equitable 
remedy under a breach of treaty protected by s. 35, or under s. 24 pursuant to a breach 
of the Charter.  Government thus is enabled to implement change in the most flexible 
manner to meet treaty or Charter obligations.  Such flexibility is desirable as the Court 
is not in a position to know which administrative methods would be preferable and 
would serve best.  The Court could, for example, make a declaration requiring 
government to provide holistic, community-based treatment for offenders with fetal 
alcohol conditions,109 even though such conditions may have been discovered or 
diagnosed some considerable time before.  It would then be the role of the government 
to design and implement appropriate ameliorative programs in the most effective and 
timely manner.   
 
1.5  Present Day Consumption Patterns 
                                                 
107Supra note 101.  In R. v. Guerin, $10 million in global damages was awarded to the Musqueam Band, 
for the Crown’s failure to act in the best interests of the Band.  The Crown had failed to consult the band 
about a change less favourable to it in the terms of a Crown lease of Musqueam land to a Vancouver golf 
club. 
108 195 D.L.R. (4th) 135, 51 O.R. (3d) 641 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 722, para. 267; [2001] SCCA No. 63, Appeal 
dismissed.  (Chippewas) 
109 Such a declaration based on the alcohol ban provision would apply only to affected individuals who 
were beneficiaries of Treaties numbered 1 through 6. 
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 The Northwest Territories Bureau of Statistics completed the NWT Alcohol and Drug 
Survey in 1996.   Along with financial support from Health Canada came access to 
national data such as the Canada Alcohol and Other Drug Survey conducted in the 
provinces in 1994.  The NWT survey included information on the respondents’ ethnic 
group, information which was lacking in national data.  The percentage of the NWT 
population who had consumed alcohol during the twelve months prior to the survey was 
71.5%, similar to the national rate of 72.3%, the rate in Nunavut being lower, 57.8%.  
For the NWT, when Aboriginal persons were considered, the rate was 60.1% compared 
to 85.2% for non-Aboriginals.  When gender was considered, the rates were 74.5% for 
men and 68.2% for women.  The rate of consumption was highest among persons 25-34 
years of age (80.6%), somewhat above the national rate (77.3%).  Only persons over 15 
years of age were included in the NWT survey. 
 
When the incidence of heavy drinking was considered, however, there was considerable 
difference between the NWT rate (25.6%) and the national rate (8.8%).  Heavy drinking 
was defined as having five or more drinks on a day when alcohol is consumed.  The 
rates of heavy drinking when gender was considered were 33.3% for men and 17.3% for 
women.  When Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal respondents were compared, regardless 
of gender, the rates were 33% and 16.7% respectively. 
 
Frequency of alcohol consumption (defined as drinking at least once a week) in the 
NWT was considerably below the national rate, 28.0% compared to 34.9%.  Frequent 
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alcohol consumption was much lower for Aboriginals (18.5%) compared to non-
Aboriginals (39.5%).    
 
In conclusion, so-called binge drinking is more characteristic of Aboriginal peoples 
surveyed, at least in the NWT.  Because the level of alcohol in the blood becomes 
higher during episodes of heavy consumption, this pattern of drinking is likely to be 
more toxic to a fetus than more frequent, but less heavy imbibing.110  Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, no pattern of alcohol consumption is considered safe for fetal 
development.111  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6  Fetal Alcohol Conditions112
 
                                                 
110 Supra note 12, Chapter 5: “Alcohol’s Impact on Children.” at 72-88.  
111Supra note 77. (1996 NWT Alcohol and Drug Survey, NWT Bureau of Statistics, retrieved February 
10, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 
<http://www.stats.gov.nt.ca/SWtatinfo/Health/alcdrug/report.html>.) 
112 Section 1.6 “Fetal Alcohol Conditions” pages 33-62. The original version of this section was 
submitted on January 8, 2003, to Professor L. Wason-Ellam for EdRes 800, as part of an unpublished 
paper entitled, “Qualitative Research Mini-Project Involving Holistic, Community-Based Treatment for 
FAS/E Individuals.”   Significant editing, revision and additions have been made since then. 
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1.6.1  Definition 
 
Fetal alcohol syndrome, FAS, is the diagnosis given to offspring who suffer at the 
severe end of a continuum of disabilities caused by the maternal use of alcohol during 
pregnancy.  Fetal alcohol effects, FAE, has been the diagnosis given for the similarly 
caused condition when the physical symptoms are more variable and less extreme.  The 
most recent diagnostic information from the U.S. Institute of Medicine (IOM), suggest 
the following multiple diagnostic categories:  FAS with confirmed maternal alcohol use 
during pregnancy, FAS without confirmed maternal alcohol use during pregnancy, 
Partial Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (pFAS), Alcohol Related Neurodevelopmental 
Disorders (ARND), and Alcohol Related Birth Defects (ARBD).113  FAE (largely 
replaced by the pFAS and ARND by the IOM) has been termed “the invisible 
disability,” because affected individuals though superficially normal, may suffer from 
central nervous system disabilities rendering them at risk for severe behavioral and 
cognitive problems. ARBD includes a range of congenital anomalies resulting from 
confirmed maternal alcohol exposure, which may include heart, skeletal, vision, 
hearing, and fine/gross motor problems.  However, FAS and FAE are the terms referred 
to in the bulk of the literature on diagnostic criteria and prevalence studies.   
Collectively, these two most commonly-used diagnostic categories are denoted FAS/E.   
Furthermore, the total spectrum of disorders is included under the umbrella term, Fetal 
                                                 
113 Stratton, K.R., How, C.J. Battagalia, F.C., Institute of Medicine.  Fetal Alcohol Syndrome—Diagnosis, 
Epidemiology, Prevention, and Treatment.  (Washington, D.C.:  National Academy Press, 1996). 
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Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASD).114  The prevalence of FASDs is estimated at 1 
per 100 in the population.115
 
FASDs are the leading cause of mental retardation, surpassing Down’s syndrome and 
spina bifida.  Brain damage occurs when the child is exposed to alcohol in utero;  
effects are not merely a matter of developmental delay, rather they are permanent and 
irreversible.116
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6.2  Cause 
 
                                                 
114 Streissguth, A., and O’Malley, K.  “Neuropsychiatric Impliations and Long-term Consequenes of Fetal 
Alcohol Spectrum Disorders.” Vol. 5, No. 3 (2000) Seminars in Clinical Neuropsychiatry,  p. 177-190; 
and 3rd Annual Fetal Alcohol Canadian Expertise (FACE) Research Roundtable (September 9, 2002), 
FAS:  When the Children Grow Up, retrieved September 30, 2002, from the World Wide Web:  
<http://www.knowtv.com>. 
115 Sampson PD, Streissguth AP, Bookstein FL, Little RE, Clarren SK, Dehaene P, Hanson JW, Graham 
JM (1997) “Incidence of fetal alcohol syndrome and prevalence of alcohol-related neurodevelopmental 
disorder.” Teratology 56: 317–326.  
116 Supra note 12 at 9. (Streissguth, A Guide for Families). 
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Since the cause of FAS/E is maternal alcohol use during pregnancy, it is prima facie a 
completely preventable condition.  However, when underlying causes of alcohol  
abuse, such as poverty and marginalization are considered, a solution is not obvious.  It 
is not simply a matter of education about the dangers of drinking while pregnant.  Types 
of interventions used with pregnant mothers will be discussed under the heading, “1.6.6 
Secondary Interventions.”    
 
The earlier in the term of pregnancy in which alcohol is introduced, the more severe the 
damage to the fetus likely will be.   The degree of damage depends on many factors 
including inter alia:   nutrition, genetics of the mother and the fetus, amount of alcohol 
consumed, the mother’s metabolic rate, her blood alcohol content (BAC), pattern of 
consumption, timing of consumption, and general health.  The fetus is more susceptible 
to alcohol than the mother, as the fetal system does not metabolize the alcohol as does 
the mother’s system; thus the alcohol accumulates to a higher concentration in the 
fetus.117   
 
Mechanisms for alcohol teratogenicity are thought to involve ready absorption of low 
molecular weight alcohol across the placenta where it can affect developing fetal cell 
structures through induced chromosomal abnormalities and enzymatic malfunction, 
leading to malformation, dysmorphology and growth deficiencies.  This mechanism is 
coupled with tendency of alcohol metabolism to induce oxidative stress.  Cell 
                                                 
117 3rd Annual Fetal Alcohol Canadian Expertise (FACE) Research Roundtable (September 9, 2002), 
FAS:  When the Children Grow Up, retrieved September 30, 2002, from the World Wide Web:  
<http://www.knowtv.com>. 
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metabolism is altered by the presence of alcohol, which also functions as a 
vasoconstrictor particularly at the umbilical cord site.  The combined effect of both 
processes is fetal hypoxia or oxygen deprivation, with subsequent organic brain 
damage.  In fact, oxidative stress is the key mechanism of brain injury throughout the 
entire FASD spectrum.118
 
 
 
 
1.6.3   Incidence 
 
The present estimate of the world incidence of FAS is 1.9 cases per l000 live births.119  
There are currently no national data for Canada.  It does appear certain that the 
incidence of FAS/E is much higher among certain Aboriginal groups,120 standing as 
high as 192 in 1000 live births in a community where alcohol consumption was high.121   
Informal studies based on selected groups place the proportion of some carceral 
                                                 
118Cohen-Kerem, R. and Koren, G. Antioxidants and Fetal Protection Against Ethanol Teratogenicity, 
Review of Experimental Data. (3rd Annual Fetal Alcohol Canadian Expertise (FACE) Research 
Roundtable, Sept. 9 2002, FAS, When the Children Grow Up, retrieved September 30, 2002, from the 
World Wide Web:  <http://www.knowtv.com>) 
119Supra note 8. Tait, C. “Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Among Canadian Aboriginal Peoples:  Review and 
Analysis of the Intergenerational Links to Residential Schools,” (Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2002) 
at 91-117. 
120 Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, Social Affairs, Seniors and Status of Women, 34th 
Parliament, 3rd Session, No. 10-22, index 1992-1993, 1-29 at 4,  “Foetal Alcohol Syndrome, A 
Preventable Tragedy,”  (Ottawa:  Queen’s Printer for Canada, 1988-1992). 
121 Robinson, G.C., Conry, J.LO. and Conry, R.F. “Clinical Profile and Prevalence of Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome in an Isolated Community in British Columbia,” (1987) 137 Canadian Medical Association 
Journal,  203-207. 
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populations at 60-80% FAS/E.122  Projected prevalence rates in the general population 
applied to total prison populations predict a much smaller proportion (~1%), which is 
likely indicative of the fact that carceral populations are not representative samples of 
the general population.  Moreover, only one-third of the 1% expected cases from the 
above projection have been identified in the prison system.   This fact is not surprising 
as none of the federal or provincial prisons or correctional centres studied reported 
having a screening program for FAS.123    Access to diagnostic services is often a 
problem, rendering prevalence statistics in most populations serious 
underestimations.124   
 
Waiting lists at diagnostic clinics across Canada range from 6 months to one year for 
children.  National standards are being developed for the diagnosis, with a view to their 
potential inclusion in the DSM-IV.125  There are many methodological problems, 
notwithstanding the diagnostic issues, in measuring incidence and prevalence rates.   
Estimates for Aboriginal incidence, in particular, must be assessed according to the 
context of the isolated reserve communities and specific clinical population samples in 
                                                 
122Fast, D.K., Conry, J.L., and Loock, C.A., “Identifying fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) among youth in 
the Criminal Justice System, (1999) 20 (5) Journal of Developmental and Behavioral Pediatrics, 370-372; 
Zakreski, D. “Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Linked to Crime.” March 10, 1998 Saskatoon Star Phoenix.    
123 Burd, L., Selfridge, R., Klug, M.G. and Juelson, T.  “Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in the Canadian 
Corrections System,” J FAS Int 2003: e14 September 2003, The Hospital for Sick Children.    
124 R. v. Gray, 2002 B.C.J. No. 428 (B.C.S.C.).  Boland, F. J., Burrill, R., Duwyn, M. and Karp, J., Fetal 
Alcohol Syndrome:  Implications for Correctional Services, (Correctional Services Canada, 1998), which 
recommends that the criminal justice system begin its own pre-sentence screening for FASDs. 
125 Cook, J. L. FAS Diagnosis, Health Canada’s Activities, (3rd Annual Fetal Alcohol Canadian Expertise 
(FACE) Roundtable, Sept. 9, 2002, FAS, When the Children Grow Up, retrieved September 30, 2002, 
from the World Wide Web:  <http://www.knowtv.com>); Cook, J. and Huffine, C. “It’s Time 
Psychiatry’s Diagnositic “Bible” Addresses FAS,” Iceberg: An Educational Newsletter for People 
Concerned about Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and fetal alcohol effects (FAE), vol. 10, issue 2, 2000, 
p. 1-2.  Note:  The DSM-IV is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Washington, 
DC:  American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
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which they were made, severely restricting the scope of generalization of these 
estimates.   Moreover, FAS/E is a global problem, not solely an Aboriginal problem.   
Aboriginal incidence statistics are comparable to other marginalized populations where 
similar conditions abound:   South Africa, Rumania, Russia, China and South 
America.126   
 
Despite the lack of scientifically rigorous data, there is no denying that FASDs in 
Canada are prevalent among native populations: 
FAS is not a problem unique to Canada’s native peoples but it is particularly 
prevalent among them.  The National Native Association of Treatment 
Disorders estimates that 80 per cent of aboriginal people in Canada are affected 
by alcoholism, either through being addicted themselves or through dealing 
with the addiction of a close family member (Fournier and Crey 1997: 174).  A 
leading researcher in the field, Albert Chudley, asserts that every native child 
adopted in the last two decades has suffered alcohol damage in utero, and that 
this fact—rather than alienation from white society—is at the root of their 
difficulties later in life (ibid.). Chudley may or may not be overstating his case, 
but there can be no doubt that the consequences of FAS for Canada’s native 
population have been severe.  Records from medical institutions in 
Saskatchewan showed that in the past decade, out of 450 children born with 
FAS/FAE 75% were aboriginal (Fournier and Crey 1997: 178).  (116).127
 
 
 
 
1.6.4  Characteristics 
 
The primary characteristics of fetal alcohol syndrome are: 
                                                 
126Supra note 8 at 113-117 (Tait); and  (Gibson, F., Home is my Road). 
127 Adams, J.  Our Son a Stranger, Adoption Breakdown and its Effects on Parents, Montreal:  McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2002, at 136. 
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• General growth deficiencies (reductions in body weight, height and head 
circumference); 
• Structural abnormalities which are primarily facial: short palpebral folds (small 
eye openings), epicanthic folds (extra skin folds close to nose), long and 
flattened philtrum (groove under nose), flattened maxilla (jaw and midface), 
shortened nose; and 
• Central nervous system abnormalities associated with impairment of both 
cognitive abilities and behavioral or adaptive functioning (neurological  
abnormalities, behavioral dysfunctions, developmental delays and intellectual 
impairment).128  
 
For individuals with FAE, the presence of the first two primary characteristics is more 
subtle, or may be absent; however, the presence of the last characteristic is pervasive 
throughout the FASD due to the ongoing effect of alcohol on the developing nervous 
system.129
 
Without appropriate intervention, FAS/E individuals are at risk of developing secondary 
disabilities, because of their cognitive and adaptive impairments.  Secondary disabilities 
are not present at birth in individuals with FAS/E, and, in all likelihood, could be 
                                                 
128 Jones, K.L., & Smith, D. W., “Recognition of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in Early Infancy” (1973) 
2(836) Lancet 999-1001; and Smith, D. W. Recognizable Patterns of Human Malformation: 
Genetic,Embryologic and Clinical Aspects (3rd ed.)  (Philadelphia:  W.B. Saunders, 1982).  
129Clarren, S.K. & Smith, D. W., “The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome” (1978) 298(19) New England Journal of 
Medicine, 1063-1067; Hanson, J.W., Streissguth, A. P., & Smith, D. W., “The Effects of Moderate 
Alcohol Consumption during Pregnancy on Fetal Growth and Morphogenesis” (1978) 92(3) Journal of 
Pediatrics, 457-460; and Smith, D. W ,“Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Fetal Alcohol Effects” (1981) 3 
Neurobehavioral Toxicology and Teratology,  127. 
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attenuated as victims mature through ongoing, effective interventions.  Streissguth and 
others identified the following secondary disabilities in their 1996 study that considered 
a cohort of over 400 individuals, ranging in age from six years to fifty-one years of age: 
• over 90% of those 6 and over experienced mental health problems; 
• 60% of those 12 and older were either expelled, or suspended or voluntarily 
dropped out of school; 
• 60% of those 12 and over were charged and/or convicted of a crime; 
• approximately 50% of those 12 and over were institutionalized or in in-patient 
treatment programs; 
• 50% of those 12 and over had been involved in inappropriate sexual behavior; 
and 
• 35% of those 12 and over experienced problems with alcohol and drugs.130 
 
In the same 1996 study, Streissguth identified in her sample the following protective 
and risk factors that respectively attenuated or aggravated the development of secondary 
characteristics in her sample: 
• Living in a stable, nurturing home; 
• Receiving developmental disability services early;  
• Being diagnosed before six years of age. 
                                                 
130 Streissguth, A. P., Barr, H.M., Kogan, J., & Bookstein, F.L. Understanding the Occurrence of 
Secondary Disabilities in Clients with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and Fetal Alcohol Effects (FAE): 
Final Report to the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention on Grant No. R04/CCR008515 (Tech. 
Report No. 96-06) (Seattle:  University of Washington, Fetal Alcohol and Drug Unit, 1996), cited in A. P. 
Streissguth, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: A Guide For Families (Toronto:  Paul H. Brookes Publishing Co., 
2001) at 107-112. 
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• Not having frequent moves; and 
• Not being a victim of violence;131 
 
Surprisingly, Streissguth found higher rates of secondary disabilities in individuals who 
had FAE rather than FAS and who had an IQ higher than 70.  She speculated that FAE 
individuals, lacking the obvious bio-markers, are not diagnosed as early, and do not 
receive developmental disability services to the same extent as FAS individuals, which 
may account for the higher rates of secondary disabilities developing in this FAE 
population.  This finding underlines the importance of the protective factors in 
ameliorating secondary characteristics.132
 
Streissguth and O’Malley133 recommend supports over the lifespan of affected 
individuals, including the following adult interventions: sheltered living, job training, 
ongoing employment supervision, assistance with money and life management, and 
positive role models.  Interventions recommended for each stage of the life cycle are 
included in the statements of best practices articulated by Health Canada.134
1.6.5.  Primary Prevention 
 
                                                 
131 Supra note 12 at 110-111. (Streissguth, a Guide for Families) 
132 Ibid. at 111-112. (Streissguth, A Guide for Families) 
133Streissguth, A. P. and O’Malley, K., “Neuropsychiatric Implications and Long-term Consequences of 
Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders,” (2000) Vol. 5. no. 3 Seminars in Clinical Neuropsychiatry. 177-190. 
134Roberts, G. and Nanson, J.  Health Canada, Best Practices, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome/ Fetal Alcohol 
Effects and the Effects of Other Substance Use During Pregnancy (Health Canada, Canada’s Drug 
Strategy Division, 2000).   Refer to “Best Practices Statements” 7.1.5 (infancy and early childhood), 7.2.5 
(later childhood), 7.3.5. (adolescent interventions), and  7.4.5 (adult interventions). 
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Considering that an estimated 50% of women in childbearing years consume alcohol 
and that an estimated 50% of pregnancies are unplanned, a significant number of fetuses 
may be exposed to the risk of alcohol teratogenicity.135 To deal with this risk, primary 
prevention focuses on the prevention of drinking, or, as an alternative, on the prevention 
of pregnancy.  Product labeling, education, and assuring access to birth control are the 
strategies employed. 
 
Hankin  reports a decrease in antenatal drinking associated with warning labels on 
alcoholic beverages, albeit a decrease small in size and one that does not impact on the 
heaviest drinkers.136  Product labeling (warning of birth defects and possible FAS) for 
alcoholic beverages was introduced in the U.S. in 1989 by passage of the Alcohol 
Beverage Labeling Act.137 Subsequently, product warning labeling was considered in 
Canada with the introduction of a private members’ Bill C-222, An Act to Amend the 
Food and Drug Act, April 25, 1996.  Unfortunately, Bill C-222 was never enacted. 
Therefore, warning labels, not required in Canada for alcohol products, paradoxically, 
                                                 
135Supra note 118. Cohen-Kerem, R. and Koren, G. FAS, When the Children Grow Up: Antioxidants and 
Fetal Protection Against Ethanol Teratogenicity, 3rd Annual Fetal Alcohol Canadian Expertise (FACE) 
Research Roundtable, 2002, retrieved September 30, 2002 from the World Wide Web:   
<http://www.knowtv.com>. 
136 Hankin, J.R., “Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Prevention Research,” (2002) 26(1) The Journal of the 
National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 58-65.  
137PL 100-690; passed in 1988, came into effect in 1989.  The Act mandates a warning on the label of 
each alcoholic beverage container sold in the United States: 1) According to the Surgeon General, women 
should not drink alcoholic beverages because of the risk of birth defects 2) consumption of alcoholic 
beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or operate machinery and may cause health problems.  By 
1981 the Surgeon General of the United States had advised women to avoid all alcohol during pregnancy.  
In 1970, Congress passed a law creating the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
(NIAAA) to support research on alcohol abuse and alcoholism, including research on alcohol and 
pregnancy, including FAS. 
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must be placed on Canadian alcoholic beverage containers exported to the U.S.138  
Warning labels should be used, as they do serve to reinforce, but do not replace, other 
strategies.  They should be used, not in isolation, but as part of a comprehensive 
strategy including initiatives in: education (pamphlets, books, media advertisements, 
videos, speakers, curricula), public policy, and treatment services.  In the Yukon and 
Northwest territories, since 1991-2, warning labels have been required on all alcoholic 
products, as well as responsible use labels being stamped on brown carry-out bags.  In 
Saskatchewan, warning messages are stamped on the brown carry-out bags for products 
purchased at liquor stores, but not on the products themselves.  The brown carry-out 
bags, however, can be out of stock, and often are removed before the consumer 
encounters the product. 
 
In lieu of warning labels, the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA) 
provides support for social responsibility initiatives such as:  anti-drinking and driving 
campaigns, programs aimed at educating the public on the dangers of drinking during 
pregnancy, the designated driver program, identification programs (“Please Bring your 
ID”), as well as other national awareness campaigns in conjunction with the Canadian 
Association of Liquor Jurisdictions (CALJ).  In 2001-2, the CALJ sponsored a national 
media public awareness campaign focused on the importance of neither selling alcohol 
to nor purchasing alcohol for minors.  SLGA is a member of the Provincial FAS 
Coordinating Committee, Chaired by the Saskatchewan Institute on Prevention of 
                                                 
138Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Alcohol Policy, Policy Framework, Warning Labels Bills/Motion, Apolnet 
(Alcohol Policy Network), retrieved February 14, 2003, from the World Wide Web:   
<http://www.apolnet.org/actpacks/pf_fas.html>. 
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Handicaps (SIPH), which SLGA funds to some extent.   Various advertising campaigns 
and conferences have been sponsored, and liquor store product bags and till tapes 
display an FAS awareness message introduced in October, 1997, “Drinking Alcohol 
During Pregnancy Can Harm the Baby – We have Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in our 
Community – Let’s Find a Solution.”139   
 
Although these initiatives are praiseworthy, it is important to consider the funding by 
liquor regulating authorities, breweries or liquor companies, of service agencies which 
may have as part of their mandate the prevention of handicaps such as FASDs.  Full 
information is not available as to how the “arm’s length” nature of these arrangements 
is protected.  While service agencies publicly do not appear to advocate for liquor 
product warning labels, it should be acknowledged that they, like the liquor companies, 
brewers, and regulators, do advocate for responsible use of alcohol.  It is perhaps a 
characteristic of good corporate social responsibility for liquor companies, breweries, 
and their regulating authorities to fund prevention and treatment of FASDs, in order to 
mitigate some of the damage their products have caused and are causing over the 
generations. 140  The amount contributed, however, in no way has approached the costs 
of remedying the extent of the damages caused.  Canada’s brewing industry spent, 
                                                 
139 Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority 2002-2003 Annual Report, at 9.  
140 Ibid.  It is noted that SLGA increased its FAS public awareness initiatives to $15,000 from $10,000 in 
previous years.  No other specific mention was made of any further contribution by SLGA to FAS or 
SIPH in the 2002-03 Annual report; According to an e-mail received from Motherisk on September 15, 
2003, <susan.santiago@sickkids.ca>, Motherisk receives $150,000 annually from Canada Brewers’ 
Association (CBA) to help fund its toll-free Substance Use Helpline (1-877-FAS INFO) and to sponsor 
Fetal Alcohol Canada Expertise (FACE).  According to the Motherisk website, retrieved Oct. 16, 2003 
from the World Wide Web, <http://www.motherrisk.org>, CBA also funds the FAS Resource Centre at 
the Canadian Centre for Substance Abuse.  At the Motherisk web-site, CBA reports having spent over 
$100 million in promotion of responsible drinking over a ten year period. 
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according to available statistics, about $10 million in one year on “responsible use” 
campaigns; this expenditure must be viewed in the context of their $ 4.6 billion in 
annual sales and the $100 million they spent on advertising to promote use of their 
beverages.141  The Standing Committee on Health and Welfare estimated that the entire 
alcoholic beverage industry in Canada in the same year spent $250 million in 
advertising, promotion and sponsorships, out of total of $9.6 billion in sales.142  
Increasing the amount contributed while controlling the “arm’s length” aspect of 
funding arrangements between the alcohol beverage industry and the service agencies is 
paramount, so that the advocacy, ethics, and programming of the funded group is not 
compromised in any way.  Perhaps blind trusts could be established to promote 
substantial, fuller mitigation, ensuring that no “strings” would be attached.  The Olivieri 
Report143 contains recommendations for protecting research ethics in the context of  
corporate sponsorship.  These recommendations may be of some relevance to the 
discussion at hand, particularly those regarding conflict of interest and the protection of 
academic freedom.  The protection of academic freedom may be extended to similar 
forms of freedom of expression in other contexts. 
.   
                                                 
141 Supra note 120 at 14-15. (Standing Committee on Health & Welfare). 
142 Ibid. at 1 and 15. (Standing Committee on Health & Welfare). 
143Report of the (CAUT) Committee of Inquiry in the Case Involving Dr. Nancy Olivieri, the Hospital for 
Sick Children and the University of Toronto, and Apotex Inc. Recommendations 1, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30, and 31. Retrieved on September 20, 2003, from the World Wide Web:  
<http://www.caut.ca/english/issues/acadfreedom/Olivieri%20Inquiry%20Report.pdf>. 
 45
The Frontier School Division in Manitoba has implemented an educational initiative in 
the way of fetal alcohol prevention curricula, “Making the Right Choices,” for grades 5-
8:144   
•  The Grade 5 curriculum deals with awareness of alcohol and tobacco use and 
accompanying risks during pregnancy.  Learning techniques used include:  opinion 
polls, information sheets about FASDs, reading and discussing a short story entitled 
Jocelyn’s Island (the story of a young Aboriginal girl who becomes concerned about 
her pregnant sister who is going to parties), learning definitions of FAS and ARND and 
related vocabulary, the writing of imaginary letters to a pregnant friend explaining to 
her why she should stop drinking, and the making of posters about the risks of drinking 
during pregnancy to be displayed in the community.  
•  The Grade 6 curriculum expands upon the diagnostic terms FAS and ARND 
and other terminology, explores the reasons why some people drink, involves the 
students in research about FAS and ARND, and presents a short story entitled Jeremy 
and Joey, about step-brothers, one of whom has FAS, and how his brother, family and 
school learn to respond effectively to his needs.   
•The Grade 7 curriculum reviews FASD, and examines the role of media 
advertisements and messages regarding alcohol and drug use.  Appropriate responses to 
these media messages are drafted by the students.145   
                                                 
144 Teaching Units on FAS, <lbraun@frontiersd.mb.ca>. 
145 Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario, Liquor Advertising Guidelines:  Liquor Sales Licensees 
and Manufacturers (Toronto:  Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario:  August, 2003).  The Liquor 
Licence Act, R. S.O. 1990, c. L-19, s. 38(1) states that no person shall advertise liquor except in 
accordance with the regulations enacted pursuant to this Act. Holders of liquor sale licences or 
manufacturers of liquor are responsible to ensure that the advertising carrying its business or brand name, 
or endorsed by it, falls within the parameters set out in the regulations and in these guidelines.  Otherwise, 
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• The Grade 8 curriculum introduces the mechanism of how alcohol is 
transferred to the fetus and its mode of attack on the fetus at various stages of fetal 
development.  The role of males in FASD causation is discussed.  The culminating 
student activity is the development and preparation of brochures on fetal alcohol 
syndrome. 
 
A sensitive approach to the curriculum is recommended, to avoid stigmatization or 
frightening of those involved, including adopting respectful language, tone and 
substance.  Parents are to be informed in writing that the prevention curriculum will be 
taught.  When discussing sensitive and confidential topics, teachers are to establish clear 
ground rules to prevent personal comments and hurt feelings.  Individual students are to  
be allowed to skip sensitive sections and support is to be provided for these students as 
required.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
disciplinary proceedings under the Registrar of Alcohol and Gaming may result.  “Liquor” means beer, 
wine and/or spirits or any combination thereof.  All advertising must be consistent with the principle of 
depicting responsibility in use or service of liquor.  Responsible advertising does not imply that 
consumption of liquor is required to obtain or enhance social, professional or personal success; athletic 
prowess; sexual prowess, or any other opportunity or appeal; or enjoyment of any activity; fulfillment of 
any goal; or resolution of social, physical or personal problems.  It should not appeal, either directly or 
indirectly, to persons under the legal drinking age, and should not associate or depict the consumption of 
liquor with driving a motorized vehicle, or with any activity that requires care and skill or has elements of 
danger. Advertising that is beyond the permissible scope of the Guidelines may result in disciplinary 
proceedings under the Registrar of Alcohol and Gaming and/or the issuance of an order of cessation 
thereunder or may result in prosecution.  No doubt this Act, Regulations and Guidelines are models for 
Canadian jurisdictions.  For instance the Liquor Advertising Rules of Conduct Regulation, Man. Reg. 
125/95 under The Liquor Control Act, C.C.S.M. c. L160, 1995, has been similar provisions to the above.  
In addition, Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority Media Advertising Policy requires prior 
approval from the Liquor Board of all related advertising.  The criteria for approval are similar to those 
aforementioned. 
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An international, national, and provincial initiative has been to declare “Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome Awareness Day,” to begin September 9 at 9:09 a.m. each year (the ninth 
minute, the ninth hour, of the ninth day, of the ninth month).  At this time, people are 
requested to show respect for the nine months an individual spends in the womb.146
 
 
 
1.6.6  Secondary Prevention 
 
Secondary prevention focuses on harm reduction to the fetus during pregnancy.    
Although in secular societies, termination of pregnancy may be an option, this is not 
usually consonant with traditional Aboriginal cultures which view children as a special 
gift from the Creator.  The favoured option is to offer the expectant mother access to 
treatment for her addictions.   
 
Pregnant women are screened for risk when they present themselves for medical care.  
Risk factors related to potential alcohol consumption that are screened for include:  
poverty, poor prenatal care, poor nutrition and health, poly-drug use, prostitution or 
other involvement in the sex-trade, parent-partner-peer problems, psychiatric concerns, 
and prior abuse.147   
                                                 
146 The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Awareness Day, Chapter F-13.101, S.S., 2002. 
147 Philp, M.“Middle-class FAS:  A Silent Epidemic?” Globe and Mail, February 1, 2003.  Middle class 
women may avoid detection for these risk factors.  However, they do have the economic wherewithal to 
consume considerable amounts of alcohol.  Their affected offspring are more likely to be diagnosed as 
ADHD, rather than with one of the FASDs, and they are better able to afford private schools or tutoring 
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 Carolyn Tait, commissioned by The Prairie Women’s Health Centre of Excellence, 
authored A Study of the Service Needs of Pregnant Addicted Women in Manitoba148, 
which included the identification of barriers for pregnant women seeking addiction 
treatment.  Barriers identified were: 
• psychological barriers (shame, fear, alienation); 
• barriers related to a woman’s children (lack of childcare, fear of having children 
apprehended); 
• barriers related to social support networks (after care services are required as a 
client may be isolated otherwise with an abusive, addictive partner upon 
termination of the treatment program) 
• barriers related to socio-geographic factors (costs of travel to treatment) 
• barriers related to stigma (the stigma associated with alcohol/drug use not under 
control, especially when involving a female) 
• barriers related to treatment programs themselves (similar programs with which 
the client has had previous experiences may have been philosophically and 
culturally inappropriate). 
 
A forgiving, welcoming, and helpful attitude manifested by service-providers is 
important in removing another possible barrier.  Disadvantaged people sometimes 
                                                                                                                                               
and the kinds of supports and advocacy that affected children require.  Retrieved February 3, 2003 from 
the World Wide Web:  <http://www.globeandmail.com>.   
148Prairie Women’s Health Centre of Excellence, retrieved February 3, 2003 from the World Wide Web:  
<http://www.pwhce.ca/epaw.htm>. 
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perceive existing health, justice and social service agencies as judgmental, cold and 
intimidating.  They may have hesitated to access services for fear of losing welfare 
benefits or of having their children apprehended.149  In some cases, women have been 
forcibly detained,150 even sterilized against their will, as has transpired recently among 
Indigenous women of Brazil,151 and was performed on the mentally disabled in Alberta 
a generation ago.152  In present day Afghanistan, in some areas, unmarried women face 
being apprehended, taken to hospitals, and coerced into enduring gynecological 
examinations to determine their chastity.153  Examples such as these may render 
marginalized women wary of accessing services.  Judgmental attitudes have been 
associated with maternal consumption during pregnancy. The presumption of personal 
autonomy of the expectant mother enabling her to abstain from alcohol use underlying 
these attitudes is a questionable one.  Considering the use of an addictive, intoxicating 
substance, combined with social conditions such as poverty, abuse and racism, personal 
autonomy of such women may be greatly diminished.  Furthermore, product warning 
labels, virtually the last line of defense before damage to a developing fetus, are absent.  
                                                 
149 Ridd, D. Pregnant Addicted Women:  Manitoba’s Experiences. (3rd Annual Fetal Alcohol Canadian 
Expertise (FACE) Research Roundtable (September 9, 2002), FAS:  When the Children Grow Up, 
Retrieved September 30, 2002, from the World Wide Web:  <http://www.knowtv.com>.) 
150 Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area v. D.F.G. (1997), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).  
An expectant, addicted mother was forcibly detained in a hospital to protect her unborn child.  The 
Supreme Court held that such detention violated her Charter rights. 
151 Johnson, B. F.,,”Stolen Wombs:  Indigenous Women Most at Risk.” 2000 Native Americas  38-42; 
and CBC News, November 4, 2002, Forced Sterilization of the Indigenous Women of Brazil, Retrieved 
November 5, 2002, from the World Wide Web:  <http://www.CBC.ca>.  
152 The Sexual Sterilization Act, R.S.A., 1928, allowed for the sterilization of mentally disabled people 
confined to institutions within the province of Alberta (several other provinces and many states had 
similar laws at that time).  In 1996, Leilana Muir was awarded $1,000,000 in damages for wrongful 
confinement  and wrongful sterilization; 700 other claimants are awaiting the dispositions of  similar 
claims (Muir v. Alberta [1996] A.J. No. 37).   
153Leopold, Evelyn (December 17, 2002).  “Post Taliban Warlords Oppress Afghan Women,”  Reuters 
News Agency, Human Rights Watch Report, Retrieved January 5, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 
<http://news.findlaw.com/international/s/20021217/afghanwomendc.html>.   
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In addition to addressing listed barriers, the implementation of Aboriginal employment 
equity would go far towards promoting both primary and secondary prevention by 
addressing the underlying social conditions that perpetuate the problem. 
 
Pharmacological intervention (antioxidant therapy) is another technique of harm 
reduction during pregnancy.  Oxidative stress is an important mechanism in the prenatal 
brain injury of FAS/E fetuses.  Antioxidant treatment strategies for preventing or 
attenuating ethanol-induced154 oxidative stress in fetal life and its impact on brain 
functioning in postnatal life have been proven effective in studies involving cell cultures 
and animal models.  In such studies, pharmacological doses of the antioxidants, vitamin 
C and E, were administered, along with varying doses of ethanol.   Although an 
antioxidant protective effect against ethanol has been observed in animal studies, there 
are no data yet available as to whether this prophylactic treatment can benefit pregnant 
women.  Antioxidant treatment during pregnancy is not a new concept, as antioxidants 
such a vitamins E and C have been used for the treatment of pre-eclampsia and were not 
found to be teratogenic.  It follows that treating women who abuse alcohol during 
pregnancy with antioxidants such as vitamin supplements may have a protective effect 
against FAS/E.   As well there is the benefit of addressing certain nutritional deficits 
that may be present, without concomitant negative effects.155  
 
                                                 
154 Ethanol is the chemical name for the alcoholic component of intoxicating beverages. 
155 Supra note 118.  Cohen-Kerem, R. and Koren, G. and  Antioxidants and Fetal Protection Against 
Ethanol Teratogenicity, (Fetal Alcohol Canadian Expertise (FACE) Roundtable, September 9, 2002, FAS,  
When the Children Grow Up, retrieved September 30, 2002, from the World Wide Web: 
<http://www.knowtv.com>.) 
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1.6.7  Tertiary Prevention  
 
Tertiary prevention rests on early diagnosis of disorders along the FASD.  Essential to 
the diagnosis of FAS/E is the confirmation of maternal alcohol consumption during 
pregnancy.  This may be problematic.  Maternal self-report is subject to denial because 
of stigma and guilt.  When diagnostic issues arise for the first time in later life, the birth 
mother may be absent.  A recent breakthrough has transpired in the field of meconium 
studies.  Meconium is the first “stool” or bowel content passed by the neonate.  A 
chemical analysis of the neonate’s meconium from the diaper can measure both 
gestational timing and magnitude of fetal ethanol exposure resulting from maternal 
drinking during the last two trimesters of pregnancy.  An enzymatic reaction occurs 
between fatty acids in the mother’s body and the ethanol she consumes, to form reliable 
biomarkers of fetal ethanol exposure in the meconium.  Characteristic patterns of fatty 
acid ethyl esters (FAEEs) form, wherever maternal alcohol consumption is more than 
minimal, and these patterns of FAEEs can confirm and elucidate prevalence of alcohol 
consumption by pregnant women.  Such patterns of FAEEs can provide the objective, 
quantitative corroborative evidence of ethanol consumption required for positive 
diagnosis of FAS/E, together with the presence of other criteria required to confirm the 
diagnosis.156     
 
 
                                                 
156 Chan, D. Neonatal Screening for Prenatal Alcohol Exposure (3rd Annual Fetal Alcohol Canadian 
Expertise (FACE) Research Roundtable, September 9, 2002, FAS, When the Children Grow Up, retrieved 
September 30, 2002, from the World Wide Web: < http://www.knowtv.com>). 
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1.6.8  Prevention of secondary disabilities 
 
Various programs have been designed and implemented to address the prevention of the    
development of secondary disabilities post-natally and beyond.  The pioneers in this 
area were the P-CAP (Parent-Child Assistance Program) and its precursor the Birth to 
Age Three Program, both developed by Dr. A. P. Streissguth in Seattle, Washington.157  
A program in Canada modeled on the Seattle P-CAP-Birth to Age Three concept is 
STOP FAS, implemented  in 1998, by Manitoba Health in four sites: Winnipeg (2 
sites), The Pas, and Thompson.  In addition, Norway House Cree Nation, a northern on-
reserve Manitoba community, has its independent version of STOP FAS, which offers a 
Birth to Age 3 Program substantially modified to provide culturally appropriate 
supports.  This program, called Steps and Stages for Mom and Baby, is run through the 
Health Division of the Norway House Cree Nation.  Their PEER program (Parents as 
Early Education Resources) carries on into the school years, in conjunction with the 
Frontier School Division.158  Such programs characteristically involve an intensive, 
paraprofessional mentorship over at least a three year period, for high-risk mothers with 
addiction problems, in order both to prevent their delivering children affected by 
alcohol and drug use, and to attenuate the development of secondary symptoms in those 
so affected.  Community Round Tables are held to ensure that programming is meeting 
community needs.  
                                                 
157 Supra note 12 at 270-275.  (Streissguth, A Guide for Families and Communities) 
158 <DRidd@gov.mb.ca>, Oct. 1, 2002, e-mail correspondence from Dawn Ridd, Child and Health FAS 
Consultant, Child Health Unit, Manitoba Health, Winnipeg, Manitoba; and  <lbraun@frontiersd.mb.ca>, 
September 30, 2002, e-mail correspondence from Lisa Braun, Library Services, Frontier School Division, 
1402 Notre Dame Ave, Winnipeg, Manitoba. 
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 Breaking the Cycle (BTC), in Toronto, does similar mentoring, as well as partnering 
with various prenatal, perinatal and postnatal service networks (housing, physical and 
mental abuse reduction, healthy babies programs, nutrition, and substance abuse 
recovery) in an attempt to facilitate and integrate the needs of both mother and child 
through a single access model.  More specifically, BTC provides: childcare, mentoring, 
basic needs support (daily breakfast and lunch, transportation, clothing exchange), 
mental health counseling, family medicine, addictions medicine, (medically supervised 
withdrawal programs and methadone programs), as well as accompaniment to 
appointments.159
 
Motherisk, at Toronto Sick Children’s Hospital, maintains a national hotline dedicated 
to the provision of free-of-charge information about the safety and risk, in terms of 
maternal-fetal toxicity during pregnancy and lactation, of drugs, environmental 
chemicals, infections (such as HIV), and disease.  Motherisk also sponsors 
teleconference courses for medical doctors in the diagnosis of FAS/E and further assists 
in implementing telediagnosis.160
  
The magnitude of the problem is illustrated by experience with Immigrant Adoptions in 
Quebec.   Some adoptive parents there are overwhelmed by problems involving FASD, 
as there are few community services to help them cope.  As a result, some parents are 
                                                 
159Leslie, M.  “Breaking the Cycle: Measures in Progress.”. (3rd Annual Fetal Alcohol Canadian Expertise 
(FACE) Research Roundtable, September 9, 2002, FAS, When the Children Grow Up, retrieved 
September 30, 2002, from the world wide web:  <http://www.knowtv.com>.) 
160Motherisk, retrieved October 16, 2003, from the World Wide Web:  <http://www.motherisk.org>. 
 54
returning children to Child and Youth Services.  Many such children eventually end up 
institutionalized or in detention in the juvenile justice system.161  
 
The David Livingstone Community School in Winnipeg, MB, provides a partial answer 
to some of the problems facing children with FASDs, through both integrated and 
segregated school programs.  The staff employs strategies and practices which have 
been found to be effective in educating such children.  The programs, from kindergarten 
to grade six, are organized around concepts of providing an external brain162 and 
environmental adaptations and supports to assist the children in learning.163
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
161 Immigrant Adoptions, The Current, host Anna Maria Tremonti, January 24, 2003, retrieved January 
28, 2003, from the world wide web:  <http://cbc.ca/thecurrent/logs.html>. 
162External Brain, retrieved September 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web:  < http://come-
over.to/FAS/externalbrain.htm>.  External brain, in reference to FASDs, is a term coined by Dr. Sterling 
Clarren to refer to the use of responsible personal mentors and memory aids to help affected individuals 
compensate for their memory deficits and other mental gaps, as well as their lack of impulse control and 
poor judgment. 
163Saskatchewan Institute on Prevention of Handicaps (SIPH), Saskatchewan Institute on Prevention of 
Handicaps Resource Catalogue (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan:  SIPH, 2002-2003) at 21.  Description of 
video, ARND:  A School Wide Approach, David Livingstone Community School, 2001; School of Hope:  
Teaching Kids with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, retrieved from the World Wide Web, September 12, 2003:  
<http://www.come-over.to/FAS/schoolofhope.htm>. 
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1.6.9  Several Qualitative Studies of Interventions to Prevent Secondary 
Disabilities 
 
To attenuate the development of secondary characteristics, to deal with maladaptive 
behaviors arising out of untreated or treatment resistant secondary disabilities, and to 
prepare FASD affected individuals for life in the community (rather than acceptance of 
institutionalization or incarceration as inevitable), interventions and supports throughout 
the life cycle are considered necessary.164  A qualitative study by Margaret Raymond 
and Joe Belanger in British Columbia is unique in focusing on community interventions 
for individuals with FAS/E.165  Community supports studied (termed literacy-based as 
they emphasized communication skills used to organize and enhance behavior) were 
provided to young adults with FAS/E.  Specific community supports selected for study 
by Raymond and Belanger were: 
• Support circles which focus on life adjustments, termed Wehman transitions,166 
namely, employment, living arrangements, getting around the community, 
making friends, sexuality, self esteem, and having fun;167 
• Cognitive compensatory tools designed to assist with everyday memory failure, 
disorganization, and social isolation problems experienced by FAS/FAE 
                                                 
164 Supra note 12 at 185-227 (Streissguth, 2001), and Supra note 129. (Best Practices) 
165 Raymond, M. and Belanger, J.  Literarcy-Based Supports for Young Adults with FAS/FAE, Prepared 
for the Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Advanced Education, Training and Technology, and 
Human Resources Development Canada, The National Literacy Secretariat.  Retrieved Oct. 2, 2002, from 
the World Wide Web:  <http://www.nald.ca/fulltext/lbsupport/Doc/pdf>. 
166 Wehman, P.  Life Beyond the Classroom, Transition Strategies for Young Peoople with Disabilities. 
(Toronto:  Paul H. Brookes Publishing, 1996). 
167 Ibid. at 23-24. 
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individuals.  The tools consist of such literacy-based devices as lists, calendars, 
a student tracker system, and homework book;168 and 
• Cognitive enhancement tools, including the Directions Personal Planning Tool, 
a program which focuses on dreams, goal setting, and implementation, as well 
as the use of an internet chat room to enhance communication, social, and 
technological skills.169 
 
Raymond and Belanger contend that funding for support services should not be linked 
to IQ, as is often the case, but rather should be related to the level of dysfunction or 
maladaptivity exhibited by the client.  Many FAE clients possess normal IQs, but are 
seriously dysfunctional, because of the neurotoxic effects of alcohol (to which they 
were exposed prenatally) on selective parts of their developing brains, resulting in 
organic brain impairment.  Such dysfunction or maladaptivity is best measured by the 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales and the Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised, 
rather than by any IQ test.  A paradox arises because, at a superficial level, individuals 
with FAE may appear and sound normal, and test normal in IQ (or at least higher than 
the usual 70-IQ benchmark for receipt of government support services), but, be 
maladaptive, nevertheless, in their everyday functioning, to the extent of requiring 
intensive, ongoing supports.170   
 
                                                 
168 Ibid. at 47-52. 
169 Ibid. at 65-67. 
170 Ibid. at 18-19 and 24. 
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Using naturalistic methods, Raymond and Belanger’s qualitative study through an 
ethnographic lens, describes the experiences and outcomes of five young adults with 
FAS/FAE and their parents utilizing various community-based interventions or 
supports.  Data collection consisted of researchers’ field notes taken during the support 
circles, as well as researchers’ notes of interviews with subjects and their parents.  The 
interviews were unstructured and open-ended, in order to give full voice to the 
experiences of the subjects and their parents.  From this primary evidence, conclusions 
were derived inductively.171  Previous findings (most significantly Streissguth et al’s 
three longitudinal studies of the adjustment problems of a cohort of 661 FAS/FAE 
clients over a 22-year period)172 are of a comprehensive, statistical nature.  Raymond 
and Belanger wished to supplement Streissguth’s landmark, extensive study of large 
groups of subjects over long periods of time, by in-depth, intensive study of relatively 
short-term interventions (one year in duration) with a small group of subjects.  In 
essence, breadth in the Streissguth study is supplemented by depth in Raymond and 
Belanger’s research, developed through the use of five case studies. 
 
As the stories of the five subjects are told, from their own perspectives and those of 
their parents, the layers and diversity of experiences with the interventions are revealed.  
Problems with the interventions are noted, as well as more limited successes. Each kind 
of intervention utilized is personnel intensive, requiring much skill and attention, and 
ongoing modification by the care giver.  Mechanistic devices like lists, calendars and 
                                                 
171 Ibid. at 5-6. 
172 Supra note 12 at 104-107. (Streissguth, 2001) 
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homework books require continuous monitoring, need external rewards as motivators 
(which can lose their value if over-used), and vary in success with the degree of 
compliance of those involved.173  The effectiveness of support groups and circles varies 
with the skills, sensitivity, and commitment of volunteer participants.  Some subjects 
refused to participate in activities in which they felt they might be considered as, or be 
labeled as, FAS/E.174  Chat room interventions had to be discontinued because of safety 
concerns; a closed network for FAS/E clients was recommended but never implemented 
because of limited human resources.175   
 
The findings of the study are presented as in-depth experiences of the five FAS/FAE 
subjects and their parents with the three types of community-based interventions.  
Biographies of the subjects and detailed descriptions of their experiences with the 
various interventions are included and it is left to the reader/practitioner to decide if 
these experiences can be generalized to the specific cases and contexts with which she 
is working.   The authors attempt to avoid generalizations and, instead, demonstrate the 
multiple realities of FAS/E adults and their families.  Further investigation of 
community interventions is needed, including systematic analysis of the data for 
common themes and patterns characteristic of effective interventions.  The study under 
review, although not definitive, does contribute, via the genre of qualitative research, 
valuable insights for parents and professionals working with FAS/E individuals.  
Through qualitative research, one acquires the feeling of directly experiencing the lives, 
                                                 
173 Supra note 165 at 62-64. 
174 Ibid. at 39-42. 
175 Ibid. at 74. 
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challenges, and voices of these five young FAS/FAE adults and their parents.  Their 
anecdotal positions effectively create the context for the reader.  As an instance, hear 
the mother of 16 year-old Bert candidly give voice to her experiences with the use of 
the weekly reward-based calendar: 
Everyday, Bert has certain jobs to do.  He used to put a great deal of effort into 
avoiding them, often spending more time and energy avoiding the work than 
the work itself required.  Sometimes, he resisted so vehemently that he would 
start yelling, throwing things or even punching holes in doors.  It would have 
been much easier for me to do most of the jobs myself, but we think it is 
important that he learns to look after himself. 
 
When we started to use this calendar, the change in behavior and attitude was 
immediate, especially between after-school and bed-time.  He started doing his 
jobs, showering and brushing his teeth before bed, and we no longer had to get 
angry and force him to do what he was supposed to do.  I think the magnetic 
calendar had a significant impact on our lives, quite remarkable for something 
so simple. 
 
In large part, the secret to its success is the reward we used at the end of every 
day:  email and chat room access.  When his computer crashed, a few months 
after starting to use his magnetic calendar, his behavior crashed, as well, 
instantaneously.  We were back to square one, trying to force him to get ready 
for bed.  He reverted to lying and trying to sneak out of his showers.  Two 
months later, he got a new computer, and the program began to work again. 
 
I suppose the magnetic calendar will work as long as he is consumed by his 
interest in chat room, email and playing computer games over the modem, and 
as long as we can control his access to the internet.  He can only get online 
when I unlock our bedroom door and plug him into that room’s phone line. 
 
He is now in Grade 11 and plans to leave home when he graduates.  If he does, 
I doubt he will want to take the calendar with him and things will unravel for 
him.  But for now, it is quite a God-send to our family.  Maybe when he gets a 
lot older he will realize that he needs this kind of help to keep his life 
together.176
 
 
Raymond and Belanger’s research, although qualitative, did focus mainly on 
fragmented, compartmentalized, and mechanistic community interventions involving 
                                                 
176 Ibid. at 73-74. 
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behavior modification.  Randolph Mason describes the difference between such a 
compartmentalized approach to interventions and a holistic approach as follows: 
The Western scientific paradigm is essentially reductionist in nature; it involves 
the breaking down of larger systems into smaller sub-systems so that these 
smaller components in turn can be analyzed in isolation (Duran and Duran, 
1995).  By and large, this approach has come to dominate most disciplines 
including the field of psychology.  It is through the application of this basic 
scientific principle that psychology and other related fields determined the best 
way to understand the nature of man was to study each of his facets in isolation.  
To accomplish this task, it necessarily involved the separation of mind, body, 
and spirit.177
 
Holistic perspectives maintain that a “whole” cannot be completely inferred merely 
from an analysis of its parts, but rather possesses a synergy which makes the whole 
“greater than the sum of its parts”.   As an illustration, studying the physical or mental 
component in isolation would be of limited value as each component is greatly 
influenced by the workings of other components.  It is less a matter of deciding which 
component needs to be addressed, than of comprehending that if a state of imbalance 
among components exists, it can lead to illness, dysfunction, or even crime.  The focus 
is on restoring the balance by engaging all of the components in a holistic way.178 
Implications for integrated and holistic delivery of education, health and social services 
follow from this premise.  Coincidentally, population studies demonstrate that education 
level and income, among other factors, are empirical indicators of health and 
wellness.179
   
                                                 
177 Mason, R. The Healing of Aboriginal Offenders:  A Comparison Between Cognitive-Behavioral 
Treatment and the Traditional Sweat Lodge Ceremony, Unpublished Masters’ Thesis. (Saskatoon, 
Saskatchewan, Canada: University of Saskatchewan, 2000) at 31. 
178 Ibid. at 31-33.  
179 Institute of Aboriginal Peoples’ Health, retrieved from the World Wide Web, August 2, 2003:  
<http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/institutes/iaph/publications/strat plan2002>. 
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In the holistic, qualitative genre, Mason180 compared the use of the traditional 
Aboriginal sweat lodge ceremony to cognitive-behavioral treatment for Aboriginal 
Offenders (not identified as fetal alcohol per se, but consisting of sex offenders and 
violent offenders, with various degrees of acculturation) at the Saskatoon Regional 
Psychiatric Centre in Saskatchewan.  The sweat lodge experience holistically engages 
one’s physical, mental, emotional and spiritual components. One experiences intense 
heat, reflects on one’s life, feels various emotions, and contacts the spirit world through 
prayer, singing, or vision, all simultaneously, in synergy.  Some inmates reported that 
the sweat lodge ceremony made them more open and more responsive to other forms of 
treatment, including cognitive-behavioral treatment.  Generally, they viewed the Elders 
in the Sweat Lodge Ceremony as less controlling, affording each inmate absolute 
control over his/her healing journey, whereas in the cognitive behavioral program they 
often felt coerced into areas of self-examination that they did not feel ready to 
address.181 In the latter, some feared being written-up in files as uncooperative or 
defensive, which could impact adversely on their rehabilitation and release.   For the 
kinds of transformative change required, holistic healing is an option to be considered 
further in community-based treatment, as well as in the institutionalized treatment noted 
by Mason. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
180 Supra note 177. (Mason) 
181 Ibid. at p. 129-130. 
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1.7  Current State of Access to Treatment Across the Sentencing Spectrum 
 
 
 
Aboriginal offenders comprise 17% of the federal and 16% of provincial admissions, 
while accounting for only 2.8% of the Canadian population.  At 123 per 100,000, 
Canada has one of the highest incarceration rates among developed countries, but the 
Aboriginal incarceration rate is six times the national rate.  In Saskatchewan, the  
incarceration rate for adult Aboriginals is 33.3 times higher than the rate for adult non-
Aboriginals.  In addition, Aboriginal offenders were more likely to be remanded in 
custody before trial, and less likely to be released on parole or mandatory supervision 
after sentencing.182  Saskatchewan’s Aboriginal youth make up 75% of secured custody 
admissions, while comprising only 15% of the youth population.  Comparable statistics 
in Manitoba and Alberta, respectively, are 79% of secured admissions to 16% of youth 
population, and 35% of secured admissions to 5 percent of the youth population.183 The 
majority of Aboriginal crime is considered alcohol-related, with 57% of inmates having 
substance abuse problems.184  Also attributed to alcohol and its effects are 35% of 
Aboriginal deaths from such causes as alcoholism, accidents, cirrhosis, suicide, and 
homicide.185
   
                                                 
182Correctional Service Canada, Aboriginal Offenders, and Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, Canadian 
Centre for Justice Statistics Profile Series, 2001.  Retrieved August 11, 2003, from the world wide web: 
>http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pubed/feuilles/off-ab e.shtml>. 
183 Hendrick, D. Youth Custody and Community Services Canada, 1999/00, Canada Centre for Justice 
Statistics, Catalogue No. 85-002-XPE200l012. 
184 Correctional Service Canada, Task Force Report on the Reduction of Substance Abuse (1990), 
retrieved from the World Wide Web, September 10, 2003, <http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/forum/e024/e024i_e.shtml>. 
185 Supra note 72. (A Statistical Profile on the Health of First Nations) 
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The Corrections and Conditional Release Act,186 s. 86 requires: 
 
 86. (1) The Service shall provide every inmate with 
 (a) essential health care; and 
 (b) reasonable access to non-essential mental health care that will contribute 
 to the inmate’s rehabilitation and successful reintegration into the community.   
 
 
No treatment is provided unless the inmate voluntarily gives his/her informed consent to 
that treatment.187  
 
The Canada Health Act188 s. 3 states: 
3.  It is hereby declared that the primary objective of a Canadian health care 
policy is to protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of 
residents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services 
without financial or other barriers.  
 
What essential mental health care consists of vis a` vis the non-essential, and what 
reasonable access is constitute significant questions.  Little jurisprudence exists 
interpreting relevant sections of the cited Acts, except the following two cases.   In Kelly 
v. Canada189 the inmate plaintiff suffered from environmental sensitivity disorder 
(ESD) or multiple chemical sensitivity disorder.  Symptoms such as fatigue, pain, 
concentration and memory problems, gastro-intestinal and sleep disorders occurred 
when Kelly was exposed to chemicals such as exhaust, tobacco smoke, waxes and 
polishes, printer’s ink, and plastics.  Kelly was twice referred to an outside physician,  
                                                 
186 R.S.C., 1992, c. 20. 
187 Ibid. at s. 88. (CCRA) 
188 R.S.C., 1985, c. C-6, s.3. 
189 [1996] F.C.J. No. 880. (Kelly) 
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whose resultant recommendations were followed up by Kingston Penitentiary.   A 
charcoal mask was purchased as well as a small air filter for Kelly’s cell.   Alternate 
living arrangements proffered were rejected by Kelly, and Kelly was assigned outdoor 
duties away from the indoor pollutants to which he was sensitive.  Accommodations 
noted were implemented, informed by the need to maintain the integrity and security of 
the institution.  The Court ruled that Kelly, not the penitentiary, failed to make 
sufficient effort to deal with his condition within the realities of his lawful confinement 
in the penitentiary, and thus neither s. 86 of the CCRA, nor s. 7, 12 and 15 of the 
Charter were breached.  As an example, while working outside, Kelly chose to loiter 
near the loading docks where exhaust fumes were prevalent, and he kept old 
newspapers in his cell as well as a computer and printer, contraindicated by his 
sensitivities.    
 
In Strykiwsky v. Stony Mountain Institution190 inmate Strykiwsky was a heroin addict 
applying on an exceptional basis for Phase I methadone treatment.  Stony Mountain had 
introduced methadone treatment in two phases: Phase I to be reserved for those inmates 
who had been receiving such treatment in the community before committal, and Phase 
II which would incrementally offer methadone treatment to all confined heroin addicts.  
Though a consent order covering the plaintiff’s situation had been reached before the 
case was heard, the plaintiff wished the case to be adjudicated for the benefit all heroin 
addicts so confined, waiting for access to treatment.  The preliminary issue of extension 
of time for the filing of expert witness affidavits was the only substantive issue dealt 
                                                 
190 [2000] F.C.J. No. 1404. (Styrkiwsky) 
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with in the cited judgment.  Hopefully, the matter of access to methadone treatment was 
resolved otherwise in a manner satisfactory for inmates, as it has not been adjudicated.   
 
Standards of Practice Policy Document 301 from Correctional Services Canada 
distinguishes among four types of essential health services: emergency health care 
(delay would endanger the life of the inmate), urgent health care (condition likely to 
deteriorate to an emergency or adversely affect the inmate’s ability to carry on activities 
of daily living), mental health care (for disturbances of thought, mood, perception, 
orientation or memory that significantly impair judgment, behavior, the capacity to 
recognize reality or the ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, both acute and long 
term) and dental care (involving pain, trauma or preventative care).  All other services 
are considered non-essential to which inmates are to have reasonable access, in keeping 
with community practice.191
 
 
As FAS/E offenders accumulate criminal records, they may receive sentences requiring 
incarceration, including penitentiary time, and possible Dangerous Offender or Long 
Term Offender designation.192  For some offenders, conditional release, including long 
term supervision, may be required to facilitate access to treatment in the community.  
As FAS/E offenders may be found throughout the sentencing spectrum from diversion 
to incarceration, access to appropriate treatment is also a concern throughout this 
spectrum.  Alternatively, if mental disorder is established, treatment needs must be 
                                                 
191 Correctional Service of Canada, Standards of Practice Policy Document 301, retrieved from the World 
Wide Web, January, 2003, < http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/prgrm/fsw/hlthstds/healthstds5_e.shtml#1> 
192 Supra note 31, Criminal Code, Part XXIV/DANGEROUS OFFENDERS AND LONGTERM 
OFFENDERS, 1997, c. 17, s. 3.   
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addressed in the types of placement applicable, and considered as a factor when 
reviewing continued detention.  In this context, a Knoblauch disposition193 which is a 
hospital disposition through the back door by way of an optional term of a conditional 
sentence, was upheld by the Supreme Court, thereby expeditiously interfacing between 
the criminal justice and mental health systems, where appropriate facilities exist. 
 
Without adequate access to appropriate treatment, FAS/E offenders may become 
institutionalized and more at risk to re-offend upon release.  Their treatment, in addition 
to being community-based, should also be culturally appropriate, that is, for 
Aboriginals, restorative, rather than retributive.  Bonds need to be established in the 
community, so that an FAS/E offender has a system of support to assist him/her in 
making positive adjustments in social, educational, psychological and occupational 
spheres.  He/she will also require ongoing interdisciplinary treatment to facilitate 
adjustment in all aspects of life.  Culturally appropriate traditional healing is an 
important option in any treatment plan involving Aboriginal peoples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
193 R. v. Knoblauch, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 780. 
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1.8  Retrospective and Prospective 
 
Chapter One begins by introducing the contention on which the thesis is based, and 
presenting existing support for that contention.  The contention that carceral treatment is 
inappropriate for offenders with fetal alcohol conditions, was supported by a 
consideration of the nature of FASD conditions involving organic brain impairment, 
and the secondary disabilities that can result without access to appropriate disability 
services.  The Chapter then examined the ideological, historical, legal and policy issues 
that are impediments to implementing community-based treatment for such offenders.   
 
Centralization of power and resultant breakdown of local community functions, the 
concomitant relativity of values and  positivistic laws, coupled with the adoption of a 
retributive justice paradigm, have mitigated against community-based treatment.   
The use of alcohol as a tool of domination and exploitation of Aboriginal peoples is as 
old as the history of colonization itself.  Current consumption patterns of Aboriginal 
peoples indicate a trend towards binge drinking which produces high BACs 
contributing to FASDs.194  Legislation and policy fall short of mandating community-
based treatment to replace incarceration.  Treaty or other legal remedies discussed in 
this respect are as yet untried; the delay, in part, is due to oppressive provisions of the 
Indian Act first enacted in 1876, and viewed by treaty beneficiaries as a colonial 
government’s hedge to full treaty implementation.  Colonialism introduced distilled 
alcohol to Aboriginal peoples, and has perpetuated its devastating effects 
                                                 
194 Supra note 77.  (NWT Statistics) 
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intergenerationally.  It has led to community, cultural, and family breakdown, FASDs, 
marginalization, alienation, and a disproportionately high crime rate.   
 
Chapter two will examine the sentencing case law, attempting to illuminate what 
happens when individuals with organic brain impairment and largely untreated 
secondary symptoms, perhaps undiagnosed or inadequately diagnosed, offend and face 
the machinery of the criminal justice system, which remains mainly retributive in 
nature.  Chapter Three will examine constitutional remedies which hold out promise for 
mandating community-based treatment for all offenders with FASDs, in lieu of 
incarceration. 
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2.  CASE LAW 
 
 
 
2.1  Mental Disorder 
 
 
 
Whether the claim of insanity is characterized as a denial of mens rea, an 
excusing defence, or more, generally, as an exemption based on criminal 
incapacity, the fact remains that sanity is essential for guilt.195
 
These words of Lamer J., as he then was, can be construed as a logical extension of 
Hart’s contention that, before punishment is justified, the offender must be responsible, 
must be acting voluntarily, and must possess the necessary mental element or moral 
culpability.  Hart criticized Kant and Hegel for their implicit premise that individuals as 
rational, autonomous decision-makers, freely choose to commit the crimes for which 
they should be punished.196  Disabled offenders, such as those with FASDs, often 
impulsive and irrational because of their organic brain impairment, may benefit from 
more generous understanding in the manner of Hart, of crime and responsibility.  Some 
assert that offenders with FASDs lack full autonomy, rationality, responsibility, 
voluntariness and culpability, and express concerns about individuals with such 
disabilities being exposed to penal consequences in criminogenic environments.197  
Mechanisms exist in law to avoid punishing those who, because of mental disorder, lack 
the ability to stand trial.  Alternately, measures exist for those found guilty of an offence 
and who suffer from a mental disorder to be excused from punishment.  For mentally 
                                                 
195 R. v. Chaulk (1990). 62 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) at 213 Lamer C.J. 
196 Supra note 29. (Hart) 
197 Green, R. G. and Healy, K. F., Tough on Kids:  Rethinking Approaches to Youth Justice  (Saskatoon: 
Purich Publishers, 2003), at 64-70. 
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disordered offenders not found unfit nor excused on the basis of their mental disorder, 
trial and perhaps punishment cannot be avoided altogether.  For them, mental disorders 
may be considered a mitigating factor which may reduce their culpability, and qualify 
such offenders for a lesser sentence, including a treatment component.  However, the 
latter is at curial discretion.  No universal, formal mechanism exists to impose a 
rehabilitative rather than a penal disposition on the convicted mentally disordered youth 
or adult not found unfit or excused.  At issue here is whether offenders with FASDs 
would qualify for any of these considerations for the mentally disordered, and, if so, in 
what circumstances.  
 
 
 
 
2.2  Unfitness to Stand Trial Due to Mental Disorder (UST) 
 
A threshold inquiry in the case law considers whether an adult or youth offender with 
an FASD has the capacity to be charged and tried in our justice system.198  The 
mechanics of such an inquiry and the consequences for the range of dispositions to 
which the accused is subject will be considered. 
 
                                                 
198 Section 51 of the Young Offenders Act and section 141 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act state the 
general rule that the Criminal Code applies to proceedings against young persons, unless there is an 
inconsistency with the youth act (YOA or YCJA) under which the youth has been charged.  Relevant 
sections of the Criminal Code dealing with fitness to stand trial or not criminally responsible on account 
of mental disorder are not inconsistent with the YOA or YCJA and thus apply to young persons, as well 
as to adults. 
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R. v. T. J.,199 a seminal case in the UST context, deals with T.J., a 22-year old 
Aboriginal man with FAS, who has the physical appearance of a 12-year old boy and 
who suffers from mental retardation.  T. J. at the age of 15 was found unfit to stand trial 
on the charge of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code,200 and has been 
detained under that jurisdiction ever since.   Had he been fit to stand trial he would have 
been subject to a maximum disposition of two years under the Young Offenders Act.201
 
Unfit to stand trial (UST), a series of complex provisions regarding sections 2, 672.21, 
672.12, and 672.54 of the Criminal Code, reads as follows: 
 
 Unfit to Stand Trial 
  
2. “Unfit to stand trial” means unable on account of mental disorder to conduct 
 a defence at any stage of the proceedings before a verdict is rendered or to 
 instruct counsel to do so, and, in particular, unable on account of mental disorder  
to 
(a) understand the nature or object of the proceedings, 
(b) understand the possible consequences of the proceedings, or 
(c) communicate with counsel; 
 
Mental Disorder 
“Mental disorder” means a disease of the mind.   
 
 Where Court May Order Assessment 
672.12 (1) The court may make an assessment order at any stage of the proceedings 
against the accused of its own motion, on application of the accused, or subject to 
subsections (2) and (3), on application of the prosecutor. 
 
(2) Where the prosecutor applies for an assessment in order to determine whether the 
accused is unfit to stand trial for an offence that is prosecuted by way of summary 
conviction, the court may only order the assessment if: 
                                                 
199 [1999] Y.J. No. 57 (Terr. Ct.).  (T.J.) 
200 Supra note 31. The incident was fairly innocent compared to most sexual assaults.  T.J. and the victim, 
a 15-year-old girl, both resided in the same group home.  On Nov. 21, 1992, T.J. lay on her bed on top of 
her, while wearing no pants.  The victim was wearing night clothes and there may have been a bed cover 
between her and T.J.  When the complainant protested, T.J. exited the room.  No force was used, nor did 
T.J. attempt to fondle the victim. 
201 R.S.C. 1985, C. Y-1. 
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(a) the accused raised the issue of fitness; or 
(b) the prosecutor satisfied the court that there are reasonable grounds to doubt 
that the accused is fit to stand trial. 
 
(3) Where the prosecutor applies for an assessment in order to determine whether the 
accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the offence so as to be 
exempt from criminal responsibility, the court may only order the assessment if 
(a) the accused puts his or her mental capacity for criminal intent into issue; or 
(b) the prosecutor satisfied the court that there are reasonable grounds to doubt 
that the accused is criminally responsible for the alleged offence, on 
account of mental disorder. 
 
 
 Presumption of Fitness 
672.22 An accused is presumed fit to stand trial unless the court is satisfied on the 
balance of probabilities that the accused is unfit to stand trial. 
 
 
Verdict of Unfit to Stand Trial 
672.31 Where the verdict on trial of the issue is that an accused is unfit to stand 
trial, any plea that has been made shall be set aside and any jury shall be discharged. 
 
 
Prima Facie Case to be Made Every Two years. 
672.32 (1) The court that has jurisdiction in respect of the offence charged against 
an accused who is found unfit to stand trial shall hold an inquiry, not later than two 
years after the verdict is rendered, and every two years thereafter until the accused 
is acquitted pursuant to subsection (6) or tried, to decide whether sufficient evidence 
can be adduced at that time to put the accused on trail. 
 
 
 
Dispositions That May be Made: 
672.54 Where a court or Review Board makes a disposition pursuant to subsection  
672.45(2) or section 672.47, it shall, taking into consideration the need to protect the  
public from dangerous persons, the mental condition of the accused, the reintegration 
of the accused into society and the other needs of the accused, make one of the 
following dispositions that is the least onerous and least restrictive to the accused: 
 
(a) where a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder has 
been rendered in respect of the accused and, in the opinion of the court of Review 
Board, the accused is not a significant threat to the safety of the public, by order, direct 
that the accused be discharged absolutely: 
  
(b) by order, direct that the accused be discharged subject to such conditions as the 
court or Review Board considers appropriate; or 
 
(c) by order, direct that the accused be detained in custody in a hospital, subject to such 
conditions as the court of Review Board considers appropriate 
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672.72 (1) Any party may appeal against a disposition made by a court or Review 
Board, or a placement decision made by a Review Board, to the court of appeal of the 
province where the disposition or placement decision was made on any ground of 
appeal that raises a question of law or fact alone or mixed law and fact. 
 
(2) An appellant shall give notice of an appeal against a disposition or placement 
decision in the manner directed by the applicable rules of court within fifteen days 
after the day on which the appellant receives a copy of the placement decision or 
disposition and reasons for it or within any further time that the court of appeal, or a 
judge of that court, may direct. 
 
(3)  The court of appeal shall hear an appeal against a disposition or placement decision 
in or out of the regular sessions of the court, as soon as practicable after the day on 
which the notice of appeal is given, within any period that may be fixed by the court of 
appeal a judge of the court of appeal, or the rules of that court. 
 
 
 
Territorial Court Judge Lilles in T.J.,202 in view of T.J.’s long detention, addressed the 
discrepancy between dispositions under s. 672.54 of the Code for USTs, compared to 
dispositions under the same section for an accused found not criminally responsible on 
account of mental disorder (NCRs).  Where an NCR accused is considered not to be a 
significant threat to the safety of the public, she may be discharged absolutely under s.  
672.54 (a).  The UST accused, however, were she to present no similar threat, is subject 
to conditions and control of the court or review board, provided the Crown can establish 
a prima face case against her every two years (s. 672.22 of the Criminal Code) or, for 
young offenders, every year (s. 13(2) of Young Offenders Act).  The option of absolute 
discharge is not open to her under the Code.  According to R. v. Swain,203in the context 
of an NCR accused (an insanity acquittee),204 the pith and substance of s. 672 is the 
protection of the public from those who have engaged in criminal acts.  Protection of 
                                                 
202 Supra note 199.  (T.J.) 
203 (1991), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) at 525, Lamer C.J.C. (Swain) 
204 At the time of Swain, the term in the Code was insanity, rather than NCRMD. 
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the public is to be achieved through prevention of the recurrence of wrongful acts by 
means of supervision and treatment of the mentally disordered person, rather than 
through punishment, arbitrary confinement, and deprivation of liberty not in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice.  Chief Justice Lamer in Swain held that 
automatic, indeterminate detention of those found not guilty by reason of insanity, 
without an enquiry as to whether they required confinement, was unconstitutional: 
The detention order is automatic, without any rational standard for determining 
whether an individual insanity acquittee should be detained. The duty of the 
trial judge to detain is unqualified by any standards whatsoever. It is difficult to 
imagine a detention being ordered on a more arbitrary basis in violation of s. 9. 
Since s. 542(2) still requires a trial judge to automatically order strict custody 
based on no criteria or standards and before any kind of hearing can be 
conducted on the issue of present mental condition, the provision infringes ss. 7 
and 9 of the Charter and cannot be saved under s. 1 of the Charter. While the 
objectives of this section, to protect the public and to prevent crime by 
detention of those insane acquittees who are dangerous, are objectives of 
pressing and substantial concern, this section cannot meet the proportionality 
tests. . . . 
 
The indeterminate nature of the strict custody order under s. 542(2) infringes on 
the rights and liberty in a manner that is not in accordance with fundamental 
justice to an acceptable degree. The minimal impairment component of the 
proportionality test requires that insane acquittees be detained no longer than 
necessary to determine whether they are currently dangerous due to their 
insanity. Section 542(2), therefore, cannot be justified as a reasonable limit on 
the accused's rights under s. 7. As regards s. 9, while the effect on an accused of 
a period of automatic and arbitrary detention without consideration of any 
criteria may not be disproportionate to the importance of achieving the 
objective, the fact that s. 542(2) provides for a period of indeterminate 
detention renders the effect of the limitation disproportionate to the 
objective.205
 
 
Accordingly, once the mentally disordered accused recovers or proves less of a threat to 
society, she should fall outside the ambit of the criminal law power, and be absolutely 
discharged.  But this option of exiting the system is not open to USTs.  Terr. Ct. J. 
                                                 
205 Supra note 203 at p. 489-90.  (Swain). 
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Lilles held that the same constitutional principles against arbitrary detention and 
unrestricted deprivation of liberty should apply to both types of mentally disordered 
accused, NCRs and USTs.  T.J.’s permanent disorder, mental retardation caused by fetal 
alcohol syndrome, could not be improved through medication.206  He would never be fit 
to stand trial and thus perhaps be acquitted, nor could he be found NCR and so subject 
to absolute discharge.  Under the UST designation T.J. had been kept subject to 
criminal law jurisdiction for 6 ½ years, without being allowed to raise the issue of 
public safety.  Terr. Ct. J. Lilles found the statutory regime established for accuseds 
who are UST was overbroad in this respect and infringed T.J.’s  s. 7 and 15 rights under 
the Charter: 
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
 
15. (1)  Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age 
or mental or physical disability. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object 
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including 
those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
 
 
Judge Lilles held that s. 672.54(2) was incapable of passing the minimal impairment 
branch of s. 1 justification under the Charter: 
1.  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
 
 
The minimal impairment branch of s. 1 was considered in R. v. Heywood 
                                                 
206 Many conditions such as psychoses or schizophrenia can be improved fairly quickly with medication, 
and the accused is then able to stand trial and exit the system. 
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In considering whether a legislative provision is overbroad, a court must ask the 
question:  Are those means necessary to achieve the state objective?  If the 
state, in pursuing a legitimate objective, used means which are broader than is 
necessary to accomplish that objective, the principles of fundamental justice 
will be violated because the individual’s rights will have been limited for no 
reason.  The effect of overbreadth is that in some applications the law is 
arbitrary or disproportionate. 
 
Overbroad legislation which infringes s. 7 of the Charter would appear to be 
incapable of passing the minimal impairment branch of the s. 1 analysis. (at. 
523)207
 
 
The statutory scheme was considered arbitrary and disproportionate by Judge Lilles, 
limiting the rights of USTs for no reason, as in the case of T.J.   Further, no UST 
accused has ever been found guilty, while NCR accused had been found guilty 
factually, although excused from guilt on the basis of mental disorder.  Notwithstanding 
the absence of a guilty finding, if mentally retarded and incapable of recovery, the UST 
accused never can be found fit to stand trial with the concomitant possibility of escaping 
criminal jurisdiction.  Neither can she escape criminal jurisdiction, either through 
acquittal or absolute discharge as can an NCR, by establishing that she is no longer a 
danger to public safety.  The constitutional remedy employed by the Court in T.J. was 
to read down s. 672.54(a), declaring the words “a verdict of not criminally responsible 
on account of mental disorder has been rendered in respect of the accused and” of no 
force and effect.  Subsection 672.54(2) would then read: 
 
672.54(a) where, in the opinion of the Court or Review Board, the accused is not a 
significant  threat to the safety of the public, by order, direct that the accused be 
discharged absolutely; 
                                                 
207 (1994), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) at 523, as cited in T.J., supra note 199, at 10-11. (Heywood) 
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making the disposition of absolute discharge applicable to both UST and NCR accused 
if neither were a threat to the safety of the public. 
 
Thus, in Judge Lilles’ court, USTs such as T.J., found not to be a risk to public safety, 
may, like NCR accused, be subject to an absolute discharge.  Not yet clear is whether 
higher courts will uphold this conflation of UST and NCR dispositions under s. 
672.54(a), making absolute discharge accessible to USTs not considered a threat to 
public safety.  Judge Lilles concluded proceedings against T.J. with a Charter remedy 
of a judicial stay of proceedings, as T.J. was not considered, on current evidence, a 
significant risk to community safety.  Until a higher court rules on the matter, in the 
interim, counsel for offenders with mental disorders may be leery of pursuing a UST 
designation for fear that it could result in indeterminate detention for their client.   
 
As the case following illustrates, offenders who one way or another avoid the UST 
designation, may not, because of their untreated mental disorder, elude criminal 
jurisdiction for long, even after serving a sentence to avoid the indeterminate detention 
that could result from being found UST.   Moreover, placement in criminogenic 
environments that could result if they are not designated UST are not appropriate for 
them and may lead to further deterioration. 
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Judge Turpel-Lafond, in R. v. W.D.,208 recounts how an Aboriginal, young offender 
with FAS, aged 13, had been, since the age of 12, charged 12 times (for minor property 
offences and consequent breaches), and had made 25 appearances in court under five 
different defence lawyers while facing many prosecutors.  Diagnosed at the age of 29 
weeks with FAS, an expert witness described him this way to the Court: 
His understanding of what happens around him and about basic society is limited.  
Equally his understanding of the court process was also relatively limited.  For 
example, he was unable to explain what “making a plea” meant.  He was unable to 
explain the role of the prosecutor, other than to say the prosecutor talks about the 
charges.  His understanding of defence counsel was simply that they stood up and 
talked.  Similarly, he did not seem to be able to define what “guilty” or “innocent” 
means.209
 
Despite perceptible inabilities, in his 25 appearances in court, no one involved in the 
court process had initiated an assessment and an UST inquiry for W.D.  Obviously 
unfit, he ended up in youth jail many times, a vulnerable, mentally disabled young 
person exposed to antisocial peers.  Concerns regarding the administration of justice led 
Judge Turpel-Lafond to order a stay of proceedings for charges against W.D.; probation 
was converted to intensive community supervision appropriate for a youth with FAS.  
The judge recommended that courts dealing with W.D. in future ascertain he is fit to 
stand trial.  She concluded her judgment this way: 
W.D. is in a difficult situation.  There is no specific programming for him in the 
community, such as a school for children with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, or a 
one-on-one coaching program for him to model good behavior.  This lack of 
support means he cannot be protected from ongoing conflict with the criminal 
                                                 
208 R. v. W.D. [2001] S.J. No. 70 (Sask. Prov. Ct.), Youth Ct. J. Turpel-Lafond.  Note:  W.D. is the second 
of nine siblings, and is a twin.  In a later case where fitness to stand trial is considered, W.D. is denoted as 
W.A.L.D.(1) and his twin as W.A.L.D.(2).  Three of the siblings have been diagnosed with FAS.  The 
mother is a single mother, in poor health, who tries her best with the children, but is somewhat 
overwhelmed by her circumstances. 
209 Ibid. at 7, quoting p. 2 report of B. McDonald, psycho-educational assessment, December 15, 2000. 
(W.D.) 
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justice system.  He is now known in the law enforcement community.  It may 
be only a matter of time until a more sophisticated youth or adult takes 
advantage of W.D. and some real harm is done to him or someone else. 
 
It is a sad commentary on our society that a severely disabled boy, who is 
highly vulnerable to antisocial individuals, would end up in a youth jail so 
many times.  One can only speculate on how this is preparing him to meet the 
challenges of adulthood, which in legal terms is a mere four years away, even if 
developmentally is many years in the future.  One cannot but question what 
social policy is served by the use of the hard penal machinery of the criminal 
justice system to deal with the most chronic mentally disabled youth of our 
society.210
   
 
 
Given the urgency of a finding of UST for FAS offenders such as W.D., despite the 
pitfall of indeterminate detention, the discussion will now turn to the legal mechanism 
of such an inquiry.  The analysis of a finding of UST per se, as modeled on the method 
used in R. v. J.A.P.,211 R. v. W.A.L.D.(1),212 and R. v. W.A.L.D.(2),213  and included 
cases, is complex.   That complexity may account in part for its omission, on occasion, 
in busy youth courts.  In the analysis, the trial judge initially is to ascertain that the 
prosecution has a prima facie case against the accused.  A finding of UST should not be 
made in the absence of grounds to try the accused.214   Usually a prima facie case can 
be made to put an FAS accused on trial, in order to have the UST designation 
considered by the Court.   Because of their impulsivity, poor judgment, inability to 
anticipate consequences, and susceptibility to negative peer influences, FAS individuals 
are prone to committing offences and their offences are easily detected as they are 
                                                 
210 Ibid. at 6-7. (W.D.) 
211 [2000] S.J. No. 260 (Prov. Ct.). (JAP) 
212 [2002] S.J. No. 221 (Prov. Ct.).  (WALD1)  
213  [2002] S.J. No. 222 (Prov. Ct.).  (WALD2)  Note:  W.A.L.D.(1) and W.A.L.D.(2) are twin, mentally 
impaired, FAS, young offenders, one being W.D. dealt with in [2002] S.J. No. 70 (Prov. Ct.), their middle 
initials later were used to distinguish them. 
214 R. v. Taylor,(1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 551 at 562 (Ont. C.A.).   
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neither capable of forethought nor of cunning concealment.  This situation is more 
pronounced when the accused is also mentally retarded.   
 
In R. v. Taylor,215 where a prima facie case had been made against the accused, the 
Court considered in some detail the issue of fitness to stand trial and the concomitant 
ability to communicate in order to instruct counsel. The Court identified three points: 
• the accused must not be acting (mentally disordered) out of malice;216 
• whether she is capable of entering a plea; and 
• whether she has sufficient intellect to comprehend the proceedings, so as to 
make a proper defence—to challenge the lawyers by making objections, or to 
understand the evidence in sufficient detail. 
Taylor held in addition that “the accused must have sufficient mental fitness to 
participate in the proceedings in a meaningful way,” although this threshold should not 
be too high. If the accused is able to understand the process, consonant with the 
principles of fundamental justice, she should be given the benefit of a speedy 
completion at trial, rather than declared unfit to stand trial.217  A fitness threshold too 
high would militate against the benefit of a speedy trial for those who are more capable 
than accused like T.J. of understanding the court process. 
  
                                                 
215 Ibid.  at 565.  
216 Taylor was actually a deaf mute and not mentally retarded, but the rule applies to the mentally 
disordered as well as the deaf. 
217 Supra note 214 at 566. (Taylor) 
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The meaning of fitness within the context of the Criminal Code was elaborated by the 
Court in R. v. Steele:   
An accused is incapable of conducting the defence, within the meaning of s. 615 of the 
Criminal Code, if he or she: 
 
(a) cannot distinguish between available pleas; 
(b) does not understand the nature or purpose of the proceedings, including the respective 
roles of the judge, jury and counsel; 
(c) does not understand the personal import of the proceedings; 
(d) is unable to communicate with counsel, converse with counsel rationally or make 
critical decisions on counsel’s advice; or 
(e) is unable to take the stand, if necessary. 218 
 
The Court in R. v. M.S.R.,219 considering R. v. Rabey220 and R. v. Cooper,221 adopted 
the same definition of mental disorder in s. 2 of the Code as did Dickson J. in 
Cooper.222  According to Dickson J. in Cooper, a mental disorder or disease of the mind 
is an illness, disorder, or abnormal condition of the mind that is neither self-induced nor 
transitory.   Further, the Court in M.S.R. concluded that the term mental disorder 
includes mental retardation or impaired cognitive ability.  The confession rule, the right 
to silence, and the right to counsel were considered in the context of UST by the Court 
in R. v. Whittle.223   Whittle held that the fit accused need not be capable of exercising 
analytical reasoning, but rather must possess only the mental capacity of an operating 
mind as is required for the confession rule and the right to remain silent.  As for the 
right to counsel, the fit accused must be able to instruct counsel, understand the function 
                                                 
218 (1991) 63 C.C.C. (3d) 149 at 181 (Que. C.A.).   (Steele) 
219 (1996) 112 C.C.C. (3d) 406, (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.)   (M.S.R.) 
220 (1980), 54 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.), aff’g (1977) 37 C.C.C. (2d) 461 (Ont. CA). (Rabey) 
221 (1980), 51 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (S.C.C.).  Note:  Dickson J.’s definition in Cooper will be more fully 
considered under the NCR analysis.   (Cooper)  
222 Ibid. at 244.  (Cooper). 
223 (1994) 92 C.C.C. (3d) 11, (S.C.C.), Sopinka J.  (Whittle) 
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of counsel, and comprehend that she can dispense with counsel.224  Sometimes, as in 
T.J., an FAS mentally impaired accused possesses a superficial understanding of the 
court process, and can parrot answers, but without understanding.  For instance, T. J. 
was conscious that he was in the criminal justice system, but was not cognizant of the 
repercussions of the UST designation, apparently believing that he was to be placed on 
probation.  Assessed by experts, he was found by them to be incapable of participating 
in the court process or of understanding the nature of the courtroom procedures.225    
 
Like NCR, UST, although based on a medical condition, is a question of law for the 
courts to decide, on the balance of probabilities.   They do resort to expert medical 
testimony to guide their decisions.  According to s. 672.12 of the Code, the UST inquiry 
may be initiated at any stage of the proceedings, by the court itself, or on application of 
the accused or the prosecutor.  The prosecutor may make such initiation if the accused 
raises the issue of fitness, or if the prosecutor satisfies the court that reasonable grounds 
exist to doubt the fitness of the accused. 
 
Judge Whelan in W.A.L.D.(1), after a UST inquiry, was convinced, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the accused was unable to pass the s. 2 fitness test. Guided by the 
opinions of experts and the viva voce testimony of the accused, she described the 
unfitness to stand trial of W.A.L.D.(1) as follows: 
He was confused about the roles of the crown, defence and judge and had a 
very rudimentary understanding of the terms commonly used in a courtroom 
                                                 
224 Ibid. at p. 26-31.  (Whittle) 
225 Supra note 199 at  para. 1-3. (T.J.) 
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such as “guilty, not guilty and undertaking.” He recalled that he has had trouble 
with his curfew.  He knows it was 9:00 p.m., but he acknowledged that he 
couldn’t tell time.  He knew that if he was out till 10:00 he could be picked up 
by the “cops” because it was after his curfew.  He thought that “remand” meant 
“going to Kilburn and doing your time.”  He was unable to explain why he was 
at Court on this day.  In answer to some questions he gave answers suggesting 
an understanding, however when asked to explain the meaning of the terms he 
used, he was unable to do so.  He had no understanding of the adversarial 
nature of court proceedings. 226
 
 
In summary, a situation similar to T.J.’s, absent a constitutional remedy, does raise 
doubts about the efficacy and advisability of UST dispositions which could leave an 
FASD accused subject to indeterminate detention in the mental health/criminal justice 
system.  Alternatively, carceral dispositions are inappropriate for those with mental 
disorders, leaving them subject to the influence of negative peers, victimization and 
deterioration in their mental states.  Before concluding that UST designations leave 
mentally disordered offenders in a dilemma, there is another specialized provision to 
consider when dealing with a mentally disordered offender.  In addition to the front end 
UST disposition, there exists the possibility of a mentally disordered offender 
qualifying for an excusing mechanism during the trial process itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
226 Supra note 212 at 10.    [W.A.L.D.(1)] 
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2.3  Not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder 
 
If an accused cannot, or does not choose to and is not required to demonstrate, on the 
balance of probabilities, that she is unfit to stand trial, 227  the second inquiry, which 
occurs only after a guilty verdict or plea, may review whether she is or is not criminally 
responsible for her actions on account of mental disorder (NCR). 
 
The NCR analysis proceeds as follows.  The first question asked is whether the person 
suffers from a “mental disorder,” within the meaning of section 2 of the Criminal Code.   
Onus of proof rests on whomever raises the defence of NCR (including the prosecutor, 
who may raise the mental disorder defense in certain circumstances as considered in R. 
v. Swain228).  Everyone is presumed not to suffer from a mental disorder which would 
exempt them from criminal responsibility, until the contrary is established on the 
balance of probabilities. Under the mental disorder inquiry one must consider first 
whether or not a specific fetal alcohol condition is a “disease of the mind” pursuant to 
section 2.  A further inquiry is made whether the evidence supports, on the balance of 
probabilities, the conclusion that the accused suffers, in each case, from the specific 
fetal alcohol condition which was examined in the first phase of the test and found to be 
a mental disorder.  If the accused from these tests is found to suffer from a mental 
disorder, one must ask, in addition, according to s. 16(1) of the Code, if that mental 
disorder rendered her, at the time of the offence, incapable of appreciating the nature 
                                                 
227 And neither the court nor prosecutor present reasonable grounds for such a finding. 
228 Supra note 203. (Swain) 
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and quality of her acts, or, in the alternative, if it rendered her incapable of knowing that 
these acts were wrong.  Case law has much to say about the interpretation of each of 
these phases of inquiry, including inter alia what is a disease of the mind, what it means 
to be incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of acts because of a mental 
disorder, and what it means to be incapable, due to mental disorder, of knowing that 
these acts were wrong.   
 
Pertinent provisions of the Criminal Code include: 
16. (1)  No person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an 
omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person 
incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of 
knowing that it was wrong. 
 
(2)  Every person is presumed not to suffer from a mental disorder so as to be 
exempt from criminal responsibility by virtue of subsection (1), until the 
contrary is proved on the balance of probabilities. 
(3)  The burden of proof that an accused was suffering from a mental disorder 
so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility is on the party that raises the 
issue. 
 
2. “mental disorder” means a “disease of the mind.”  
 
  Dickson J. in R. v. Cooper, defined “disease of the mind” as: 
 
Any illness, disorder, or abnormal condition which impairs the human mind, 
and its functioning, excluding however, self-induced states caused by alcohol or 
drugs, as well as transitory mental states such as hysteria or concussion.229
 
Alcohol has impaired the mind of those with FASDs through involuntary exposure in 
utero, not through self-induced states.  The effects of alcohol exposure in utero on the 
mental state are not transitory, but permanent.   R. v. Daviault230 held that self-induced, 
                                                 
229 Supra note 221 at 244. (Cooper) 
230 (1994), 93 C.C.C. (3d) 21 (S.C.C.) at 45-46.  (Daviault) 
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extreme intoxication to the point of automatism is a defence. However, those with 
FASDs could not ordinarily be characterized, solely because of their FASDs, as being  
intoxicated by self-induced means nor as being automatons.  R. v. Rabey characterized 
the internal and non-transitory aspect of a mental disorder, in the context of insane 
automatism, as a 
malfunctioning of the mind arising from some cause that is primarily internal to 
the accused, having its source in his psychological or emotional make-up, or in 
some organic pathology, as opposed to a malfunctioning of the mind which is 
the transient effect produced by some external factor such as, for example, 
concussion. 231
 
Malfunctionings of the mind that result from internal states such as organic pathology 
are more likely to recur, than are malfunctionings resulting from transitory states 
produced by some external factor.  Therefore, non-transitory, internally produced 
conditions justify subjecting the offender possessed of them to possible detention or 
treatment that can result from a finding of NCR.   In contrast, transitory malfunctionings 
of the mind that result from extraordinary external causes, such as concussion or shock, 
may never recur, and do not justify subjecting the offender possessing of them to 
possible detention.  FASDs fall under the category of malfunctionings of the mind that 
result from non-transitory, internal states, including permanent organic pathology.  
Consequently, those diagnosed with a particular FASD are likely to qualify as having a 
mental disorder, or disease of the mind, within the meaning of s. 2 of the Criminal 
Code.  Though the various diagnostic categories included in FASD are not contained in 
                                                 
231 (1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 461 at 477-8 (Ont. C.A.), aff’d (1980), 54 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.), Martin J.  
(Rabey) 
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the DSM-IV232 as specific categories of mental illness, they may still qualify as mental 
disorders under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.   The situation of FASDs is analogous to 
epilepsy, arteriosclerosis, and diabetes, in that although these conditions neither are  
contained in the DSM-IV nor are they considered psychiatric illnesses, yet they have 
been found to be mental disorders.   
 
It is a question of law (not medicine) whether a condition or state constitutes a disease 
of the mind under s. 2 of the Code, and it appears that FASDs would lie within this legal 
category.  It is a question of fact whether evidence in a particular case discloses the 
existence of such a disease in the accused at the time the offence was committed, to 
meet the requirement that mens rea (or proof that it is lacking) and actus reus be 
coincidental.  A court may thus find that FAS is a mental disorder pursuant to s. 2.   
Whether or not the disease existed in an accused at the time of an offence is a question 
of fact.  This has to be decided by reference to the diagnoses of qualified expert 
witnesses, such as physicians and psychologists who practice in this area, to the 
testimony of the accused or other witnesses, and to other evidence.  The issue of 
deciding among conflicting expert opinions is considered at length in R.  v. J.A.P.,233 in 
the context of a mentally handicapped youth, albeit one who is not FAS. 
 
Once determined that the accused suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the 
offence, it remains to be decided if that mental disorder was of such severity as to 
                                                 
232 American Psychiatric Association (APA), Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Volume IV (Washington, DC: APA, 1994). 
233 Supra note 211.  (JAP). 
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render her incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of her acts, or in the 
alternative, of such severity as to render her incapable of knowing that these acts were 
wrong.  In most cases involving FASDs, this is the crux of the analysis.  Although 
impulsive, individuals with FASDs usually do appreciate the nature and quality of their 
acts to the extent required.   They are unable rather to fully control their actions or to 
understand the long term consequences of them.   Moreover, such individuals know, 
superficially, that their acts are wrong.  Though their moral sense be egocentric and 
immature, it is not sufficiently impaired to qualify under this second arm of the mental 
disorder test in s. 16(1).   R. v. R.F.234 and R. v. S.L.P.235 are cases in point.  Offenders 
with FAS who do qualify under the s. 16(1) test are those so mentally impaired by low 
intellectual ability that they are unable to appreciate the nature and quality of their acts, 
or do not know such actions are wrong.  Cases in point under this category include R. v. 
T. J.236 and R. v. W.D.,237 R. v. W.A.L.D.(1)238 and R. v.  W.A.L.D.(2).239   
 
The difference between “knowing” and “appreciating” the nature and quality of an act 
was discussed for the majority by Dickson J. in R. v. Cooper.  The context of the case 
was a psychotic individual choking another mental patient: 
To “know” the nature and quality of an act may mean merely to be aware of the 
physical act, while to “appreciate” may involve estimation and understanding 
of the consequences of that act.  In the case of the appellant, as an example, in 
using his hands to choke the deceased, he may well have known the nature and 
quality of that physical act of choking.  It is entirely different to suggest, 
                                                 
234 [2002] S.J. No. 742 (Sask. Prov. Ct.).  (R.F.) 
235 [2002] S.J. No. 311 (Sask. Prov. Ct.)  (SLP) 
236 Supra note 199.  (T.J.) 
237 Supra note 208. (WD) 
238 Supra note 212. (WALD1) 
239 Supra note 213.   (WALD2) 
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however, that in performing the physical act of choking, he was able to 
appreciate its nature and quality in the sense of being aware that it could lead or 
result in her death. . .  
 
The true test necessarily is, was the accused person at the very time of the 
offence—not before or after, but at the moment of the offence by reason of 
“disease of the mind,” unable fully to appreciate not only the nature of the act 
but the natural consequences that flow from it:  In other words was the accused 
person, by reason of “disease of the mind” deprived of the mental capacity to 
foresee and measure the consequences of the act?240
 
  
The word “appreciates,” then, connotes something beyond mere knowledge of the 
physical performance of the act.  If an offender does not appreciate that the physical act  
of choking can lead to death of the victim, she does not possess the requisite mens reas 
for the offence, and should be excused as NCR.  However, a finding of NCR does not 
apply when the accused merely lacks remorse for what she has done.   The complex 
meaning of “appreciation” is considered further in R. v. Abbey.241 Abbey’s delusion that 
he would not be caught or would possess special powers making him immune from 
prosecution, did not bring him under the first arm of the s. 16(1) test. The test is not one 
of appreciating punitive consequences (e.g. choking could result in jail), but rather one 
of appreciating logical consequences of an act (e.g. choking could result in death).   
Although Abbey thought he would not go to jail for his illegal act (importing narcotics), 
he knew the act was morally wrong according to the standards of society. 
 
The second branch of the section 16(1) test requires that the offender suffer from a 
mental disorder that renders her incapable of knowing that her acts are wrong.  She may 
understand the logical consequences of her act; the mens rea and actus reus may be 
                                                 
240 Supra note 221 at 146.  (Cooper) 
241 (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 394, at 403-406, (S.C.C.). (Abbey) 
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established in her case, nevertheless, she may be incapable of knowing that her acts are 
wrong because of a mental disorder, as in R. v. Chaulk.242   “Wrong,” as used in the 
second branch, denotes more than legally wrong, against the law; the accused must also 
realize that the act is morally wrong, according to the standards of society.  Young 
offenders in Chaulk killed under a delusion that they could rule the world.  They  
perceived their act as justified to rid their world of “losers”.   Under the power of their 
disease of the mind in the form of a delusion, they did not comprehend that their act was 
morally wrong by the standards of society.  Chaulk engenders controversy, as critics 
posit that the offenders, whether or not they were acting under a delusion, were 
substituting their moral standards for those of society.  However, the test is that the 
accused be aware that the act is wrong according to the moral standards of society; the 
defendants in Chaulk lacked this awareness and were thus excused under the NCR 
provision.  The intention of the NCR provision is to prevent psychopaths, sociopaths, 
and antisocial personalities, who substitute their own standards for those of society, 
from eluding criminal liability.  Chaulk is very close to the line on this issue. To benefit 
from an NCR defence, the offender, because of a mental disorder, must be unable to 
realize, at the time the offence was committed, that her act was morally wrong 
according to the standards of society.  It is important to stress that such defence is open 
only to those who do have a mental disorder pursuant to s. (2) of the Code which 
renders them unable to make this distinction.   
 
                                                 
242 Supra note 195. (Chaulk) 
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It may not be difficult for an individual with an FASD condition to meet the legal 
threshold of having a mental disorder (given the generous interpretation of the legal 
meaning of mental disorder).   However, it is not easy for such individual to establish 
that, as a consequence of that disorder she was incapable, at the time of the offence, of 
appreciating the nature and quality of an act or omission.  This is especially true as the 
focus of the test is on immediate, rather than long term consequences: 
 
 
As has been pointed out by the commentators, a narrow literal interpretation of 
this test [the first arm of the insanity test] is such that "nobody is hardly ever 
really mad enough to be within it" (Baron Bramwell quoted by G. A. Martin in 
"Insanity as a Defence" (1965-66), 8 Crim. L.Q. 240 at p. 243).243
 
 Nor is it a simple process to establish that a mentally disordered offender did not know 
an act was wrong according to the standards of society.     
 
 
Many individuals with FASDs, as well as possessing a mental disability, are delayed in 
moral development.  This delay is characterized by egocentricity in making moral 
decisions, which in itself reveals a lack of understanding of the social contract and the 
common good:  
In the early stages of moral reasoning, moral reasoning is--egocentric; it’s 
organized around the individual’s needs, perceptions, what you can get away 
with.  It’s in the latter three stages of moral reasoning that one comes to 
understand that the essence of a social contract, that morality is designed 
around—the common good.  And that one follows the rules even when there is 
no consequence--…R., in my opinion, has not reached that stage of moral 
reasoning where she can understand following the rules for the common good 
as opposed to following the rules for R.244
  
 
                                                 
243 Supra note 241 at p. 402.  (Abbey) 
244 Supra note 234 at 19, expert testimony from Dr. J. Nanson, Psychologist. (R.F.) 
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However, another factor militates against mentally disordered FASD offenders being 
excused under the second arm of the s. 16(1) test.    FASDs may possess some 
characteristics of the antisocial personality, which excludes them from this arm of the s. 
16(1) defence.  For instance, they may lack feeling for their victim due to lacunae in 
their mental functioning that render them incapable of empathizing with others: 
I am troubled by Dr. Nanson’s statement that she [R.] is unable to perceive her 
acts from the viewpoint of the victim.245
 
 
Thus, they are excluded under the second arm of the test as they usually do not commit 
their acts under a psychotic delusion that what they are doing is being done to satisfy a 
divine order or under some similar disturbance of thought.  They are excluded under the 
first arm of the test because, while not always cognizant of long term consequences and 
implications, such offenders usually do appreciate the immediate consequences of their 
acts, which is all that is currently required in the case law to be sane under the first arm 
of s. 16(1).  Also problematic is the establishment of the temporal requirement, that is, 
that at the time of the offence the offender did not realize either the consequences of her 
act or that her act was morally wrong.   The temporal requirement is especially 
problematic when considering the situation of multiple offences involving an offender, 
and the frequent memory gaps of individuals with FASDs.  Although mainly dealing 
with the first arm of the test, the same practical limitations apply to both arms as set 
forth in the finding below: 
I am finally troubled because the discussion concerning R.F.’s appreciation of 
the nature and quality of her acts, was general in nature, not specific to the 
individual offences, certainly not in any systematic way and it was not focused 
on the specific day of the offence and R.F.’s thinking on that day.  I appreciate 
                                                 
245 Ibid. at para. 76, quoting Judge Whelan. 
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well the practical difficulties in this regard, especially in a Hearing involving so 
many similar charges over a long period of time.  I find that the evidence fails 
to meet this branch of the test…246
 
 
In conclusion, unless the fetal alcohol conditions of the offenders are so profoundly 
mentally disabling (many so affected are near normal in mental ability) that they do not 
appreciate the superficial nature and immediate consequences of their acts, or unless 
offenders suffer from some co-morbidity such as a psychotic delusion whereby they do 
not appreciate that an act was wrong according to the standards of society, the defence 
of NCR is not available to them.  Such is the situation facing R.F.  Limitations in this 
regard are consonant with public policy against allowing too many accused to escape 
criminal liability through the defence of NCR.  However, FASD offenders are mentally 
disabled, notwithstanding that they may not meet the rather stringent requirements for 
UST or NCR.  As a result of not meeting these requirements, they will enter the justice 
system without any formal and universal mechanism in place requiring that they be 
sentenced according to their reduced culpability arising from their mental disorder, and 
without a requirement to stream them away from criminogenic placements.  Moreover, 
their mental disorder can work to their detriment in assessments of risk of future danger 
to the public, which may bar them from non-carceral options or release.  
 
 
Considering those few for whom the defence of NCR is available, pursuant to s. 672.54 
of the Code,247 the least onerous or restrictive disposition is to be recommended, 
including absolute or conditional discharge, for those not considered a significant risk to 
                                                 
246  Ibid. at para. 76-77, Judge Whelan. 
247 Refer to page 74 of this thesis. 
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the safety of the public.  Otherwise, NRC’s are to be detained in custody, in a hospital, 
subject to regular reviews of that disposition by a Review Board.  The concomitant risk 
assessment will be based largely on the recommendation of the mental health 
authorities.248  Such indeterminate detention, without a capping mechanism as proposed 
in s. 672.64 of the Code, but never proclaimed, deters defence counsel from 
recommending the NCR defence to their clients.249  Unless the offence is serious, 
counsel may deem it beneficial for the client to serve the time, although pitfalls of that 
option have been considered under UST. 
 
A litany of disposition horrors occurred in D. J. v. Yukon.250  D. J., a sex offender who 
suffered from FAS and ADHD, had been found NCR.  The Review Board considered 
that it could not support a conditional discharge of D.J., under s. 672.54(b) of the Code.   
There were, in the Review Board’s opinion, insufficient resources in the community to 
provide D. J. necessary treatment and supervision, without exposing the public to an 
unacceptable level of risk.  Moreover, the Review Board deemed that there was no 
appropriate secure hospital facility available for his confinement and treatment 
according to the other alternative open to them under s. 672.54(c) of the Code.251  
Consequently, even after many appeals to a Review Board, D.J. remained detained in 
                                                 
248 Stuart, D.  Canadian Criminal Law:  A Treatise (Scarborough, ON:  Carswell, a Thomson Company, 
2001) at 376.   
249 Parliament in 1992 enacted caps on detention, such as life for first or second degree murder, 10 years 
for certain designated offences, and two years for other offences, however the capping provision was 
never proclaimed. 
250 (Review Board) [2000] YTSC 513.  (D.J.) 
251 Ibid. at para. 14 -19. (D.J.) 
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administration segregation in a correctional facility.252 Pursuant to the applicant’s 
appeal under s. 672.72 of the Code,253 Veale J. made an order of habeas corpus under s. 
24(1) of the Charter, consequent upon a finding that by unduly depriving him of his 
liberty, D.J.’s section 7 Charter rights had been infringed.254  Veale J. took this measure 
under the authority of Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)255 
which held that the legislative scheme for dealing with NCR’s does not violate s. 7 of 
the Charter, except in cases where governmental actions operate to thwart the scheme’s 
emphasis on the applicant receiving appropriate treatment.  Administrative 
convenience, Veale J. found, did not constitute a justification under s. 1 of the Charter.  
Habeas corpus relief had been used in Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution,256 as 
relief against administration segregation where applicants had been denied the benefit 
of procedural fairness.  Under the aegis of habeas corpus, Veale J. ordered D. J. into the 
care and custody of a secure hospital facility, with appropriate conditions and treatment.   
D. J. illustrates the use of a Charter remedy to mandate necessary treatment for NCRs.   
 
However, D. J. is disquieting, as it provokes consideration of how many vulnerable 
NCRs, absent an advocate or an opportunity to be brought before a judge who will 
deem to remedy their situation, are languishing in inappropriate placements, not the 
least onerous nor the least restrictive, which may not provide necessary treatment for 
their mental disorders.  Such individuals stand at risk of being forgotten, lost 
                                                 
252 Ibid. at para. 20. (D.J.) 
253 Refer to page 74 of this thesis for this provision of the Code. 
254 Supra note 250, at para. 50. (D.J.) 
255 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625.  (Winko) 
256 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643.  (Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution) 
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indefinitely in the great maw of the justice system’s penal apparatus.  It was never an 
intention of the legislation to see such mentally disordered offenders warehoused in 
penal institutions for any extended period of time.   It is no overstatement to conclude 
that the mentally ill, including those with FASDs, whatever the disposition, do not fare 
well in the justice system.  For the most vulnerable members of society, in a post-
Charter era, this state of affairs is not tolerable. 
 
 
 
 
2.4  Sentencing 
 
If an accused is not UST, or if she does plead guilty or stands trial and is found guilty 
and is not excused under the rubric of NCR, the inquiry turns to the sentencing phase.  
Notwithstanding that the accused has a mental disorder, if not found UST nor NCR, she 
is, in law, criminally responsible for her actions.  The sentencing judge does have the 
discretion to consider a mental disorder as a mitigating factor that could reduce 
culpability.   As noted, such consideration is discretionary.   Until recently the judge has 
not had the discretion of a hospital disposition for such offenders.  Hospital dispositions 
are now a possibility but only in the limited context of probation or conditional sentence 
orders.  Community-based sentencing options, such as diversion, probation and 
conditional sentences, may be imposed.  However, dangerousness, or the assessment of 
 97
future risk, is a consideration in all non-conceral dispositions and forms of release, and 
a mental disorder may impact negatively on this assessment.    
 
In the context of s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code257 as interpreted by R. v. Gladue,258 a 
related concern, since a large proportion of FAS/E offenders are Aboriginal, is the 
consideration of systemic factors in the application of restoration and restraint in the 
disposition of Aboriginal offenders.  Systemic factors include alcohol use and its 
effects, including fetal alcohol conditions.  Despite Bill C-41 (Part XXIII of the 
Criminal Code) enacted into law in 1996, containing goals of restraint, responsibility 
for the offender, reparation for the victim, and restoration, these, like s. 718.2(e), are 
placed in the larger punitive context of s. 718 and the rest of the Code: 
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime 
prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and 
safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objects: 
  (a) to denounce unlawful conduct; 
  (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; 
  (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; 
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; 
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to community; and 
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm 
done to victims and community. 
718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of 
responsibility of the offenders. 
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following 
principles: 
(a)  a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offenders, and, without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing: 
(i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice 
or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, 
colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, 
sexual orientation, or any other similar factor, 
                                                 
257 Supra note 31. 
258 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688.  (Gladue) 
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(ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, 
abused the offender’s spouse or child, 
(iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, 
abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the 
victim, or 
(iv) evidence that the offence was committed for the benefit of, 
at the direction or in association with a criminal 
organization 
shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances; 
(b)a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar 
offences committed in similar circumstances; 
(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be 
unduly long or harsh; 
(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be 
appropriate in the circumstances; and 
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the 
circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the 
circumstances of aboriginal offenders. 
 
 
Each of the following sentencing principles, denunciation, deterrence, separation, 
proportionality and parity, are to receive equal weight where relevant; often they seem 
to overshadow restraint, reparation, restoration, and responsibility.  Denunciation, 
separation, proportionality and parity, and consideration of mitigating and aggravating 
factors derive from just deserts or retributive roots.  Specific and general deterrence, 
and estimates of future risk of harm derive from utilitarian or consequentialist 
concerns.259  The sentencing landscape is characterized by a struggle of retributive-
restorative-utilitarian paradigms, a veritable sentencing “star wars”.   The attempts of 
                                                 
259 Roberts, J. V. & Verdun-Jones, S. “Directing Traffic at the Crossroads of Criminal Justice and Mental 
Health:  Conditional Sentencing After the Judgment in Knoblauch,” (2002), 39 Alta. L. Rev. (No.4) 788-
809 at para. 13; and  Bentham, J.  “Principles of Penal Law,” in J. Bowring, Ed., The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, How First Collected:  Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: 
William Tait, 1834), as cited in Blumoff, T. Y., “Justifying Punishment,” (2001) 14 Can. J. L. & Jurs. 
161-211. Under the doctrine of utilitarianism, all actions were to be judged by their consequences. The 
greater good of the greater number in society requires punishment of any who threaten the greater good 
through crime.  Pain would be inflicted on offenders in proportion to the amount of pleasure they derived 
from their crime, a calculus of pleasure and pain sufficient to deter immediate offenders, as well as others 
in the future. 
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the courts to interpret and balance these dichotomies or conflicting trilogies of the Code, 
case law, and policy will be analyzed and critiqued.  From within the ramparts of a long 
tradition of retributive justice, it is difficult to shift paradigms and view justice in 
restorative terms.  However, it is from the restorative vantage this writer chooses to 
comment, believing it to be the appropriate paradigm for mentally disabled offenders 
such as those with FASDs.  The restorative perspective, with its emphasis on healing, 
overlaps to some extent with therapeutic jurisprudence; in the latter, the emphasis 
includes integrating understandings in psychology with those in the law,260 as has been 
attempted here with FASDs and sentencing.  Restorative justice would, in addition, 
integrate traditional healing and spirituality into the mix of law and psychology.261
  
 
Though recognition of fetal alcohol conditions had occurred in the medical literature by 
1973,262 the justice system, like many other institutions in society, had its proverbial 
head in the sand about this matter, a situation extending into the 1990’s.  Prov. Ct. J. 
Barnett comments to that effect n R. v. Abou: 
FAS has been the subject of comment in only a few reported Canadian court 
decisions (Joe v. Yukon Territory (1986), 5 B.C.L.R. (2d) 267 and R. v. 
R..B..M. (1990), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 132) and it is not well understood by most 
judges, lawyers, probation officers, corrections officers, social workers or other 
persons likely to encounter it in the context of the justice system.   
                                                 
260 Wexler, D. B.  “Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law,” 227-246 at 245-6. in Jill Peay (Ed.), 
Criminal Justice and the Mentally Disordered. 
261 Von Hirsch, A., (Ed),  Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice:  Competing or Reconcilable 
Paradigms.  (Oxford:  Hart, 2003) at 240. 
262 Jones, D.L., Smith, D.W., Ulleland, C.N., Streissguth, A.P.  “Pattern of malformation in offspring of 
chronic alcoholic mothers,” Lancet, 2:1267-1271, 1973;  Jones, K. L., Smith, D.W. “Recognition of the 
fetal alcohol syndrome in early infancy,” Lancet, 2:999-1001, 1973; and Jones, K.L., Smith, D.W., 
Streissguth, A.P. Myrianthopoulos, N.C. “Outcome in Offspring of Chronic Alcoholic Women,” Lancet, 
1:1076-1078, 1974. 
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It is not a new notion that the taking of strong drink by pregnant women 
endangers unborn babies.  People understood this truth in biblical times.  But 
ancient wisdom was largely forgotten until about 20 years ago, when the first 
reports of modern studies were published.  We have now come to understand 
that fetal exposure to alcohol is the leading cause of mental retardation in 
Canada.  Moreover, fetal exposure to alcohol causes actual brain damage and 
the long term effects of fetal exposure to alcohol are more severe than those of 
other drugs, including heroin and cocaine. 
………………………… 
  
Mr. Justice David Vickers has recently spoken strongly about the difficulties 
FAS and other handicapped persons encounter in Canada.  He says that our 
model of service delivery “is counter-productive, judgmental and 
nonsupportive.” (see R. v. Williams; Victoria SCBC No. 74093, 1994; 
transcript, page 13) 
 
One real tragedy of cases like those of Victor Williams and Ida Abou is that 
nobody made any effort to provide meaningful help until it was, perhaps, too 
late.  We must all pay a very real price for these and other similar failures.  And 
persons whose handicaps might have been addressed are now stigmatized as 
criminals. 263
 
 
 And in R. v. Baptiste, Prov. Ct. J. Barnett observed further: 
We have been incredibly remiss in failing to understand the damage done by 
drinking during pregnancy.  Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) was not discussed in 
medical schools or textbooks until 1976. 
 
But we now know that FAS is the most common and only known preventable 
cause of mental retardation.  On a worldwide basis 1 to 3 of every 1000 live 
born infants are afflicted with FAS.  The risk is a great deal higher for mothers 
from poverty stricken communities where alcohol abuse is prevalent.  
Unhappily, Canada has a great many such communities. 
 
There has been very little discussion of FAS in judicial or other legal writing.  
In 1986 a Superior court judge considered that I had erred in taking judicial 
notice of FAS (Joe v. Y.T. (1986), 5 BCLR (2d) 267) but I believe that in 1992, 
FAS can properly be the subject of judicial notice.264
 
 
                                                 
263 [1995] BCJ No. 1096 (B.C. Prov. Ct.), at para. 11, 12, 19 and 29. (Abou) 
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Similarly, in R. v. E.L.J, Youth Ct. J. Faulkner commented, in the context of a case 
about a FAS offender, that:  
This case is one more proof, if any were needed, of the terrible toll that alcohol 
abuse has taken in the Territory.  We have failed to come to grips with this 
problem over a long number of years and now we are reaping the whirlwind.265
 
R. v. J.266 is typical of earlier cases in which considerations of public safety were placed 
first in sentencing FAS/E offenders. Youth Court J. de Villiers compared the lack of 
empathy with or sympathy for their victims revealed by FAS/E offenders to the same 
characteristics among pedophiles.  Correspondingly, he maintained that sympathy for  
FAS/E offenders should not outweigh concern for public safety, more than it does in 
offences involving pedophiles.  Thus, he sentenced a 16 year-old FAS offender charged 
with his fourth vehicle theft, to one year closed custody, followed by two years 
probation.  The context of the case was exceptional as there had been 190 such thefts in 
1996 in the small city of Williams Lake, B.C.   
 
An early case in which a restorative approach was taken is R. v. R.B.M.267.  Daily 
training and supervision by qualified personnel was recommended for a 22 year old 
Aboriginal who functioned at the level of a 15-16 year old.  It was noted that, although 
expensive, the costs of such program did not compare to the higher cost, which ranged 
around $50,000.00 per year, of maintaining a prisoner in custody.  Although many 
offenders are required to see an advisor only periodically, or merely to call in by 
telephone rather than having to appear in person, for the FAS/E offender such practices 
                                                 
265  [1998] Y.J. No. 19 (Yukon Youth Ct.) at para. 8. (E.L.J.) 
266  [1996] B.C.J. No. 2754 (Yukon Youth Ct.).  (R. v. J.) 
267 (1990) 54 C.C.C. (3d) 132 (BCCA). (R.B.M.) 
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are of little use.  FAS/E offenders require ongoing supervision and mentoring.  In 
addition, drug or alcohol dependencies are common among them and need to be 
addressed through treatment. 
 
According to R. v. Williams,268 an important component in treating FAS/E is the 
necessity of addressing the learning of adaptive living skills, including inter alia:  
personal care, socialization, household organization, money-management, grocery 
shopping, cooking, and employment-related skills (getting up on time, arriving on time, 
dealing with the public appropriately, care and attention to job details, handling routine, 
and so forth).   
 
An adoptive father of a son with FAS/E in R. v. Steeves,269 testified for CBC television 
on the topic of FAS/E offenders.  The father was a corrections officer with 23 years of 
service.  Although before his experience with his son, the father had believed in the 
adage “if you can’t do the time, don’t do the crime,” he has come to understand that the 
emphasis should be on treatment for offenders with problems such as FAS/E.  
Otherwise, he observed, prisons will continue to be revolving doors for such people 
who could become law-abiding were they to receive treatment.  
 
R. v. M.L.270 saw Youth Ct. J. Turpel-Lafond sentence to open custody an FAS young 
offender who impulsively started fires.271  The Judge requested social services structure 
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a plan, to provide the intensive supervision and multi-disciplinary treatment that such an 
offender requires.  This sentence was imposed in the face of the Crown’s position, 
pursuant to Proulx,272 that in the absence of appropriate community treatment facilities, 
an FAS/E offender should be incarcerated to ensure public safety. The ruling in Proulx, 
however, was not in the context of a disabled young offender.   The sentence in M.L. 
was not appealed, but, as it was permissive, was not carried out. 
 
Judge Turpel-Lafond, in R. v. W.D.,273 cited, as a model of the treatment required, 
Guideline 647 of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba on Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome:  
 
[T]reatment of affected children is individualized and multi-disciplinary, 
including diagnostic modalities, social services, counseling, rehabilitation 
therapy and educational support.274
 
 
She lamented that there was no equivalent guideline for Saskatchewan. 
  
Some judges have begun responding with urgency to the needs of offenders with 
FASDs and other mental disabilities, and speaking out about such needs.  Ontario 
                                                                                                                                               
271 Cook P. and Proulx M., Firesetting and Youth (Brandon, MB:  Office of the Fire Commissioner, 
2002).  This book is a resource for parents, educators and professionals to discuss firesetting with 
children and youth, particularly those youth with cognitive impairments and deficits, who may not realize 
the consequences of their actions.  Youth with Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorders (ADHD), FAS 
and other impairments related to impulsivity, hyperactivity, difficulty in understanding causal 
relationships, and who also may be susceptible to detrimental peer influences, may as a result be at a 
greater risk of firesetting behavior.  The book is designed to meet the learning needs of these groups of 
children and youth, and to minimize through understanding the negative attitudes that can develop 
towards them. 
272 R. v. Proulx. [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61. 
273  Supra note 208 at para. 27. (W.D.) 
274  Ibid. at para. 27, citing  para 3 of the Guideline. (W.D.) 
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Provincial Court Judge David Cole told a Law Union of Ontario conference in 
November, 1997, 
 
What most of us are doing is a lot of routine processing of petty offenders—
most of whom are mentally ill.  We are tired of watching the parade.275
 
Similarily, Judge Turpel-Lafond  in R. v. W.D.276 asks, 
What social policy can be served by the use of the hard penal machinery of the 
criminal justice system to deal with the most chronic mentally disabled youth of 
society?277
 
 
 
Yukon Territorial Court Judge Stuart, who deals daily with the problems of offenders, 
their families, and communities condemned the current approach, in the context of 
finding himself in the position of having no choice but to sentence a mentally 
disordered offender to a carceral term: 
 
 
Stephens, the drafter of our Criminal Code believed that it was morally 
appropriate to hate criminals (Sir J.F. Stephen, A History of Criminal Law of 
England, vol 2, (London:  MacMillan, 1883) at 81), a concept he embedded in 
the Criminal Code.  This may partially explain the justice system’s intractable 
propensity to punish.  The advent of restorative justice principles holds the 
promise to move our practices from regarding all offenders as hateful to 
recognizing their potential if reconnected to family and community.  Most 
offenders who pass through our courts are neither dangerous nor hateful; they 
have been marginalized or suffer from problems that punishment usually 
exacerbates. 
 
As long as we continue to ascribe to ancient theories of punishment, we will 
continue to load our jails and spend money on institutions, as opposed to 
investing in families and communities.  We will continue to spend money on 
symptoms, not causes, and will continue to place responsibility on professions 
                                                 
275 Supra note 14 at 9. Cayley, C. The Expanding Prison (Toronto:  House of Anansi Press Limited, 1998) 
at 9. 
276 Supra note 208 at para. 35. (W.D.) 
277 Ibid. at para.35. (W.D.) 
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for matters that communities and families ought to, and can handle more 
effectively. 
 
Our excess dependence upon punitive sanctions to change behavior reflects the 
lamentable “wooden-headedness” that Barbara Tuchman noted infects public 
decision-making.  Her insightful analysis argues that large societies are 
irrationally committed to a “March of Folly,” as they persistently pursue 
policies contrary to their best interests.  The wooden-headedness that propels 
this march of folly stems from taking a path proven to be counterproductive, 
instead of turning to alternatives known to be prudent and less prone to long-
term risks (see Tuchman, B.W., March of Folly (New York:  Ballantine Trade, 
1995).278
 
  
Rather than a punitive, retributive model of criminal justice, treatment of medical 
conditions in a healing, restorative, community-based environment is what Judges 
perceive increasingly as appropriate for offenders with FASDs.  
 
The current trend is for courts to attempt actively to seek treatment and supervision for 
offenders with FASDs, rather than to sentence them to some sort of custody until such  
treatment becomes available.  However, such reformist attempts on the part of the 
bench are sometimes frustrated.  R. v. L.E.K.279 exemplifies a proactive curial trend,  
culminating in a frustrating outcome.  L.E.K. did not do well in either open or secure 
custody.  Open custody was unworkable because he would not respect imposed 
conditions and would run (due to his organic brain impairment caused by in utero 
alcohol exposure); closed custody was inappropriate because he would associate with 
negative peers.  Judge Turpel-Lafond discovered that there were available no youth 
workers trained to treat and supervise organic brain-impaired youth, and that existing 
                                                 
278 R. v. Elias, [2001] YKTC 501 at para. 97-99. 
279 [2000] S.J. No. 844 (SKCA). (LEK) 
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intensive supervision programs did not provide round-the-clock supervision which 
L.E.K. would require.  In light of these circumstances, Judge Turpel-Lafond imposed a 
30-day open custody sentence, to be followed by one year probation, with the condition 
that L.E.K. be assigned a youth worker with special training in, and understanding of, 
organic brain impairment.  On L.E.K.’s release from open custody, a comprehensive 
case plan for him was to be in place, a plan which was to involve an in-patient treatment 
centre with an Aboriginal focus, special educational supports, and supports in terms of 
residence.280
 
As the services Judge Turpel-Lafond requested for the disabled youth were not in 
existence in Saskatchewan, the Court of Appeal held that her order was 
unconstitutional; it was the realm of the executive branch of government to allocate 
public funds as it saw fit in providing such programming.  Correspondingly, the Youth  
Criminal Justice Act (YCJA),281 proclaimed on April 1, 2003, in s. 42(3), stipulates that 
youth court judges can make orders for such restorative, rehabilitative and reintegrative 
options as intensive support and supervision, and attendance at a non-residential 
program, only “if the provincial director has determined that a program to enforce the 
order is available.”  The Saskatchewan provincial director did not so determine.  
Similarly, orders under s. 42(2)(r), for intensive rehabilitative custody of the mentally 
disordered to be followed by a period half as long of supervision in the community, are 
subject to s. 42 (7), which restricts their use.  Section 42(7) initially limits the use of 
                                                 
280 Ibid. at para. 8.  (LEK) 
281 S.C. 2002, c.l.  (YCJA) 
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intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision to cases where the young person has 
been found guilty of serious, violent offences.282  However, in addition, the young 
person has to have been found to suffer from a mental disorder, for which a treatment 
plan has been developed that has reasonable possibility of reducing the risk of 
reoffence, and even then, only when “the provincial director has determined that an 
intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision program is available and that the young 
person’s participation in the program is appropriate.”   Sanjeev Anand, in “Crafting 
Youth Sentences:  The Roles of Rehabilitation, Proportionality, Restraint, Restorative 
Justice, and Race under the Youth Criminal Justice Act,” comments: 
 When the YCJA was first introduced into the House of Commons, the federal 
 Government announced that it would transfer an extra $400 million over 5 to 
 6 years to the provinces to help implement the new youth justice regime.  These 
increased transfer payments still amount to less than half the cost of 
programming for the new youth justice regime.  As a result, it seems likely that 
the only way that new non-custodial sentencing options will become available 
is if the provincial governments agree to pay for most of the costs associated 
with them.  Given the current political climate in Canada, with the public 
simultaneously calling for deficit reduction, lower taxes, and increased 
government spending on health and education, the prospect of the provinces 
outlaying significant new funds for new non-custodial youth sentencing seems 
remote, especially in the absence of a pledge of fifty-fifty cost-sharing by the 
federal government. 
 
There is little doubt that the YCJA provides much clearer legislative direction 
for judges on how to approach the youth sentencing enterprise than does the 
YOA. However, it is also readily apparent that if Ottawa truly wants to change 
the face of youth sentencing, it just do more than pass a statute.283
 
 
Governments need to take the long view, and appreciate the cost reductions over many 
years that implementing restorative, rehabilitative, and reintegrative options will 
                                                 
282 By serious, violent offences is meant:  murder, manslaughter, and aggravated assault, or, in the 
alternative, two convictions for other serious, violent offences. 
283 (2003) 40 Alta. L. Rev. (No. 4) 943-963 at para. 47-48.  (Sanjeev Anand) 
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achieve; government’s perspective is, however, sometimes limited to the few years of a 
political mandate.  Ultimately, when required treatment services are not forthcoming for 
either young persons or adults, legal ways of attempting to mandate community-based 
treatment orders (such as the order, which in L.E.K., proved abortive) may be initiated, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
In a constitutional challenge of the YCJA, Reference Re Youth Criminal Justice Act,284, 
released March 31, 2003, the Court of Appeal of Quebec held that sections 75 and 
110(2) (b) of the YCJA were a violation of s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
that could not be justified under s. 1.  The impugned sections permit judicial discretion 
to operate in the matter of disclosure of names of offenders as young as 14 on the sole 
basis of their being eligible for, but not given, adult sentences.   The Court of Appeal 
held that in no circumstances should the names of such young offenders be disclosed, 
until they were given actual adult sentences.  In addition, sections dealing with so-called 
presumptive offences such as first and second degree murder, attempt to commit 
murder, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assaults, and certain other violent offences 
were declared a breach of s. 7 which could not be justified.   By committing such 
offences, youth, even as young as 14, face the automatic presumption of being 
sentenced as an adult, and bear the reverse onus of refuting this presumption.  Measures 
and procedures that lead to adult sentences, and, in addition, which elude youth 
publication bans, especially in the case of persons as young as 14, are contentious in 
Quebec.  Objections arise because, rather than requiring the Crown to justify the need 
                                                 
284 [2003] J.Q. no. 2850 (Court of Appeal of Quebec). 
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for the imposition of an adult sentence or for the disclosure of the identity of minors, the 
impugned provisions place the burden upon the young offender of demonstrating why 
an adult sentence should not be imposed and why his or her identity should be 
protected.   
 
 
 
 
2.5 The New Sentencing Regime, the YCJA, as Applied to Young Persons with 
FASDS 
  
The YCJA had as its purpose the reduction of incarceration for young offenders, who 
often had received longer carceral terms than adults, albeit mostly for system generated 
and property offences.  The YCJA sought to emphasize more clearly and coherently 
sentencing principles of rehabilitation, restoration and reintegration, providing judges 
less leeway than did the Criminal Code to select punitive principles from which to 
sentence.  Although reintegration, or supervision upon release, has been available to 
adults for some time, it had not been a requirement for youth upon release from custody 
prior to the coming into force of the YCJA.  Extrajudicial measures in Part I of the 
YCJA require police to consider informal alternatives to the court process before laying 
charges.  Such police-initiated extrajudicial measures include verbal warnings and 
cautions from police, informal diversion programs such as “family group conferencing”, 
referrals to community agencies, and formal programs requiring community service on 
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the part of the offender, or reparations, compensation and restitution to the victim or 
victims.  Extrajudicial measures are promoted to keep youth out of the court system 
entirely, where possible.  Restorative measures are promoted to keep youth out of 
custody when they do enter the court system.  Fostering greater social justice by 
meeting the needs of young offenders, rather than punishing them and exacerbating 
their problems is the thrust.  Ultimately, where custody cannot be avoided, 
rehabilitation should form an important component of the custodial portion of a 
sentence.   As noted, intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision orders, although 
included in s. 42(2) (r) of the YCJA, are circumscribed in application by the provisions 
of s. 42(7), as are noncarceral rehabilitative measures in s. 42 (2)(l) and (m), by s. 42(3).  
The provincial director does have discretion whether or not to provide programs 
specifically designed for rehabilitation.   When no funding for implementation is 
forthcoming from either provincial or federal coffers, avenues of mandating such 
programs become an issue.  
 
Many of the concerns considered play out in R. v. M. (B.) [B.M.],285 the first case heard 
under the YCJA concerning a young person with FASD.  B. M. concerns a 16 year old 
Aboriginal young person with FASD (ARND) who committed gang-related robberies 
and an assault.  A joint-submission by crown and defence counsel (with which judges 
do not interfere lightly) for a two year secure custody disposition, was held in abeyance 
by Judge Turpel-Lafond while a full review of the guiding principles of the YCJA was 
undertaken.  She concluded this review by sentencing M.B. to 18 months probation 
                                                 
285 Supra note 3.  [2003] S. J. No. 377 (Sask. Provincial Youth Court). (B.M.) 
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while residing with extended family, away from gang activity and substance abuse.  
B.M.’s unexpired time from a previous disposition for robbery was converted to 
probation on the same terms.  In this groundbreaking application, Judge Turpel-Lafond 
attempted, under the aegis of the new Act, to design the type of restorative, 
rehabilitative, and reintegrative disposition that she was thwarted from creating several 
years earlier for the disabled youth in L.E.K.286   Despite the presence of violent 
offences, robbery (including a prior offence of robbery), and an assault, and various 
aggravating factors such as gang involvement, obvious planning, and attempts at 
concealment through the wearing of masks, she nevertheless crafted a community-based 
disposition for B.M.  On appeal, parity and proportionality concerns may give rise to a 
finding that the trial judge erred in principle, and that the sentence is demonstrably 
unfit,287  notwithstanding that under the YCJA such principles are to be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the greater dependency and reduced level of maturity of young 
persons.288  Sections 38 and 39 of the YCJA puts forth the general rule that a court shall 
not impose a custody sentence, even if violence is present, unless the court has 
considered all of the alternatives to custody at the time of sentencing, and then only if 
the young person fails to comply with a previous sentence, or has a history of offences, 
or is an exceptional case where a non-custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the 
principles of the Act, which include inter alia parity and proportionality.   
 
                                                 
286 Supra note 279.  (L.E.K.) 
287 R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227; R.  v. M.(C.A..), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; R. v. S. (K.B.), [2001] 5 
W.W.R. 259; and R. v. (S.)M., (2003), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 526. 
288 S. 3(1)(b)(ii) and s. 38(2)(b) & (c) of the YCJA. 
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Judge Turpel-Lafond addresses these concerns in her analysis, considering five themes: 
the Aboriginal component; the consideration of special requirements of youth such as 
FASD, and specifically, ARND; the gang-related aspect of the offence; proper 
interpretation and application of the new YCJA, in the context of the youth crime 
situation in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, and Canada; and limitations of infrastructure 
faced by the courts in attempting to implement fully the new Act. 
 
The first theme is the Aboriginal component.  Sections 3(c)(iv) and 38(2)(d) of the 
YCJA direct the Court to consider the needs of Aboriginal young persons, including the 
consideration, particularly for that group, of alternatives to custody, reasonable in the 
circumstances.  These sections comprise an almost perfect conflation of the Gladue 
sentencing provision (s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code).  Judge Turpel- Lafond 
pondered whether evidence of the background factors identified in Gladue will be 
required for each Aboriginal youth, or whether the overrepresentation of such youth in 
the criminal justice system will be sufficient to direct the Court to consider alternatives 
in each instance.289   In B.M.’s case there was evidence of Gladue-type background 
factors:  single-parenthood, maternal substance abuse (and the resultant FASD 
dimension) as well as B.M.’s own substance abuse, transience, and loss of culture and 
community.  Gladue provided the following guidance to the Court with respect to 
systemic or background factors: 
                                                 
289 Supra note 258.  Gladue, in the context of an adult criminal offence, held that judicial notice be taken 
of the history of colonization and repression faced by Aboriginal peoples. 
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How then is the consideration of s. 718.2(e) to proceed in the daily functioning 
of the courts?  The manner in which the sentencing judge will carry out his or 
her statutory duty may vary from case to case.  In all instances it will be 
necessary for the judge to take judicial notice of the systemic or background 
factors and the approach to sentencing which is relevant to aboriginal 
offenders.  However, for each particular offence and offender it may be that 
some evidence will be required in order to assist the sentencing judge in 
arriving at a fit sentence.  Where a particular offender does not wish such 
evidence to be adduced, the right to have particular attention paid to his or her 
circumstances as an aboriginal offender may be waived.  Where there is no 
such waiver, it will be extremely helpful to the sentencing judge for counsel on 
both sides to adduce relevant evidence. Indeed, it is to be expected that counsel 
will fulfill their role and assist the sentencing judge in this way.  
However, even where counsel do not adduce this evidence, where for example 
the offender is unrepresented, it is incumbent upon the sentencing judge to 
attempt to acquire information regarding the circumstances of the offender as 
an aboriginal person.290   
 
Although sentencing courts must take judicial notice of systemic and background 
factors facing Aboriginal offenders generally, they may also investigate where relevant 
specific background factors for a particular Aboriginal offender, with her consent. 
 
Regarding the second theme, the FASD dimension, Judge Turpel-Lafond, pursuant to s. 
34 of the YCJA, ordered a medical and psychological assessment, on reasonable 
grounds of belief that B.M. was suffering from a physical or mental illness or disorder, 
including a learning or mental disability.  Consequently, two court-appointed experts, a 
pediatrician with experience in medical brain impairment screening, and a psychologist 
with a specialization in neuropsychology, diagnosed B.M. as suffering from ARND, a 
particular type of FASD.  Hallmarks of this condition include:  attentional and memory 
deficits, impulsivity, inability to appreciate consequences of actions, and lack of 
                                                 
290 Ibid.  at para. 83-84. (Gladue) 
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executive functioning.  Executive functioning includes the capacity to think in a flexible 
way, to use feedback to modify behavior, and to use higher level conceptual thinking.   
FASDs who lack executive functioning commonly persist with an unsuccessful strategy 
over a considerable period of time, even when facing frustration.   
 
The Court viewed the gang-related aspect, the third theme of the case, not as a 
conventional aggravating factor, but as symptomatic of a vulnerable, disadvantaged, 
disabled youth seeking a sense of affiliation and achievement.  B.M.’s capacity for 
critical thinking, empathy, and full accountability to victims might be diminished, and 
his susceptibility to peer influences increased, because of his disability.  Consequently, 
B.M.’s participation in gang-related activities should be viewed in light of these factors, 
rather than in terms of justifying the fashioning of a more severe sentence which would 
expose him to further antisocial influences.291  However, there was a recognition by all 
concerned that continued gang activity (from which it is almost impossible to extricate 
oneself) and involvement with anti-social peers would eventually result in B.M. serving 
penitentiary time.292
 
The guiding principles of the YCJA, set out in s. 3(1) of the Act, was the fourth theme 
analyzed by Judge Turpel-Lafond.  These principles include inter alia:  understanding 
                                                 
291 Two other cases under the YCJA have considered gang-related behavior:  R. v. S (B.R..), [2003] SKPC 
84, and R. v. G.(H.W.), [2003] SKPC 122.  The latter case cites the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian 
Nations’ study of youth gangs entitled, Alter-Natives to Non-Violence Report, Aboriginal Youth Gangs 
Exploration:  a community development process.  In neither of the cases were young persons with FASDs 
involved, so the need to respond to the special requirements of young persons in s. 3(1)(c)(iv) was not as 
fully engaged as in B.M. 
292 Supra note 3 at para. 60.  (B.M.) 
 115
the circumstances or root causes of the offending behavior; rehabilitation and 
reintegration of the young person; ensuring meaningful consequences to the young 
person for the offence to promote long-term protection of the public; timely intervention 
that reinforces for the young person the link between the offending behavior and its 
consequence; fair and proportionate accountability consistent with the greater 
dependency and reduced level of maturity of young persons; reparation for harm done 
to victims; involvement of parents, family, community, and social agencies; and 
consideration of the needs and level of development of young persons, including in 
particular, response to the needs of Aboriginal young persons and of young persons 
with special requirements.  In s. 39 there are restrictions on the use of custody, and an 
emphasis on consideration of alternatives.  However, pursuant to s. 38 and 39, violence 
and aggravating circumstances can render a non-custodial sentence inconsistent with the 
purpose and principles of sentencing.293  
 
To address these principles, two conferences were convened by the Court pursuant to s. 
19 and 41 of the YCJA.  The conferences were held in circle format, according to 
Aboriginal cultural tradition, and the young person, his family, community members, 
youth worker, police, and victims were invited.  Although the victims did not attend, 
one victim had expressed the desire to do so, and a sincere attempt was made to 
accommodate that victim.  The conferences attempted to delve into the root cause of the 
offending, and to design the best measure to reduce the offending behavior and to 
rehabilitate and reintegrate the young person, in order to promote long term protection 
                                                 
293 S. 39(1)(a) and (d) of the YCJA. 
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of the public.  In the circle, B.M. addressed the causes of his behavior, as well as 
expressing a desire to change.  An aunt and uncle in LaRonge, with whom he had lived 
for a brief period, were identified as pro-social resources.  B.M. was able to re-establish 
contact with them; subsequently, they attended the circle and offered to have B.M. 
come to live with them, in order to remove him from antisocial influences in his current 
neighbourhood or in youth facilities, and to provide him supportive home and 
community resources. 
 
The culminating theme of Judge Turpel-Lafond’s sentencing analysis dealt with 
infrastructure and resources with which to implement the YCJA. Without the 
willingness of the aunt and uncle to have B.M. reside with them in La Ronge, the Court 
would have been without resources with which to fashion a community-based sentence. 
No option would have remained but a custodial sentence, as proposed in the joint 
submission.   In addition to presiding over B.M.’s six court appearances, the Judge 
devoted much of her Chamber time to schedule and hold the series of conferences.  
Clearly, such arrangements may not be always available, and without sufficient 
community and institutional resources, courts will be circumscribed in the extent to 
which they can implement the new legislation. Their ability to address effectively root 
causes of offending, or to fashion rehabilitative dispositions likely to enhance 
community safety through provision of appropriate supports, as Judge Turpel-Lafond 
attempted in the unusual situation of B.M., would be jeopardized. The immensity of the 
problem is illustrated by Saskatchewan court statistics, revealing there were over 
100,000 appearances of young people in youth courts in 2002, with over 35,000 in 
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Saskatoon alone.294  Without sufficient resources in place, an assembly-line process 
leading to revolving door custodies will be the likely outcome for youth, no matter what 
progressive legislation is enacted.295   
 
 
 
 
2.6  Conditional Sentences 
 
A relatively recent vehicle to provide holistic, community-based sentences for adult 
offenders is s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, conditional sentences, and related case law 
interpreting its implementation.  Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code provides: 
742.1  Where a person is convicted of an offence, except an offence that is punishable 
by a minimum term of imprisonment, and the court  
(a) imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, 
(b) is satisfied that serving the sentence in the community would not endanger the 
safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and 
principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2. 
the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behavior in the community, 
order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the offender’s 
complying with the conditions of a conditional sentence order made under section 
742.3. 
                                                 
294 Supra note 3 at para. 27. (B.M.) 
295 R. v. M.(B.)#2, [2003] SKPC 133, was released shortly before the printing of this thesis.  Because of 
lack of resources and illness in the extended family, B.M.’s placement with his aunt and uncle broke 
down.  B.M., facing new charges, appeared before the Court in LaRonge, which deferred review of his 
probation order until he could appear before Judge Turpel-Lafond in Saskatoon.  As there were no 
placements available of the kind recommended for B.M., he was left to serve out his order with his 
Mother, who still suffered from addictions and other problems, and still resided in Saskatoon near the 
gang influences.  Without the special care and treatment B.M. requires due to his organic brain 
impairments, his future appears bleak.  Judge Turpel-Lafond pursued every alternative with B.M.’s case 
worker, but no rehabilitative measures were available.  The Judge concluded that it was very difficult to 
implement the YCJA without sufficient services available for disabled youth.  Without sufficient support 
services and accommodation, such youth may be deemed as a safety risk in the community, and 
incarcerated by default, a practice which perhaps itself contributes to future safety risks.   
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Similarly, in the YCJA recently proclaimed, s. 42(5) provides for a similar disposition 
(except that it expressly precludes serious, violent offences) termed a Deferred Custody 
and Supervision order: 
42(5)  The court may make a deferred custody and supervision order under paragraph 
(2)(p) if  
(a) the young person is found guilty of an offence that is not a serious violent offence; 
and 
(b) it is consistent with the purpose and principles set out in section 38 and the 
restrictions on custody set out in section 39. 
 
 
No offences, including violent offences, are automatically precluded by s.742.1 of the 
Criminal Code as long as they are subject to a sentence of less than two years, and 
serving such sentence in the community would neither endanger the safety of the public, 
nor be inconsistent with the principles of sentencing found in the Code. 
 
 
Community-based sentences, such as probation and conditional sentences, and now 
deferred custody and supervision orders for youth, are major vehicles used to provide 
the venue and treatment required for convicted offenders with mental disorders such as 
FASDS.  Conditional sentences or community-based sentences are critical for offenders 
with FASDs for the following reasons: 
• in closed custody situations the offenders with FASDs are unusually 
susceptible to the influence of negative peers;296 
• they are often subject to victimization in institutional settings;297 
• they lack the abstract thinking skills required to be able to transfer coping 
skills learned in carceral situations to community situations;298  
                                                 
296 Supra note 1 a para. 15. (Steeves) 
297 Supra note 4. (Conry & Fast) 
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• the deterrence principle does not function well because in may cases they do 
not appreciate consequences (inability to grasp cause-effect relationships), 
and because frequently they are impulsive which leads to their repeating acts 
without thinking beforehand; and299 
• carceral options are culturally inappropriate for Aboriginal offenders,  who 
comprise the majority of offenders with FASDs.300 
 
At the end of the day, however, conditional sentences may be subject to the same 
limitation of services encountered by Judge Turpel-Lafond with regard to terms in 
probation orders.  This possibility makes paramount the pursuit of alternate legal 
strategies to mandate treatment, the topic of Chapter Three. 
 
Since the inception in 1996 of conditional sentences in Section 742.1 of the Criminal 
Code, and, in particular, since the landmark case, R. v. Proulx,301 interpreting the 
application of 742.1, the use of conditional sentences, in a manner cognizant of the 
problems of FASD offenders has, in some respects, been curtailed.  To increase the use 
of conditional sentences, the Supreme Court in Proulx incorporated various punitive 
upgrades to counter criticisms that conditional sentences as legislated were too lenient.  
These punitive upgrades include: 
                                                                                                                                               
298 Supra note 3. (M.(B) citing Streissguth 
299 Supra note 4 and 5.  (Conry & Fast, and M.L.) 
300 Supra note 258 at para. 62. (Gladue) 
301 Supra note 272. (Proulx). 
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• making a conditional sentence longer than a corresponding carceral sentence 
for the same offence;302 
• attaching more punitive terms to the conditional sentence;303 and 
• the presumption that breach of a term of a conditional sentence would result 
in serving the remainder of the sentence in jail.304 
 
The negative effect of these punitive upgrades on offenders with FASDs is considered 
in R. v. Elias.305  In Gladue,306 Proulx,307 and R. v. Wells,308 the Supreme Court 
emphasizes two principal objectives for conditional sentences:  to reduce the use of 
prison, and to expand the use of restorative justice.  Unlike probation, conditional 
sentences have a punitive, as well as a rehabilitative component, rendering them hybrid 
in nature.  Notwithstanding the punitive aspect, a breach of a term in a conditional 
sentence is not necessarily a criminal offence.  Those who breach conditions bear the 
onus of establishing in court a reasonable excuse for their breach on a balance of 
probabilities.  Failing this, options available in the legislation include: 
S.  742.6(9)  Where the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the 
offender has without reasonable excuse, the proof of which lies on the offender, 
breached a condition of the conditional sentence order, the court may 
(a)  take no action; 
(b)  change the optional conditions; 
(c)  suspend the conditional sentence order and direct 
(i)  that the offender serve in custody a portion of the unexpired sentence, and 
(ii)  that the conditional sentence order resume on the offender’s release from 
custody, either with or without changes to the optional conditions; or 
                                                 
302 Ibid. at para. 102. 
303 Ibid. at para. 30. 
304 Ibid. at para. 39. 
305  Supra note 278.  (Elias)   
306 Supra note 258. (Gladue) 
307 Supra note 272.  (Proulx) 
308 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 517.  (Wells) 
 121
(d) terminate the conditional sentence order and direct that the offender be       
committed to custody until the expiration of the sentence. 
 
 
The options in the legislation are flexible, ranging from doing nothing, to changing the 
optional conditions, to serving a portion of the unexpired sentence in custody, to serving 
all of the unexpired sentence in custody.  If the presumption of jail is to govern, 
however, as Proulx prescribes, the offender, who cannot provide a reasonable excuse to 
the Court for a breach will serve the unexpired portion of her sentence in custody.  This 
judicially created, automatically incurred consequence of a breach will result in 
offenders, originally sentenced to conditional sentences, serving longer carceral 
sentences than had they been sentenced initially to jail.  This is so because of the 
holding in Proulx, that to make the sentences equally punitive, a conditional sentence 
for an offence should be longer than a carceral sentence for that same offence. 
 
In Elias,309 the adult offender breached a no contact term in her conditional sentence.  
Defence counsel requested that, contrary to Proulx, the offender be able to serve 
custodially a reduced portion of her unexpired term, as the full unexpired term would 
impose an unduly harsh sanction given the initial offence.310   Because of the ruling in 
Proulx, Territorial Court Judge Stuart was not able to accede to defence counsel’s 
request.311  Nonetheless, he did dwell on significant problems punitive upgrades were 
causing.   Elias has FAS/E, as do an estimated half of offenders in Yukon courts.312  
Because of disabilities, such offenders often experience difficulty complying 
                                                 
309 Supra note 278. (Elias) 
310 Ibid. at para. 1. (Elias) 
311 Ibid. at para. 2 and 10 
312 Ibid. at para. 39. 
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consistently with conditions.  When they fail, they require, in general, that conditions be 
fine-tuned to meet their needs, rather than receiving a lengthy jail term to serve.  “A 
breach may be a simple misstep along a demanding path that calls upon offenders to 
change their friends, habits, and lifestyles, and to work through the demands of 
treatment.”313  An alcoholic, for instance, sober for many weeks, may fall off the 
wagon.  This reveals a need to persevere in efforts at rehabilitation, not a reason to be 
incarcerated. 
 
Another watershed case, R. v. Knoblauch,314 following on the heels of Proulx,315 
tempered, in some respects and for some situations, the implications of Proulx for 
mentally disabled offenders.  Knoblauch does not impact on the punitive upgrades in 
Proulx analyzed in Elias, including their negative impact on mentally disordered 
offenders.  However, extrapolating from Proulx, Knoblauch has implications for 
hospital dispositions via probation orders and conditional sentence orders for offenders, 
who, while mentally ill, like individuals with FASDs, are neither UST nor NCR.  
Arbour J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, situates Knoblauch “at the 
often ambiguous crossroads between the criminal justice and the mental health care 
systems.”316  Knoblauch, who had a long history of mental illness and of dangerous 
handling of explosives, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of explosive substances 
and to possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.   
 
                                                 
313 Ibid. at para. 58. (Elias) 
314 Supra note 193.  (Knoblauch) 
315 Supra note 272.  (Proulx) 
316 Ibid. at para. 1. (Knoblauch) 
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Knoblauch’s mental illness involved long term obsessive compulsive personality 
difficulties and depression, fantasies about violence, preoccupation with weapons and 
explosives, and included attempts to actualize these fantasies, all rendering him 
potentially dangerous.317  However, to this point he had caused minor injury only to  
himself.  He had a history of treatment as an out-patient, as well as of civil committal318 
in the Alberta Hospital Edmonton.  The trial judge, Alta. Prov. Ct. J. Chrumka, imposed 
a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years probation, 
including a novel condition under the aegis of s. 742.3, a section of the Code which 
deals with compulsory and optional conditions of conditional sentence orders.  Pertinent 
sections of the Code include: 
 
742.3(1) The court shall prescribe, as conditions of a conditional sentence order, that 
the offender do all of the following: 
  (a)  keep the peace and be of good behavior; 
  (b) appear before the court when required to do so by the court; 
  (c) report to a supervisor 
(i) within two working days, or such longer period as the court directs, 
after the making of the conditional sentence order, and 
(ii) thereafter, when required by the supervisor and in the manner 
directed by the supervisor; 
 
(d)  remain within the jurisdiction of the court unless written permission to go outside 
that jurisdiction is obtained from the court of the supervisor; and 
(e)  notify the court or the supervisor in advance of any change of name or address, and 
promptly notify the court of the supervisor of any change of employment or occupation. 
 
 
(2)  The court may prescribe, as additional conditions of a conditional sentence order, 
that the offender do one or more of the following:  
 (a) abstain from 
   (i) the consumption of alcohol or other intoxicating substances, or 
      (ii) the consumption of drugs except in accordance with a medical 
prescription; 
                                                 
317 Ibid. at para. 6. (Knoblauch) 
318 Mental Health Act, S.A. 1988, c. M-13.1.  
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(b) abstain from owning, possessing or carrying a weapon; 
(c) provide for the support or care of dependents; 
(d) perform up to 240 hours of community service over a period not exceeding eighteen 
months; 
(e) attend a treatment program approved by the province; and 
(f) comply with such other reasonable conditions as the court considers desirable, 
subject to any regulations made under subsection 738(2), for securing the good 
conduct of the offender and for preventing a repetition by the offender of the same 
offence or the commission of other offences. 
 
(3) A court that makes an order under this section shall 
(a)cause to be given to the offender 
(i) a copy of the order, 
(ii) an explanation of the substance of sections 742.4 and 742.6, and 
(iii) an explanation of the procedure for applying under section 742.4 
for a change to the optional conditions; and 
(b) take reasonable measures to ensure that the offender understands the order 
and the explanations given to the offender under paragraph (a). 
The novel, salient condition imposed, in consultation with forensic psychiatrists who 
qualified as expert witnesses, and with the consent of the accused, was a secure hospital 
disposition at the psychiatric treatment unit at Alberta Hospital Edmonton, under s. 
742.3(2)(f) of the Code.  A term of his three year probation order required that 
Knoblauch continue to reside at that facility and to follow any treatment prescribed by 
his forensic psychiatrist.319     
 
The Court of Appeal of Alberta reversed the trial judge’s conditional sentence and 
ordered that Knoblauch be incarcerated in a correctional institution for two years less a 
day.  Seven months after commencing the carceral sentence, Knoblauch was granted 
full parole and moved to the Alberta Hospital Edmonton as a condition of his parole.   
He was eligible for leave with permission from the psychiatrist on duty, or his delegate, 
and in consultation with his parole officer.320  As Arbour J. notes, the carceral 
                                                 
319 Ibid. at para. 2, and 9-12. (Knoblauch) 
320 Ibid. at para. 12.  (Knoblauch) 
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disposition substituted by the Court of Appeal necessitated Knoblauch’s earlier release, 
with fewer safeguards, and less therapeutic preparation, than did the trial judge’s non-
carceral hospital disposition under s. 742.3(2)(g).321  At the Supreme Court appeal of 
this reversal of the conditional sentence order, the Crown argued that the conditional 
sentence imposed by the trial judge was contrary to the statutory regime in s. 742.1 of 
the Code.  The sentence was contrary to this regime, according to the Crown because of 
the danger Knoblauch presented, and because the sentence required that he be kept in 
custody in an institution, rather than in the community.322   
 
Section 742.1 of the Code is a core provision in terms of the sentencing reforms of 
1996, the two principal objectives of which were to reduce the use of imprisonment and 
to increase recourse to restorative justice principles.  It is linked to other provisions of 
the Code: to restraint in s. 718.2(d) and (e), to the fundamental purpose of sentencing in 
s. 718, that is respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe 
society, and to principles in s. 718(d), (e) and (f) respectively of rehabilitation of the 
offender, reparations to the victim, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in the 
offender. 
 
Knoblauch met statutory conditions precedent for the imposition of a conditional 
sentence under s. 742.1.  There was no minimum term of imprisonment for the offences 
charged, and no dispute that two years less a day was a fit and appropriate term for the 
                                                 
321 Ibid. at para. 29-31.  (Knoblauch) 
322 Ibid. at para. 13 and 33.  (Knoblauch) 
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offence.  The more contentious issue of dangerousness was resolved by the majority of 
the Supreme Court through reference to Proulx.  Lamer C.J. in Proulx, for the majority, 
held that s. 742.1 does not exclude any class of offenders, including dangerous 
offenders.  Rather, dangerousness is to be assessed in reference to the risk of re-offence 
and the gravity of damage that could thus ensue.  In Knoblauch’s case the gravity of 
damage that could ensue was extreme.  However, Lamer C.J. held that the risk of re-
offence should be assessed in light of the conditions tailored for the sentence.323  
Arbour J., accordingly, in Knoblauch, for the majority, held at the crux of the case, that, 
considering the conditions tailored by the trial judge, the risk of Knoblauch re-offending 
in a secure, psychiatric hospital was no greater than his risk of re-offending while 
incarcerated: 
In my view, if the conditions contemplated by the trial judge are taken into account in 
evaluating the risk that the appellant would re-offend while serving his conditional 
sentence, that risk is reduced to a point that is no greater than the risk that the appellant 
would re-offend while incarcerated in a penal institution.  The sentence fashioned by 
the trial judge provided that the appellant would be in a locked, secure psychiatric 
facility, in the case and custody of forensic psychiatrists who were well aware of his 
history, and who by no means minimized his dangerousness.  They would have been 
vested with the authority to determine the pace and method of his gradual release and 
reintegration [page 800] into society, ultimately through the probation order. 
 
In contrast, his incarceration in a penal institution, subject as it is to the provisions of 
the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C., 1992, c.20, could require his earlier 
release, or, in any event, would most likely leave him considerably less well prepared 
for facing his renewed liberty.  Therefore, it seems to me that whether the appellant is 
incarcerated in a penal institution, subject to the release power of the Parole Board, or 
whether he is made to reside in a locked secure psychiatric facility, subject to the 
supervisory authority of a consensus of psychiatrists, it cannot be said that he would be 
a greater danger to the community during that time under one regime rather than the 
other. 
 
                                                 
323 Supra note 272 at para. 69-72. (Proulx)   
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The dangerousness of the appellant is a product of the combined effect of his mental 
illness and his ability to acquire and make use of explosive materials and devices.  
Incarceration precludes the latter, but does little to address his mental illness.324
 
    
The sentence imposed by the trial judge was perceived as fostering potential for long 
term therapeutic benefits, addressing the underlying cause of Knoblauch’s 
dangerousness, his mental illness.  On the other hand, incarceration would likely 
aggravate his mental condition, according to the testimony of Knoblauch’s psychiatrist.  
He described the macho, abusive, hostile and competitive culture of penitentiary 
inmates, as well as the authoritative institutional atmosphere.  Both, the psychiatrist 
concluded, would trigger destructive feelings of revenge in Knoblauch, rendering him 
more dangerous.325
 
 
As for the community aspect of the disposition, Arbour J., for the Court, commented 
that the issue had not been squarely raised in the fact situation of Proulx, as it had in 
Knoblauch.   Arbour J. determined that s. 742.1, as an alternative to incarceration, is 
essentially an alternative to the regime of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act 
(CCRA),326 and not merely an alternative to a particular place or building, whether 
secure or not.327  In Knoblauch’s case, there was no involuntary element in his 
confinement as there is in confinement under the CCRA, although the requirement for 
                                                 
324 Supra note 193at para. 28-30.  (Knoblauch) 
325 Ibid. at para. 31. (Knoblauch) 
326 Supra note 187. (CCRA) 
327 Supra note 193 at para. 37. (Knoblauch) 
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consensus under ss.742.3 (2) (f) or (g) has not as yet been adjudicated.328  One can 
speculate that non-voluntary confinements would be unlikely to facilitate the healing 
process. 
 
Although not referenced by the Supreme Court in Knoblauch, Proulx’s holding that 
deference be shown to trial judges may have influenced the Court’s affirmation of the 
sentence imposed by the trial judge.   Deference is perceived as due the trial judge as he 
views offender, witnesses, and evidence first hand, and is in a position to have 
immediate knowledge of the community, the context of the offence, as well as the 
impact on any victim.  Such deference gives empathetic trial judges a window of 
opportunity to fashion therapeutic dispositions in the community.  Such dispositions 
have the benefit of lowering the risk of dangerousness for the offenders, as the risk of 
re-offence is to be assessed in light of therapeutic conditions tailored for the offender in 
his sentence order.  Carefully crafted therapeutic conditions have the potential of 
preserving, even enhancing, the initial mitigating effect of mental disorders in 
sentencing considerations, preventing their conversion to aggravating factors where risk 
of re-offence is not addressed.      
 
A landmark decision, Knoblauch addresses serendipitously, rather than by obvious 
legislative fiat, the dearth of hospital or other treatment dispositions for those mentally 
ill offenders neither UST nor NCR.  A specific “Hospital Order’ provision, s. 747 of the  
                                                 
328 Ibid. at para. 36 and 40-43.  (Knoblauch) 
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Criminal Code, drafted for the 1996 revisions,329 but not yet declared in force, provides 
for consensual detention330 in a treatment facility for offenders suffering from mental 
disorders.  One may speculate that insufficient infrastructure may have been the reason 
for indefinite deferral of the proclamation of this provision. Hospital orders proposed 
under s. 747.5 would be made only at the time of sentencing and only for a period not 
exceeding 60 days, after which the accused would be sent to prison to serve the 
unexpired term of the sentence.   
 
In contrast to this proposed “Hospital Order” under s. 747, the Knoblauch innovation 
was implemented through the conditional sentence regime, from the perspective of an 
unusual fact situation, absent the restrictions of s. 747.5.  Consonant with Gladue331 and 
restorative justice emphases, healing and treatment, including hospital treatment in 
some cases, are essential for the ultimate goal of restoration and reintegration.   Prison 
is a setting not conducive to the process of healing.332   In the wake of Knoblauch, there 
is potential for the number of mentally disordered prisoners serving sentences in 
correctional facilities to be reduced.333  Other creative treatment dispositions may 
                                                 
329 For ease of reference, refer to the proposed provisions, provisions not yet declared in force, in 
Appendix 2. 
330 Section 747.3 of the proposed “Hospital Order” requires the consent to the order of both the offender 
and the person in charge of the treatment facility where the offender is to be detained.  Criminal Code, 
S.C., 1995, c. 22, s. 6 (unproclaimed). 
331 Supra note 258.  (Gladue) 
332 Drugs, gangs and a violent culture prevail:  March 2, 2003 Inquest of Sonja Keepness who died of an 
overdose of contraband methadone sold to her by fellow inmates the day before her death in the 
Pinegrove facility, at the Prince Albert Penitentiary; and the Second Interim Report of the Commission on 
First Nations and Metis Peoples and Justice Reform, “Gangs and the Saskatchewan Experience,” vol. 7 
No. 4 (Winter 2002), Justice as Healing, p. 8. 
333 Julian V. Roberts and Simon Verdun-Jones, “Directing Traffic at the Crossroads of Criminal Justice 
and Mental Health:  Conditional Sentencing After the Judgment in Knolbauch,” (2000) 39 Alta. L. Rev. 
(No. 4), 788-809 at para. 61 and 66.   
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evolve in response to the Knoblauch model, including declaring in force a less 
restrictive modification of the s. 747 “Hospital Orders” provision.   The s. 747 hospital 
disposition, consensual as it is, need not be restricted to 60 days, nor be limited in 
availability to the time of sentencing.  Were these changes effected, hospital 
dispositions under s. 747 would become available to a broader range of convicted, 
mentally disordered offenders, not merely those who meet the conditions precedent for 
conditional sentences or probation.  In addition, such hospital dispositions could serve 
as an alternative to prison in the event of a breach of a conditional sentence, pursuant to 
Proulx334 and Elias.335   However, hospital dispositions may not be applicable to all 
mentally disordered offenders and will be feasible only where and when there are 
suitable facilities available, which raises again the spectre of mandating access to 
treatment.   Notwithstanding the hospital disposition, however, the complete gamut of 
community-based dispositions is the essence of restorative justice initiatives: 
There has to be more than lip service recognition that the solutions for the great 
majority of mentally disordered offenders do not lie in psychiatric wards and special 
hospitals, but in local support of a low-key nature provided by a combination of health, 
housing and social services at the ground level.  Establishing structures which are 
properly resourced in terms of both personnel and material benefits is what will prevent 
more mentally disturbed people from acquiring the role and status of “disordered 
offender”.  Ironically, as things stand at present, for many a court appearance may be 
the only way that their needs will become apparent.336
 
Increased home care recommendations and funding included in and resulting from the 
Royal Commission on Health Care (2002)337 may assist in providing properly resourced 
                                                 
334 Supra note 272.  (Proulx) 
335 Supra note 278.  (Elias) 
336 Burney, E. and Pearson, G., “Mentally Disordered Offenders:  Findng a Focus for Diversion,” 291-249 
at 245, in Peay, Jill, (Ed.), Criminal Justice and the Mentally Disordered, (Darrtmouth:  Ashgate, 1998). 
337 Romanow, R.  Commissioner, Royal Commission on Health Care, Building on Values: The Future of 
Health Care in Canada.  ( Ottawa:  Privy Council of Canada, 2002). 
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“health, housing and social services at the ground level” through primary care agencies 
and early intervention, precluding the reliance on the justice system solely to meet the 
unaddressed needs of the mentally disordered.  In this context, Health Canada’s Best 
Practices: Fetal Alcohol Syndrome/Fetal Alcohol Effects and the Effects of Other 
Substance use During Pregnancy recommends, on the basis of consensus among 
experts, specialized lifespan supports in many areas of daily living, including, inter alia, 
education, employment, residential, money-management, substance abuse treatment, 
mental health therapy, dealing with the justice system, and basic living skills. 338
 
Some jurisdictions have resorted to or are contemplating the implementation of 
specialized, therapeutically oriented mental health courts that would possess the 
expertise in mental health law issues to address the needs of mentally disordered and 
disabled offenders.  In sparsely populated areas, the cost of maintaining a parallel court 
system may prove prohibitive. A suggested compromise is the provision of mental 
health counselors to assist judges in youth and criminal courts screen offenders that 
have mental disorders such as FASDs and develop coordinated treatment plans for 
them.  Such initiatives are to be applauded, but they are dependent for their success on 
the availability of treatment resources and facilities.339
 
 
 
                                                 
338 Supra note 134 at p. 89-91. (Health Canada’s Best Practices)   
339 Chartrand, L. and Forbes-Chilibeck, E., “The Sentencing Of Offenders with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome,”  
2003 Health Law Journal, publication pending. 
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3.  MANDATING TREATMENT 
 
3.1  Hurdle of Positive State Obligation 
 
The problem in mandating and thereby accessing community-based treatment for 
FASDs, is, as in L.E.K.,340 one of overcoming the hurdles of judicial legitimacy and 
institutional competence in order to impose an obligation on the state to fund and 
provide treatment.  Courts traditionally have avoided trenching on the legislative and 
executive policy roles of allocating scarce, budgetary resources among publicly-funded 
programs.  A curial policy-operational dichotomy precedent plays a role in this 
deference.   The decision whether to fund or not to fund community-based treatment 
programs is, then, more likely than not, to be construed by the courts as a policy 
decision, and a proper exercise of executive discretion, as long as that decision is 
undertaken by the government in good faith and is not patently unreasonable.341
 
As well, there is the conundrum of the constitutional federal-provincial division of 
powers with which to contend.  For instance, the federal government introduces 
community-based sentences under its powers over the criminal law conferred by s. 91 
                                                 
340 Supra note 279. (L.E.K.) 
341 Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420, Cory J.; 
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 Lord Wilberforce; and City of Kamloops v. 
Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, Wilson J, as cited in C. Jones “Fixing to Sue:  Is there a Legal Duty to 
Establish Safe Injection Facilities in British Columbia?”  (2002) 35 U.B.C.L. Rev. 393-454. 
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of the Constitutional Act, 1867, but s. 92 of the same Act, institutes a provincial 
responsibility to implement such sentences.342   Community-based provisions tend to 
fall through such jurisdictional cracks. 
 
As in L.E.K.,343 concerns of judicial legitimacy and institutional competence may 
militate against courts requiring governments to provide benefits.344  Alternatively, 
Charter and other Constitutional rights might, in some cases, trump structural factors 
and disentangle Gordian Knots in the division of powers and judicial competence. As an 
example, enforcement of Charter rights overcame these concerns in Eldridge v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General),345 and Mahe v. Alberta,346 with respect to 
accommodating the deaf and to implementing second language rights pursuant to s. 15 
and 16 of the Charter, respectively. 347  The courts compelled the appropriate branch of 
government under the division of powers to fund the relevant services.  As Cory J. 
noted in Vriend v. Alberta,348  
The notion of judicial deference to legislative choices should not, however, be 
used to completely immunize certain kinds of legislative decisions from Charter 
scrutiny.  
 
To illustrate, the ratio decidendi in Okimow v. R.,349  that s. 7 and 15 of the Charter 
cannot be used to defeat executive action (in particular, decisions regarding accessibility 
                                                 
342 S. 91(27) and s. 92(14) & (15), Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31,Vict., c.3.. 
343 Supra note 279. (L.E.K.) 
344 Macklem, P. “Aboriginal Rights and State Obligations,” (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. (No. 1) 97, at 14 and 
18 (QL). 
345  [1997] 3 S.C.R.  624. (Eldridge) 
346 Supra note 104.  ([1990] 1 S.C.R. 342.  (Mahe) 
347 Notwithstanding that the wording in s. 16 of the Charter is significantly stronger than in s. 15. 
348 Vriend v. Alberta [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, para. 54. 
349 [2000] S.J. No. 449. (Okimow) 
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to alternative measures programs), under the principle of stare decisis was conclusively 
settled otherwise in Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada.350   Operation Dismantle held 
that executive decisions are reviewable by the courts under s. 32(1)(a) of the Charter, 
and that the executive branch of the government bears a general duty to act in 
accordance with the dictates of the Charter.   However, the facts alleged in Operation 
Dismantle did not constitute a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.  More specifically, the 
cabinet decision to allow the United States to test cruise missiles in Canada did not 
constitute a s. 7 violation as the applicants did not establish a causal link between the 
tests and the risk of nuclear war.  Conversely, the facts of Okimow do constitute a 
violation of s. 15 rights, albeit a violation that may have been justifiable under s. 1.  
Nevertheless, the blanket holding in Okimow that the Charter cannot be used to defeat 
executive action is in error. 
 
Iacobucci J., in M. v. H.,351 emphasized the circumscribed aspect of judicial deference 
to the legislature, affirming Vriend.  He noted that the introduction of the Charter 
redefined our system of government in such manner as to create a “dialogue of mutual 
respect between the courts and legislatures.”352  The courts do defer to legislative policy 
choices when convinced that the legislature is in the best position to make these 
choices, (such as the difficult policy judgments regarding claims of competing groups 
not involving a Charter aspect, or in the evaluation of complex and conflicting social 
science research) although such deference will not immunize completely certain 
                                                 
350 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at paras. 28 and 50. (Operation Dismantle) 
351  [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.  (M.H.) 
352 Supra note 348 at para. 134 (Vriend), as cited in Ibid. at para. 78 (M.H.). 
 135
decisions from Charter scrutiny.  Under s. 1 of the Charter, the burden of proof rests on 
the legislature to justify the infringement or denial of a right; the legislature must then  
provide the court with evidence and arguments to support its claim of justification of 
policy choices, confirming that there were reasonable in the circumstances.  Courts 
must exercise caution in not overstepping the bounds of institutional competence in 
reviewing such choices.  However, the question of deference must be resolved by 
considering the nature of each particular claim and the relevant evidence.  Deference is 
not a threshold s. 1 decision to be dispensed with at the outset of the analysis.  An 
examination of context must be undertaken to determine whether or not deference is 
appropriate.353   
 
More recently in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),354 McLachlin, C.J., writing 
for the majority, did not preclude that, in an appropriate fact situation (which Gosselin 
was not) s. 7 of the Charter could be used to obligate governments to provide the basic 
necessities of life to people who could not provide these for themselves, and that this 
right should develop incrementally: 
It does not follow, however, that courts are precluded from entertaining a claim 
such as the present one [s.7]. While it may be true that courts are ill-equipped to 
decide policy matters concerning resource allocation - questions of how much 
the state should spend, and in what manner - this does not support the 
conclusion that justiciability is a threshold issue barring the consideration of the 
substantive claim in this case.  As indicated above, this case raises altogether a 
different question: namely, whether the state is under a positive obligation to 
provide basic means of subsistence to those who cannot provide for 
themselves.  In contrast to the sorts of policy matters expressed in the 
justiciability concern, this is a question about what kinds of claims individuals 
can assert against the state.  The role of courts as interpreters of the Charter and 
                                                 
353 Supra note 351 at para. 78-80. (M.H.) 
354 [2002] S.C.J. No. 85. (Gosselin) 
 136
guardians of its fundamental freedoms against legislative or administrative 
infringements by the state requires them to adjudicate such rights-based 
claims.  One can in principle answer the question of whether a Charter right 
exists - in this case, to a level of welfare sufficient to meet one's basic needs - 
without addressing how much expenditure by the state is necessary in order to 
secure that right.  It is only the latter question that is, properly speaking, non-
justiciable.355  
 
 
Such a tentative, but seminal holding required first that the Court interpret s. 7, the right 
to life, liberty, and security of the person, to extend beyond the realm of the 
administration of justice into other realms, in particular, the realm of the administration 
of welfare benefits, construed in the lexicon of substantive equality as equitable 
resource distribution.356  Further to this, Gosselin does not preclude a positive state 
obligation arising in a suitable fact situation that involves state inaction which infringes 
s. 7. Through not precluding such obligation, Gosselin affirms the potential for the 
existence of positive rights under s. 7 of the Charter and the concomitant state 
obligation to uphold them, even if incrementally:   
This concludes my interpretive analysis of s. 7. In my view, the results are 
unequivocal: every suitable approach to Charter interpretation, including textual 
analysis, purposive analysis, and contextual analysis, mandates the conclusion 
that the s. 7 rights of life, liberty and security of the person include a positive 
dimension. (para. 357) 
 
 
By not precluding s. 7 rights, Gosselin opens slightly the Pandora’s Box of economic 
rights (a component of the rights to life, liberty and security), first affirmed in the 
Canadian Bill of Rights.357   However, in view of the Court’s 5:4 decision against  
                                                 
355 Ibid. at para. 332. (Gosselin) 
356 Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?”  (2001) 27 Queen’s L. J., 299-318 at 
para. 8.      
357 Canadian Bill of Rights, R..S.C. 1985, App. III. 
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including a positive obligation under s. 7 rights in the context of the facts of the case, 
the opening is slight indeed. 
 
Madam Justice Saunders discusses a similar Pandora’s Box in Auton v. B.C., in the 
context of mandating treatment for autistic children.  She comments that the courts have 
not yet addressed the possibility of a positive state obligation to fund treatment for a 
gravely disabled child, in the context of a universal health program.  Justification for not 
funding such treatment may be more difficult: 
Nor do I consider that a decision in favour of the petitioners will open 
Pandora’s Box.  While there has been debate as to whether the Charter, in 
application, can impose a positive duty to ameliorate pre-existing and non-state 
caused conditions of disadvantage, for example Ferrell v. Ontario (Attorney 
General) (1998) 42 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.) and Lovelace v. Ontario (1997), 33 
O.R. (3d) 735 (C.A.), the discussion has not addressed a failure to provide 
treatment to a child, in the context of a universal program, to ameliorate a 
gravely debilitating affliction.  In this circumstance, it is appropriate for the 
Court to look both to the past and to the present for assistance in determining 
whether the underinclusiveness of the Province’s health care scheme, creating a 
gap for treatment of children with autism or ASD, is reasonable and justified in 
a free and democratic society. 358
 
More common has been the court’s enforcement of negative rights, that is, of striking 
down discriminatory laws, for instance, laws that prohibit the use of an official 
language.  Mandating accommodation of disabilities or access to instruction in an 
official language is a positive state obligation.  However, such action may be viewed by 
the courts as encroachment on executive powers.  Accordingly, the legislative decision 
or executive action under review will not be overturned lightly; rather, the Crown will 
attempt to justify its actions through a Section 1 Charter justification.   Nor will  
                                                 
358 Supra note 106 at para. 59. (Auton, 2002, BCCA). 
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infringement of a right (such as failure to treat a disabled child) survive a Section 1 
justification without compelling supportive reasons.  A proposed constitutional remedy 
mandating a positive state obligation to provide community-based treatment may 
require, inter alia:  a favourable cost-benefit analysis, evidence of effectiveness of the 
treatment, as well as a “gate-keeping” mechanism, for example a medical practitioner’s 
referral, as a requirement to qualify for state-funded treatment.   Lamer C.J. in 
Schachter emphasized that at issue was not whether courts can, but rather, the degree to 
which courts can make decisions that impact on a legislature’s budgetary policies, and 
the context in which such decisions occur (e.g. treatment for disabled children) that 
would be the determining factors behind acceptance or rejection.359
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
359 Schachter v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 679 at 709. 
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3.2 Charter of Rights and Freedoms360
 
 
3.2.1  R. v. L.E.K. 
 
In R. v. L.E.K.,361 because of inappropriateness of either an open or a closed custody 
disposition for an FAS/E young offender, Judge M. E. Turpel-Lafond imposed a 
minimal 30-day open custody sentence, followed by one year probation, with the 
following condition: 
It is the direction of the court that there be a youth worker with special training 
and understanding in organic brain impairment who is assigned to his 
[L.E.K.’s] file, and that a comprehensive plan be prepared for the day of his 
release, and I want him brought back before me, Judge M.E. Turpel-Lafond on 
[the day of this release] and which should include an in-patient treatment centre 
with an aboriginal focus, should include special educational supports, and 
special supports in terms of residence. (para. 14)   
 
The Court of Appeal showed sympathy for the plight of FAS offenders and 
acknowledged the genuine concern of youth court judges who wish to “break the 
insidious cycle of in/out as exemplified by this young offender who, at 16 years of age, 
has a string of at least 45 convictions.”362  Nevertheless, the Court had no option but to 
overturn the impugned probation condition, due to concerns about the judicial and 
institutional competence of courts to impose obligations on the legislative and executive 
branches of government: 
                                                 
360 This topic was dealt with as part of an unpublished paper submitted to Professor N. Zlotkin for 
Advanced Native and Aboriginal Law 801.3, “Charter, Treaty and Constitutional Solutions Proposed as 
Remedies to Obtain Interdisciplinary, Non-Carceral Treatment for FAS/E Offenders.”  The topic has been 
significantly altered, revised and expanded in the present form. 
361 Supra note 279 at para 14. (SKCA)  (L.E.K.) 
362 Ibid. at para. 35.  (L.E.K.) 
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The portion of the probation order directing the provincial director to assign a 
youth worker with specialized training in organic brain impairment went 
beyond the competence of the youth court judge. The jurisdiction of the youth 
court to make specific orders must be conferred expressly or by necessary 
implication from the provisions of the Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 
Y-1.  The Act defines the powers and duties of the youth court judge, the 
provincial director, the offenders, and the Attorney General.  The statement of 
general principles in s. 3 of the Act does not confer jurisdiction that is not 
specifically conferred elsewhere.  It is the responsibility of the province to 
provide the programs and facilities necessary to enable the terms of the statute 
to be carried out, but s. 3(1) does not impose a mandatory duty on the 
provincial director to create specific types of programs. The youth court’s 
jurisdiction is also limited by the fundamental constitutional principle that it is 
the judiciary that imposes sanctions and it is the executive that administers 
them.  The effect of the judge’s order in this case was to order the government 
to engage a specific kind of person with certain qualifications and to order that 
person to be assigned to work with the accused.363  
 
 
 
The Court of Appeal in L.E.K. cited a somewhat similar case, R. v. R.J.H.,364 in the 
context of a young offender requesting, rather than the existing publicly funded 
program, more extensive and specialized private addiction treatment: 
A question relating to the extent of the implied powers contained in s. 
3(1) [of the Young Offenders Act] was dealt with by the Alberta Court 
of Appeal in R. v. H.(R.J.). . . In that case the young offender was 
ordered to attend an existing private care program "as directed by his 
probation officer" and the government was explicitly ordered to pay the 
$1,250 monthly bill for such treatment.  Madam Justice Fruman on 
behalf of the Court noted that s. 3(1)(c.1) imposes no mandatory duty on 
the court.  The words "whenever possible" in s. 3 do not empower a 
youth court judge to force the government to hire or create a program 
where one does not exist.  There is nothing in the Act that gives a youth 
court judge power to order governments to create programs no matter 
how badly they are needed.  Moreover, to read a federal act as giving a 
youth court judge the power to determine how a province will spend its 
money goes against the division of powers set out in the 
Constitution.  We agree with both the reasons and the results of 
H.(R.J.).365  
 
                                                 
363 R. v. L.E.K., (2000), 153 C.C.C. (3d) 250 at 252 as cited in R. v. S.L.P. [2002] SKPC 52 at para. 31.  
364 [2000] ABCA 111. (R.J.H.) 
365 Supra note 279 at para 26. (L.E.K.) 
 141
As Judge Turpel-Lafond’s probation order trenched on the power of the provincial 
government to administer justice under s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the 
SKCA repealed it, replacing the offending portion with the following less prescriptive 
form: 
He [L.E.K.]shall report to the designated youth court worker as directed and at 
the time specified for the purpose of receiving inpatient treatment with an 
aboriginal focus for his organic brain injury and substance abuse; and, he shall 
report to the designated youth court worker as directed and at the time specified 
for the purpose of the establishment of a long term plan of rehabilitation which 
takes into account his special education and residential needs.366
 
 
This order appears to meet the R.J.H.  test of a recommendation rather than a binding 
order by the court to the provincial government: 
 
The Provincial Court judge made a heart-felt determination that the A.A.R.C. 
[Alberta Adolescent Recovery Centre] private treatment program is R.J.H.'s 
best chance for rehabilitation. There is little doubt that R.J.H. requires drug 
treatment, and the Alberta government may well choose to send him to 
A.A.R.C. While it was open to the judge to recommend the A.A.R.C. program, 
she did not have the jurisdiction to order the government to pay for it.367  
 
 
A notice under the Constitutional Question Act,368 pursuant to sections 7 and 15 of the 
Charter,369 was declined by the Court of Appeal in L.E.K. because the notice was not 
initiated at the trial level.370 However, Charter challenges, properly initiated, may be a 
means of acquiring the necessary treatment.  Sanjeev Anand in “R.J.H. and the Power 
                                                 
366Ibid. at para. 49  (L.E.K., SKCA) 
367 Supra note 364 at para. 38. (R.J.H.) 
368 R.S.S., 1978, C. C-29. 
369 Supra note 72. (Charter) 
370 Telephone interview of April 21, 2003, with Katharine Grier, Legal Counsel for L.E.K. at the Court of 
Appeal and Director of Legal Aid, Saskatoon.   As the Judge had taken the initiative to create the special 
order and programs for L.E.K., there was no Charter breach at the trial level.   It was not until after trial 
when the Crown launched their appeal of the sentence, that action under the Charter became relevant, 
and was initiated by the defense at the Court of appeal. 
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of Courts to Order Provincial Governments to pay for Young Offender Treatment,”371 
concludes that provincial courts are not courts of competent jurisdiction, citing R. v. 
Mills,372 a decision respecting the nature of courts of competent jurisdiction under s. 24 
of the Charter: 
   For those reasons, and to summarize, I am of the view that:  
-
 
A court of competent jurisdiction in an extant case is a court that has 
jurisdiction over the person, the subject matter and has, under the criminal
or penal law, jurisdiction to grant the remedy; 
 
- As a general rule, the court of competent jurisdiction is the trial court;  
-
 
A judge presiding at a preliminary inquiry is a court of competent 
jurisdiction to determine whether there has been a violation, but only if 
the order sought is the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).373  
 
 
Professor Anand reasons further that, according to s. 24, anyone whose Charter rights 
have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain a 
remedy, concluding that the Court of Appeal was such a court of competent jurisdiction 
for cases like R.J.H., had a Charter application been made.  Although R.J.H. does not 
deal with a Charter application per se, Professor Anand speculates about a remedy 
under s. 7 of the Charter that would mandate the specialized addiction treatment the 
provincial court judge had attempted to order for R.J.H.  However, a thorough study of 
Mills indicates that while preliminary inquiry judges are excluded from the category of 
courts of competent jurisdiction under s. 24 (except for powers of exclusion of 
evidence), neither trial courts at the provincial level, nor trial courts qua trial courts at 
                                                 
371 (Feb., 2001) 12 NCLJ 309-314. 
372 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863. (Mills) 
373 Ibid. at para. 53.  (Mills) 
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any other level of jurisdiction are excluded from this category.374    Presumably, 
sentencing courts would be considered trial courts, as sentencing is the culminating 
phase of the trial function.375   
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the respondent L.E.K. argued that his Charter rights 
were not infringed at the trial level; not until the trial court was functus officio did the 
infringement arise.  Therefore, L.E.K. anticipated that the Court of Appeal would have 
been able to entertain the Charter question.376   The reasons the Court of Appeal did not 
are set forth in Mills.  A trial court, at any level, is a court of competent jurisdiction, 
according to Mills.  The trial court, including a provincial trial court, has been entrusted  
by law to adjudicate the matter, and has jurisdiction to grant the remedy.  Furthermore, 
the trial court is in a position to hear viva voce evidence and examine exhibits first 
hand; the appeal court, on the other hand, might have to deal with conflicting affidavits 
or with resulting delays if cross-examination of deponents is warranted to resolve 
conflict.  For the workings of the supervisory or appeal court, it is preferable that the 
matter be considered on the basis of the entire record in the trial court, where all issues 
may be considered in one forum, rather than have it litigated piecemeal between the two 
levels of courts.377   Appellants like L.E.K. should seek remedy before the trial court, in 
L.E.K.’s case the provincial youth court, which being a trial court, is a court of 
competent jurisdiction within the meaning of s. 24(1) of the Charter. 
                                                 
374 Ibid. at para. 26-57. (Mills) 
375 Both R.J. H. and L.E.K. plead guilty before a provincial court judge and were then sentenced by that 
judge. 
376 Telephone Conversation of April 21, 2003, with Kathy Grier, Counsel for L.E.K. 
377 Supra note 372 at para. 74.  (Mills) 
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3.2.2   Auton v. British Columbia     
  
  
In Auton v. B.C.,378  a Charter challenge analogous to L.E.K., but outside the criminal 
law context, was successful in acquiring treatment for autistic children.   The appellants 
in Auton alleged discrimination against the mentally disabled, an enumerated ground in 
s 15(1): 
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination, and in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.   
  
The appellants claimed discrimination because they were denied funding for medical 
treatment necessary to alleviate symptoms of their disability.  Medical treatment 
necessary to ameliorate a wide range of health-related conditions normally is available 
to members of the public.  Furthermore, there is a Charter obligation to supply 
treatment to those such as the mentally disabled who, without adequate accommodation, 
risk affront to their human dignity through stigmatization, disadvantage, and exclusion. 
 
Section 15(1) of the Charter expresses a commitment to the equal worth and dignity of 
all peoples and “entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the 
knowledge that they are recognized as human beings equally deserving of respect.”379  
                                                 
378 [1999] B.C.J. No. 718 (BCSC); [2000] B.C.S.C. 1142, [2001] BCSC 220; aff’d  [2002] BCCA 538; 
[2002] S.C.C.A. No. 510 (Notice of appeal filed June 16, 2003.  Appeal not yet inscribed for hearing.)  
(Auton) 
379 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at p. 171. 
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It represents a desire to rectify extant and to prevent future discrimination against 
particular groups, “suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in our society.”380  
Moreover, Charter rights are to be interpreted generously and purposively.381  The 
analysis must be contextual, always bearing in mind protection of human dignity.382   
  
People with both autism and autism spectrum disorders (ASDs),383 and fetal alcohol 
spectrum disorders (FASDs), belong to an enumerated group under s. 15(1), the 
mentally disabled.  The determination of whether the law is discriminatory against 
them, 384 being a contextual exercise, it is important to look at the larger social, political 
and legal milieu.385    La Forest J. in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 
describes the stigmatized, marginalized context for disabled people:  
It is an unfortunate truth that the history of disabled persons in Canada is largely 
one of exclusion and marginalization.  Persons with disabilities have too often 
been excluded from the labour force, denied access to opportunities for social 
interaction advancement, subjected to invidious stereotyping and relegated to 
institutions; see generally M. David Lepofsky, “A Report Card on the Charter’s 
Guarantee of Equality to Persons with Disabilities after 10 years – What 
Progress?  What Prospects?” (1997),7 N.J.C.L. 263.  This historical disadvantage 
has to a great extent been shaped and perpetuated by the notion that disability is 
an abnormality or flaw.  As a result, disabled persons have not generally been 
afforded the “equal concern, respect and consideration” that s. 15(1) demands.  
                                                 
380 R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at p. 1333. 
381 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at p. 156. 
382 Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. 
383 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Minister of Health), [2000] BCSC 1142 at para 2-3.  
Autism or autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurobehavioral syndrome caused by a dysfunction in the 
central nervous system, which leads to the onset, within the first three years of life, of the following three 
general categories of symptoms:  impairments in social interaction; impairments in communication; and 
restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior which can be destructive to both self and others. 
Unless their condition is treated, many will be locked a world of silence and isolation, unable to relate to 
others emotionally or through language, with eventual institutionalization the likely outcome. 
384 As in Auton and Eldridge, there is no legislation that prohibits necessary medical treatment for ASD 
children, for the deaf, or, by extension, for FASDs.  However, the law is interpreted and applied in a 
manner that has the effect of discrimination by denying the necessary treatment to certain disabled groups 
by not funding the special programs they require.   
385 Supra note 380, at p. 1331.  (Turpin) 
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Instead they have been subjected to paternalistic attitudes of pity and charity, and 
their entrance into social mainstream has been conditional upon their emulation 
of able-bodied norms; see Sandra A. Goudry and Yvonne Peters, “Litigating for 
Disability Equality Rights: The Promises and the Pitfall” (1994) at pp. 5-6.  One 
consequence of these attitudes is the persistent social and economic disadvantage 
faced by the disabled.  Statistics indicate that persons with disabilities, in 
comparison to non-disabled persons, have less education, are more likely to be 
outside the labour force, face much higher unemployment rates, and are 
concentrated at the lower end of the pay scale when employed; see “Minister of 
Human Resources Development, Persons with Disabilities:  A Supplementary 
Paper (1994), at pp. 3-4 and Statistics Canada, “A Portrait of Persons with 
Disabilities” (1995), at pp. 46-49.386
 
 
For offenders with FASDs, who, in addition, may be victims of racial discrimination, 
being disabled renders them further marginalized, both economically and socially, and 
consequently subject to disproportionately high rates of incarceration, the most adverse 
form of institutionalization.    Profoundly socially isolating as ASD can be, the 
condition often lacks the racial dimension of discrimination.  Furthermore, although, 
individuals with ASD, too, are often subject to institutionalization in group homes or 
hospital settings, they are not subject to incarceration with its harsh, penal 
consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
386 Supra note 345 at para. 56. (Eldridge) 
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 3.2.2.1  Law v. Canada Analysis  
  3.2.2.1.1 Section 15(1) 
 
Law v. Canada387 introduced a uniform approach to s. 15(1) analysis, a general 
framework synthesized from earlier cases,388 but possessed of its own characteristic 
synergy.  The Law approach has been adopted and, at least partially applied, in 
subsequent cases,389 such as Granovsky v. Canada,390 in the context of an adult’s short-
term disability.   Speaking for the majority of the Court in Law, Justice Iacobucci 
emphasized that the central concern is whether an impugned law or government action 
violates the overall substantive purpose of s. 15,391 which is to protect essential human 
dignity and freedom.392  He outlined three broad determinations a court should make 
under a s. 15(1) analysis:  (1) in purpose or effect, the impugned law must create a 
distinction between the claimant and others; (2) the distinction must be made on the 
basis of an enumerated ground under s. 15(1) or on an analogous ground; and (3) in 
purpose or effect, the distinction must constitute discrimination which undermines the 
                                                 
387 Supra note 382. (Law) 
388 Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 at para. 62; Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 
S.C.R. 418; and Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
389 However, the full application and articulation of some aspects of the Law analysis has not as yet been 
made clear.  For instance, there is controversy about whether some aspects of the analysis are part of the 
s. 15 analysis, or whether they more properly belong in the s. 1 analysis.  Some question the likelihood of 
agreement on a firm definition of dignity, which underlies the s. 15 analysis.  Some of the stages of the 
tests, including analysis of contextual factors, have not been fully articulated by the Court, and all of the 
contextual factors listed in Law may not be relevant in every case.  Moreover, since the list is not 
exhaustive, factors not as yet articulated could be relevant in future cases. 
390 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703. (Granovsky) 
391 Supra note 370 at para 25 (Law); Supra note 336 at para. 81-2 (Vriend); Supra note 333 at para. 60-61 
(Eldridge). 
392 Supra note 382 at para 83.  (Law) 
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presumption of the equality guarantee that each individual is of equal worth and dignity, 
regardless of the group to which she belongs.393   
 
The first and second stages of the Law inquiry require that a distinction made under 
legislation (or under statutory authority) must be based on enumerated or analogous 
grounds.  However, not every distinction made based on enumerated or analogous 
grounds will constitute discrimination under s. 15(1).  Only those distinctions based on 
enumerated or analogous grounds that detract from essential human dignity will be 
considered discriminatory under s. 15(1).  At the third stage, to assess if the distinction 
demeans human dignity and is accordingly discriminatory, the court will examine 
contextual factors.  Four contextual factors identified, but not considered exhaustive, by 
Justice Iacobucci in Law include: 
• pre-existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping or prejudice experienced 
by the claimant’s group; 
• relationship between the ground upon which the claim is based and the actual 
characteristics and circumstances of the claimants; and 
• the ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law or action upon a more 
disadvantaged group or person in society;394 and 
• the nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned law or action.395 
 
                                                 
393 Ibid. at para. 8.  (Law) 
394 As in s. 15(2), affirmative action initiatives.  
395 Supra note 382 at para 88.  (Law) 
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As the claim in Auton is based on the enumerated ground of disability, the four 
contextual factors play a significant role in determining whether the dignity of the 
claimants is demeaned, and therefore the distinction is discriminatory.  Considering the 
first contextual factor, ASDs, due to their mental disability, have suffered pre-existing, 
historical disadvantage through stigmatization, marginalization and exclusion from 
mainstream society.  Untreated, their fate may be life-long institutionalization,396 with 
attendant loss of liberty, and the denial of opportunity to participate in mainstream 
society through involvement in the labour force and other avenues of social, 
educational, economic and political discourse.  There is, thus, no question as to the 
seriousness of the grounds upon which their claim is based, as addressed by the second 
contextual factor.  Further, pursuant to the third factor, the Crown made no specific 
claim as to the ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law on a more 
disadvantaged group.  They did, however, express general concerns regarding the 
skewing of resources away from other special needs children,397 but not necessarily 
more disadvantaged children.  Regarding the fourth contextual factor, the nature and 
scope of the interest affected, the petitioners’ claim for funding of treatment involves 
comprehensive health care, one of the most important values in Canadian society and 
immense in scope.  Decision-making in the health care arena, by necessity, does involve 
complex balancing of the interests and needs of various groups and individuals.398  
Application of the four contextual factors points towards upholding substantive equality 
for the disabled claimants in Auton through provision of the special treatment they 
                                                 
396 Supra note 383 at para. 4 (Auton, 2000, BCSC) 
397 Supra note 106 at para. 134. (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
398 Ibid. at para. 56. 
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require, subject to balancing processes incorporated to fairly distribute health-care 
funding in compliance with Charter principles. 
  
Under the three broad enquiries of the Law analysis, claimants first must establish that, 
because of the distinction the impugned legislation or action under statutory authority 
has drawn between them and others, they have been denied “equal protection” or “equal 
benefit” of the law, which constitutes differential treatment on the basis of at least one 
of the enumerated or analogous grounds.  Further, claimants must establish, using the 
contextual factors, that the distinction demeans their dignity, compared to other groups, 
and is, accordingly, discriminatory within the substantive meaning of s.15(1).  In 
Eldridge, the deaf (which can be held to be a group analogous to both ASDs and  
FASDs) were entitled, along with the general population, to have equal access to and to 
receive medically necessary, effective treatment of their health problems.399  Eldridge 
generalizes to all situations where lack of funding for treatment or services renders 
some disabled individuals unable to benefit from the provision of medical services to 
the same extent that persons without their disability benefit.  Under s. 15(1), it is not 
necessary to find a discriminatory purpose in the legislation, policy, or action; it is 
sufficient if the effect is to deny someone the equal protection or benefit of the law.  
The main consideration is the impact of the law, policy or action upon the individual or 
group concerned.400  Adverse effects discrimination is particularly relevant in the case 
of disability; governments rarely single out disabled persons for direct discriminatory 
                                                 
399 Supra note 345 at para. 95-96.  (Eldridge) 
400 Supra note 379 at p. 165.  (Andrews) 
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treatment, more commonly, laws or policies of general application will have a disparate 
impact on the disabled: 
[T]he government must take into account differences which in fact exist 
between individuals and so far as possible ensure that the provisions adopted 
will not have a greater impact on certain classes of persons due to irrelevant 
personal characteristics than on the public as a whole.  In other words, to 
promote the objective of the more equal society, s. 15(1) acts as a bar to the 
executive enacting provisions without taking into account their possible impact 
on already disadvantaged classes of persons.401
 
The Court in Auton concluded that the discrimination was in the form of a socially 
constructed handicap.402  Acting under statutory authority, a health care administrator 
had decided not to fund certain treatment, perceiving the needs of ASD children as less 
worthy of treatment than the needs of other children requiring medical treatment, or less 
worthy than the needs of adults requiring mental health care.403  
 
The crux of the Law analysis is the third stage, where the court must inquire whether the 
differential treatment brings into play the purpose of s. 15(1).  The process must 
“engage in a comparative analysis which takes into consideration the surrounding 
context of the claim and the claimant.”404  To do so, the analysis must “identify 
differential treatment as compared to one or more other persons or groups.”405  Such 
inquiry must ask whether the impugned legislation or action taken under statutory 
authority violates the essential human dignity of the disabled group, through promoting 
the view that persons with disabilities are less worthy of dignity than a comparator 
                                                 
401 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at p. 549. 
402 Supra note 106 at para. 51. (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
403 Ibid.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA)   
404 Supra note 382 at para. 55. (Law) 
405 Ibid. at para. 56.  (Law)   
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group, thereby demeaning the sense of dignity of disabled claimants.   The question 
posed by the third stage must be answered from the perspective of a hypothetical 
reasonable person, in the same situation as the disabled claimants, who takes into 
account the relevant contextual factors.406   Whether this contextual process based on an 
objective/subjective standard resolves the underlying ambiguity of the meaning of 
dignity is yet to be demonstrated.  
 
The appropriate comparator groups selected by the claimants in Auton were two:  the 
group of non-mentally disabled children, and the group of mentally disabled adults.407  
The Court determined that the infant autistic claimants had been discriminated against 
in comparison to both comparator groups on the enumerated grounds of mental 
disability and age, respectively.408  The comparator groups were selected to avoid 
pitting a group of autistic children against another group of disabled children in a “race 
to the bottom.”409  ASD claimants are doubly vulnerable being children and mentally 
disabled, both groups having faced pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, or 
prejudice.   
 
                                                 
406 Ibid. at para 55.  (Law). 
407 Supra note 106 at para. 28. (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
408 Ibid. at para. 33-42. (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
409 Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at para 69.  (Lovelace)   Iacobucci  J. coined the term, “race 
to the bottom,” in the context of ostensibly rejecting a relative disadvantage approach among Aboriginal 
groups, all of whom have been affected by a legacy of stereotyping and prejudice. 
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In the context of health legislation and policy,410 the early IBI therapy sought by the 
claimants is entirely consistent with an ameliorative purpose which includes the 
provision of necessary medical services. The claimants had been denied necessary 
treatment compared to the treatment provided children without mental disability and 
compared to the treatment provided adults with mental disability.  Differential denial of 
treatment distinguished the autistic claimants from the comparator groups, constituting 
underinclusiveness.411  Such differential denial of treatment, from the perspective of a 
hypothetical reasonable person in the same situation as the claimants, would be deemed 
to promote the view that ASDs are less worthy of dignity than non-mentally disabled 
children and mentally disabled adults, thus constituting discrimination. 
 
On the basis of underinclusiveness, Auton can be distinguished from Granovsky.  In the 
latter case, the claimants were less disadvantaged than some of those in the comparator 
groups; the reverse is true in Auton where the autistic claimants are more disadvantaged 
than the comparator groups.  Without treatment, the claimants in Auton face the 
prospect of remaining greatly disadvantaged for the duration of their lives. The needs of 
the claimants in Auton are great, existing in the context of a severe condition, ASD, 
which absent treatment at an early stage of life, may consign them to subsequent 
isolation and institutionalization.  The urgent needs of ASD claimants must be 
considered in the context of an existing treatment method which holds a realistic 
                                                 
410 Ministry of Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 301, s.3; Canada Health Act, R.S.C., Chap. C-6, ss. 3, 5, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11, and 12; B.C. Mental Health Care Plan, 1998; and The Medicare Protection Act, R.S.B.C., 
1996, c. 286.. 
411 Supra note 106 at para. 33 and 49.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
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possibility of substantial improvement in the their communication and behavior 
skills.412   
  
As stated by McIntyre J., “the accommodation of differences . . . is the essence of true 
equality.”413  To elaborate, the essence of s. 15(1) is not only to prevent stereotyping 
related to immutable conditions such as sex and race, but also to ameliorate the 
disadvantage suffered by those, such as the disabled, who have been excluded from 
mainstream society. The essence of the discrimination the disabled face does not lie so 
much in the attribution to them of untrue or irrelevant personal characteristics, as it does 
in the failure to make reasonable accommodation to their actual characteristics so that 
they can fully participate in society.  By ignoring her disability, society forces such an 
individual to sink or swim in the mainstream.  The central purpose of s. 15(1) is to 
recognize the actual characteristics of a disabled person and to reasonably accommodate 
them.414
 
Sign Language Interpretation, SLI, is the means in Eldridge by which deaf persons are 
to receive access to the same quality of medical care enjoyed by the hearing 
population.415  Thus it is for ASD or FASD claimants and the ameliorative treatments 
they require, whether it be to expedite access as in Eldridge or to provide treatment 
services per se as in Auton.  Necessary, effective, medical treatment is a benefit 
generally available to members of the public, and post-Charter, cannot be denied to the 
                                                 
412 Supra note 106 at para. 49.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
413 Supra note 379 at p.169.  (Andrews) 
414 Eagan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at paras. 66-67. 
415 Supra note 345 at para. 71.  (Eldridge) 
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disabled.  Anything less “bespeaks a thin and impoverished vision of s. 15(1).  It is 
belied, more importantly, by the thrust of this Court’s equality jurisprudence." 416    
Government policy not to fund certain treatment denies disabled persons who require 
such treatment the benefit of the law, and discriminates against them in comparison 
with persons not so disabled. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2.1.2  The Case for FASDs Under S. 15  
 
The preceding analysis from Auton could be applied, with minor modifications, to 
individuals with FASDs. Without treatment for the secondary symptoms of their 
disabilities, such individuals remain seriously disadvantaged for the duration of their 
lives. Their needs, too, are great, and, if unmet, may consign them not only to 
institutionalization, but also to incarceration with its loss of liberty and harsh, penal 
consequences.  Many individuals with FASDs suffer under, not a double, but a triple 
jeopardy of being vulnerable due to age, disability, and race.417 Cost benefit analyses 
illustrate the economic folly of continuing to incarcerate rather than acting to intervene 
early with treatment of their secondary symptoms.   
 
                                                 
416 Ibid. at para. 77. (Eldridge) 
417 Ferguson, L.G. (1997). Deconstructing Fetal Alcohol Syndrome:  A Critical Inquiry into the Discourse 
around Alcohol, Women, Ethnicity, Aboriginals and Disease, Unpublished Masters’s Thesis, Carleton 
University (Canada). 
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Although no scientifically proven method of treating individuals with FASDs exists, 
ameliorative practices are recommended by experts in the field of organic brain 
impairments and FASDs.418 Evidence of the efficacy of such practices may well follow 
implementation, but first there must be programs in place to review.  Even Crown 
experts in Auton conceded that treatment of the ASD claimants should not be delayed 
while awaiting replication of the Lovaas study.419  Like ASDs, FASDs are permanent 
conditions that cannot be cured, but symptoms can be treated allowing affected 
individuals to lead fuller lives in the community.    
 
Unlike the situation for ASDs, the Crown’s role as a causal contributing factor to 
FASDs, through its regulation and sale of alcoholic products, is direct, and possibly in 
breach of constitutionally protected treaty rights.  The Crown, therefore, may have a 
greater duty under s. 15 of the Charter to provide and fund services for FASDs.  Such 
services would be directed at the amelioration of a disadvantage the Crown was and 
continues to be instrumental in creating and furthering, in the face of a constitutionally 
protected treaty promise to the contrary.  
 
For a majority of FASDS, pre-existing disadvantage has been canvassed in the 
historical analysis surrounding the excesses of the whiskey trade, and current 
consumption patterns, demographics, socio-economic factors, and health indicators.420  
                                                 
418Supra note 134. (Health Canada, Best Practices) 
419 Supra note 383 at para. 52.  (Auton, 2000, BCSC) 
420 Refer to Chapter One of this thesis for a discussion of these factors. 
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Great disparities in health status persist between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginals in 
Canada, on almost every health indicator, including:  diabetes, tuberculosis, heart, lung 
and kidney disease, addictions and fetal alcohol, youth suicide, infant mortality rates, 
longevity statistics, mental health, injuries, environmental health, communicable and 
infectious diseases, education, employment, and others.421   These disproportionate 
burdens upon Aboriginal peoples stem from systemic causes attributed to the legacy of 
colonization. This legacy includes, in addition to the whiskey trade, residential schools 
and their intergenerational effects, perpetuated by the Sixties Scoop422 and subsequent 
child protection policies.  The consequence is far too many Native children left rootless 
in foster homes and custodial placements.   
 
Positive initiatives beyond medical care, comprehensive health services, and 
hospitalization, have been and are being attempted.  These include inter alia the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, the Aboriginal Healing Fund (AHF), the National 
Aboriginal Health Organization (NAHO), health research initiatives such as CIHR-
IAPH and ACADRE,423 Fetal Alcohol Canada Expertise (FACE), the Suicide 
Prevention Advisory Group, and the National Network for Aboriginal Mental Health 
                                                 
421 Supra note 72. [Health Canada, A Statistical Profile on the Health of First Nations in Canada (Ottawa, 
Canada: 2003), http://www.hc-sc.gc] 
422 Olesen, M. and Williams, D. Living in Limbo, 2003, www.geocities.com/adoption_dallas_mavis.  In 
the late 1960’s government practice expedited the adoption of First Nations and Metis children into non-
Aboriginal homes, in line with the policy of assimilation.  The genuineness of the need, in all cases, for 
removal of the children from their birth homes is questionable. 
423 Canada Institute of Health Research--Institute of Aboriginal Peoples Health (CIHR-IAPH) and 
Aboriginal Capacity and Developmental Research Environments program (ACADRE).   
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Research (NNAMHR).  Much more remains to be done, particularly at the grassroots 
level.   
In the context of the treaty alcohol ban and the whiskey trade that occurred 
contemporaneously with, as well as prior to the treaties, it would be a hypocritical 
travesty for the courts not to accommodate FASDs, particularly considering the huge 
profits made by colonizers, including the Crown, and the continuing role of the Crown 
in the regulation and sale of alcohol. 
As the treaty alcohol ban is a significant contextual factor for the s. 15 analysis, it has 
been considered in some detail in Chapter One, Section 1.4.  Although there is debate as 
to whether, on its own merits, breaches of the constitutionally protected treaty alcohol 
ban could be successfully litigated, the topic in its fullness, from such a strong 
underpinning in history and constitutional law, is introduced in this Charter discussion 
solely as a critical contextual factor under the Law analysis.  The written text of the 
treaty alcohol ban provision is strictly limited in area and scope; it applies solely to 
those affected beneficiaries of Treaties numbered 1 through 6, who were exposed to 
alcohol in utero, through maternal consumption on their respective reserves.  The power 
of its implications, however, may resonate beyond these boundaries. 
 
The alcohol ban is relevant to the following contextual factors identified in Law:  pre-
existing disadvantage experienced by the claimant’s group; the relationship between the 
circumstances of the claimants and the ground on which the claim is based; and the 
nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned law or action.  The first 
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contextual factor, pre-existing disadvantage, has been well canvassed in this thesis, 
starting from the days of the whiskey trade, continuing to current alcohol consumption 
patterns, and resultant incidence of FASDs.    
 
The second contextual factor, the relationship between the circumstances of the 
claimants and the ground on which the claim is based, also must be considered in 
relationship to the treaty alcohol ban.  Contrary to the alcohol ban, a group of potential 
Aboriginal claimants, through no fault of their own, were exposed to the teratogenic 
effects of alcohol in utero.  FASDs resulted, for which funding for accommodation of 
disabilities may be claimed.  The alcohol ban was included in the treaties, at the 
insistence of treaty signatories and their advocates, as a safeguard against the damage 
caused by alcohol during the whiskey trade and its anticipated intergenerational impact 
thereafter.  Consequently, it was included, with all treaty rights, in s. 35 of the 
Constitution, 1983, to be recognized and affirmed.  Complicity of the Crown in 
breaching the treaty alcohol ban, leading to incidences of FASDs in relevant Aboriginal 
populations, would constitute a significant contextual factor in a s. 15 Charter analysis.   
 
In view of the constitutional protection afforded by the treaty alcohol ban, the third 
contextual factor, the interest affected by the impugned law or action, is considerable in 
both nature and scope.  Lack of accommodation in the form of funding of treatment for 
relevant, affected individuals fails to ameliorate the damages caused not merely by a 
moral or statutory breach, but, more significantly, by a constitutional breach.  A 
constitutional breach is of the highest order of importance, representing as it does a 
 160
breach of the supreme law of Canada.  A Charter analysis would consider the gravamen 
of such a breach, in both s. 15 substantive equality analysis and in a s.1 infringement-
justification analysis.  Openly disregarding a constitutionally protected treaty right 
certainly demeans the dignity of the treaty signatories and their descendants, virtually 
declaring that they are not worthy of having promises made to them honoured and their 
constitutional rights protected.   It is doubtful that the Crown could either deny 
existence of such a right under s. 15, or justify infringement of it under s. 1, in order to 
elude responsibility for funding treatment that would ameliorate the damage caused by 
FASDs.  The Court, in a contextual, Charter analysis, is less likely to constrain the 
ban’s implications to strict geographic, site, and treaty boundaries, than it would in 
treaty litigation on its own merits. 
 
The etiology of ASD is a matter of speculation, ASD being a pre-existing and non-state 
caused condition.424 Thus, the request to fund intensive behavioral intervention (IBI)425 
services for ASDs was not directed at the amelioration of a disadvantage created by the 
law, except in the interpretation of the medicare provisions so as to exclude such 
                                                 
424 Supra note 106 at para 59 (Auton, 2002, BCCA); and Supra note 339 at para. 10. (Auton, 2000,BCSC) 
425 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Minister of Health), [1999] B.C.J. No. 718 at para. 
8-14. The form of early intensive behavioral intervention (IBI) requested by the petitioners was the 
Lovaas Autism Treatment (LAT).  Numerous jurisdictions, including Alberta, Prince Edward Island, 
England, and a number of states in the United States, have recognized the LAT as an appropriate therapy 
for autism.  The treatment is based on the work of Ivar Lovass, a psychologist at UCLA in California; he 
developed his method in the seventies and published the results of his research in 1987.  The basic 
premise of his treatment is that people with autism can be taught, on a one-to-one basis, the skills that 
they lack, primarily through rewarding appropriate behaviors.  The treatment is very intensive, about 40 
hours a week, and to be effective, must be employed early in the child’s life.  Although the treatment 
costs $45,000.00 - $60,000.00 per year per child, Dr. Lovass estimated (1987) that the savings for each 
child would be $2 millions U.S. in care over the course of his or her life.  Without effective treatment, the 
majority of autistic children are severely impaired in intellectual, social and emotional functioning, and 
require extensive care throughout their life span. 
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funding.426  Conversely, the epidemiological aspect of in utero transmission of FASD is 
well documented, and attributable, in part, at least, to Crown action or inaction. Product 
warning labels for alcohol have not been instituted in Canada, nor have warnings 
through other means been put in place until fairly recently.  Their effectiveness has not 
been tested.  Programs for the prevention and treatment of the FASDs are either in their 
infancy, or non-existent; this is especially true for treatment of existing conditions. 
 
In addition, courts may find stronger grounds for FASDs than for ASDs to use the 
ancient parens patriae jurisdiction, based on the underlying thesis that the law works 
for the protection and advantage of children.427  Such jurisdiction could justify intrusive 
intervention of the courts on behalf of children or disabled adults with FASDs, 
particularly in view of the large number of Aboriginal children, and children with 
FASDs, who are, or have been, subject to child protection orders.428   
 
The essence of the s. 15 substantive “dignity” analysis is the marginalization and 
exclusion from society that both ASDs and FASDs would suffer, absent adequate 
accommodation of differences through provision of funded health-care treatment.  As 
acknowledged by the Court in Auton, not all refusals to fund health-care would be 
                                                 
426 Supra note 106 at para. 52 (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
427 Ibid. at para. 61.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
428 Greschner, D. and Lewis, S., “Medicare in the Courts:  Auton and Evidence-Based Decision-Making,”  
publication pending in the Canadian Bar Review, page 22.  Only 25.6% of children with FAS/E lived 
with their biological parents when last seen at a provincial child development centre [B.F. Habbick et al, 
“Foetal Alcohol Syndrome in Saskatchewan:  Unchanged Incidence in a 20-year period” (1996) 87 Can. 
J. Public Health 204-207], and 88% of hospitalized people with FAS/E were Aboriginal [E.A. Loney et 
al, “Hospital Utilization of Saskatchewan People with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome” (1998) 89 Can. J. Public 
Health 333-336].  
 162
viewed as discriminatory.429  However, those refusals that violate the substantive 
equality provisions of s. 15, by failing to attenuate the marginalization and exclusion of 
groups like ASDs and FASDs who are subject to differential treatment on the basis of 
enumerated or analogous grounds, would be discriminatory.  Although the reverse 
could not be justified, funding could be diverted from other Crown sources to meet the 
needs of a more disadvantaged individual or group, such as those with ASD and FASD, 
For instance, funding allocated for institutionalization and incarceration could be 
diverted to funding IBI and similar treatment for FASDs.  The proceeds from the tax on 
alcoholic products could be diverted to the treatment of FASDs.  Significant portions of 
profits made by distilling and brewing companies, as a condition of their licensing, 
could be allocated to the mitigation of damages caused by the role of alcohol in 
contributing to conditions such as FASDs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
429 Ibid. at p. 18.  As a consequence of scarce resources, the health care system cannot address all medical 
needs.  For instance prescription drugs, hearing aids and spectacles are, in many cases, not funded 
through medicare.  Sometimes the health care system does not fund treatment unless it is shown to be 
effective, and even if effective, may not fund it if its effectiveness does not justify the cost.  The authors  
express the concern that the potential amount of the order in Auton may skew resources away from other 
children with special needs.  Allocation of health funding may become captive to various advocacy 
groups, or groups with sufficient means to mount a Charter case.  Groups like FASDs are not likely to be 
in such position, due to their prevalence in the child protection system, and the poverty and 
marginalization of other sources of advocacy for them in the family or community.  (Greschner, D. and 
Lewis, S.  “Medicare in the Courts:  Auton and Evidence-Based Decision-Making”) 
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  3.2.2.1.3  Section 1 Test 
 
Once a Charter right to treatment is established for ASD claimants (or by extension for 
individuals with FASDs), it is subject to limitation under Section 1, which reads: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrated in a free and democratic society. 
 
In R. v. Oakes,430  the Supreme Court set out a test for determining whether a law (or its 
effects) constitutes a reasonable limit on a Charter right.  The crux of the Oakes test,  
applied to disability cases such as Auton,431 and Eldridge,432 and by extension to FASD 
claimants, focuses on whether or not the denial of treatment or ameliorative services  
constitutes only a minimum impairment of the right.  A minimum impairment would 
qualify as a reasonable limitation of the right.  To constitute a minimum impairment, the 
government must make reasonable accommodation of the appellants’ disability to the 
point of “undue hardship.”433   Governments are given wide latitude by the Courts to 
allocate scarce resources, especially when choosing between or among disadvantaged 
groups, but no latitude where the choice is between a disadvantaged group and the 
general population, and no latitude where reasonable accommodation has not been 
attempted.434   
 
                                                 
430 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. (Oakes) 
431 Supra note 106.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
432 Supra note 345.  (Eldridge) 
433 Ibid. at para. 94. (Eldridge) 
434 Ibid. at para. 85. (Eldridge) 
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The Crown contended in Auton that the expenditure of funds and allocation of other 
scarce resources among myriad competing demands requires a balancing of interests on 
a comprehensive and systematic basis, which only the executive branch can do, rather 
than, a balancing, as in Auton, on a case by case basis by the Court.435  The Court 
responded by reference both to Eldridge,436 where the Crown was required by the Court 
to pay for translation services for the deaf, and to Tetrault-Gaudoury,437 where UIC 
back benefits were to be payable after a Charter  remedy of “reading in” those who had 
been previously excluded on the basis of age.  According to Chief Justice Lamer in 
Schachter: 
The question is not whether courts can make decisions that impact on budgetary 
policy; it is to what degree they can appropriately do so.  A remedy which 
entails an intrusion into this sphere so substantial as to change the nature of the 
legislative scheme in question is clearly inappropriate.438  
 
Madam Justice Saunders of the B.C.C.A. did not consider the expenditure of funds 
contemplated for the treatment of ASD claimants in Auton to be so extraordinary as to 
be subject to reasonable limitation under s. 1.439  The treatment at issue was ordered 
only where it had been requested before the Court and where it had been recommended 
by an appropriate health care practitioner. Considering the particular facts of Auton, and 
the significant place of children in the law,440 the B.C.C.A. affirmed and extended441 
Madam Justice Allan’s B.C.S.C. holdings in this respect. 
                                                 
435 Supra note 106 at para. 56. (Auton, 2002, BCCA). 
436 Supra note 345.  (Eldridge) 
437 Tetrault-Gadoury v.Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22. 
438 Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 at 709, as cited in Auton, BCCA at para.57. 
439 Supra note 106 at para. 58.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA). 
440 The Court is referring to Parens patriae, the state’s duty of care for children (or adults unable to care 
for themselves) in the common law, classically used either to compel or to prevent the performance of 
some medical procedure, for the good of the child as perceived by the state, overriding the parent’s 
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The significant place of children in the law is supported further by Articles 23, 24 and 
40(3) & (4) of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child,442 ratified by 
Canada in 1992.  For all children, a right to the highest standard of health care is 
emphasized in Article 24.  Moreover, article 23 extends that right, with particular 
attention to the health care needs of mentally or physically disabled children, to  
rehabilitative care, in order to promote self-reliance and full participation in the  
community.  In the same article, state signatories specifically recognize the right of a 
disabled child to special care, free of charge (subject to available resources of the state), 
designed to ensure the disabled child’s access to education, training, health care 
services, rehabilitation services, recreation, and employment preparation.  In countries 
with resources comparable to Canada’s, a significant right to special care would be 
reasonable.  Ultimately, no child is to be deprived of access to health care services.  
Article 40 of the same Convention documents the right of child offenders to a variety of 
dispositions other than institutionalization to meet their needs for care, including 
residential care, guidance, counseling, education and vocational training.   
 
Generally, statutes of Canada, which possess a federal jurisdictional component as do 
health and criminal legislation, are interpreted so as to conform to international law.443  
                                                                                                                                               
objections; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N.T.S., passed by the United Nations in 
1990 and ratified by Canada in 1992. 
441 There was no age restriction in either order for Crown funding of IBI therapy.  However, in the 
BCCA, parents were granted leave to appeal for reimbursement of IBI services for which they had 
already paid, whereas previously they had been restricted to a symbolic award of $20,000.00 each. 
442 G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U>N> Doc. A/44/49 (1989), ratified by 
Canada in 1992. 
443P. Cote, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 367-389, 
cited in Jones, C. “Fixing to Sue:  Is There a Legal Duty to Establish Safe Injection Facilities in British 
Columbia?” (2002) 35 UBCL Rev. 393-454. 
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Accordingly, Madame Justice Saunders (in reference to action pursuant to provincial 
statutory authority related to health care) upheld the use of international covenants in 
the section 1 stage of Charter analysis.  Section 1 determines whether a Crown 
limitation of a right is reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic society.  A 
right upheld by international conventions would present a strong section 1 threshold for 
the Crown to meet.444  The Convention on the Rights of the Child supports the claims of 
disabled children for funded health-care (whether ASD or FASD) thereby weighing 
against Crown justification of denial or infringement of that right under s. 1.  Further, of 
particular importance for FASD offenders, the Convention, in article 40, supports the 
claim for provision of community-based treatment services for children who break the 
law.445   
 
The Crown in Auton emphasized that its health care resources are limited and argued 
that the effect of funding treatment for ASDs would skew resources away from other 
children with special needs.  The petitioners countered that a great deal of money spent 
by the Crown was misdirected, including money spent on researching critiques of the 
Lovaas autism treatment (LAT),446 a particular form of IBI that the claimants were 
requesting.   
                                                 
444 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, cited in Supra note 106 at para. 63.  
(Auton, 2002, BCCA).  
445 Applicable to adults, as well as children is article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights [1976], 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [1976- Can. T.S. 46, as it recognizes the right of 
everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.  For Aboriginal peoples, 
articles 23 and 24 of the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples raise the issue of self-
determination in health care and social programmes, as well as inclusion of the Indigenous component of 
traditional healing. 
446 Supra note 383 at  para. 25-52. Ivor Lovaas began his IBI project in 1970 at UCLA, after observing 
that ASD children do not learn from everyday environments.  He hypothesized that their abnormal 
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With regard to another section 1 issue, evidence of effectiveness of treatment, the Court 
did accept the ASD parent petitioners’ affidavits as admissible evidence regarding 
improvements in their children while receiving LAT.   However, the Court was 
skeptical regarding the validity of the estimation processes used in the cost-benefit 
analyses presented by the same petitioners’ economist.447   Ultimately, the Court did 
concede that, in the long run, the costs of paying for effective treatment would be more 
than offset by the savings of not paying for lifelong care and institutionalization of 
ASDs.448   
 
In Auton, ASD claimants received differential denial of treatment with respect to a non-
mentally disabled comparator group of children, and a mentally disabled comparator 
                                                                                                                                               
behavior patterns and skills deficits could be ameliorated through intensive behavioral modification 
treatment, using both positive and negative reinforcement, and that such treatment would allow many 
ASD children to join their normal peers by grade one.  In 1987, Dr. Lovaas  published the results of his 
study, termed the Young Autism Project (YAP).  The children in the YAP were three years or younger at 
the beginning of treatment and received 40 hours a week of intensive one-on-one treatment by a therapist.  
Lovaas reported that 17 out of 19 children who received his form of IBI termed Lovaas autism treatment 
(LAT) improved significantly in their social and communication skills.  Nine out of the 19 were able to 
complete grade one in regular classrooms without special supports, and were indistinguishable from their 
peers in IQ, adaptive skills, and emotional functioning. A control group of similar ASD children who 
received no form of IBI, showed very little improvement; none were able to enter regular education 
classes.  A follow-up study in 1993 showed that the treatment gains were maintained.  Seventeen children 
in the experimental group showed an average IQ gain of more than 20 points.   These results have never 
been replicated.  YAP is the only controlled study undertaken with respect to IBI programs for ASD 
children; current ethical concerns preclude the use of a control group that would deny treatment at a 
critical time in their development to a group of  young, vulnerable, disabled children.  The use of physical 
aversives in the Lovass program to negatively reinforce dysfunctional behavior would also be highly 
controversial from an ethical point of view.  Critics also point out that the Lovaas study, using a small 
sample of children, failed to randomly assign them to the control and experimental groups, and that the 
children placed in the experimental group may have had higher IQs from the outset.  Without the use of 
random assignment, one cannot conclude that the groups were equal at the outset, and, therefore, it does 
not follow that any differences in the groups are due to the treatment variable.   Lack of random 
assignment and replication are major flaws in the study, as well as the small sample size. (Auton, 2000, 
BCSC) 
447 Supra note 106 at para. 145.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
448 Supra note 383 at para. 145-147.  (Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Health), [2000] BCSC 1142.) 
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group of adults.  As no reasonable accommodation of their needs for IBI treatment had 
been attempted, the point of undue hardship was not engaged.   Therefore, failure to 
provide necessary medical treatment and adequate accommodation of the disabled ASD  
claimants constituted a denial of s. 15(1) of the Charter that was not a reasonable 
limitation under s. 1.   
 
 
 
 
3.2.2.1.4  The Case for FASDs Under S. 1 
 
The situation for FASDs is analogous to Auton, if not more compelling.  The degree of 
curial intrusion into the budgetary allocations of the executive branch required to 
provide treatment for individuals with FASDs, would not likely be so extraordinary as 
to be subject to limitation under section 1, in light of similar gate keeping mechanisms 
as used in Auton.  In addition, the Crown, at a minimum, has a duty to warn of the 
teratogenic affects of alcohol in order to reduce the incidence of FASDs requiring 
treatment.  The dangers of in utero alcohol exposure have been known in the scientific 
literature since 1973.449  The gravamen of the Crown’s duty is escalated considering its  
                                                 
449 Supra note 262.  (Jones, D.L., Smith, D.W., Ulleland, C.N. , Streissguth, A.P.  “Pattern of 
malformation in offspring of chronic alcoholic mothers,” Lancet, 2:1267-1271, 1973.; Jones, K. L., 
Smith, D.W “Recognition of the fetal alcohol syndrome in early infancy,” Lancet, 2:999-1001, 1973; 
Jones, K.L., Smith, D.W., Streissguth, A.P. Myrianthopoulos, N.C. “Outcome in Offspring of Chronic 
Alcoholic Women,” Lancet, 1:1076-1078, 1974.) 
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constitutional duty to enforce the alcohol ban, especially where prevalence of the 
condition is high, and where proper warnings, along with enforcement, could potentially 
dramatically reduce the occurrence of the syndrome.  The Crown’s duty also must be 
assessed in the context of the special, protected position of children in the law, 
including the ancient parens patriae jurisdiction, especially in view of the number of 
FASD children in care,450 and international treaties, such as the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, to which Canada is been a signatory. 
 
Last, but not least, the Crown has a duty to accommodate the disabilities of those 
already affected by the teratogenic effects of alcohol through the funding of 
community-based treatment programs, modeled on best practices.451  This duty is 
magnified as long as the Crown is involved in the sale, regulation, and licensing of 
alcohol.  Currently, significant funds from the sale and taxation of alcoholic products 
are not directed to the prevention and treatment of FASD conditions.452  Only recently 
have systematic prevention programs, short of universal warning labels, been 
introduced in Canada.453   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
450 Supra note 428.  (Medicare in the Courts) 
451 Supra note 134. (Health Canada’s Best Practices) 
452 Supra note 139.  (SLGA) 
453 Food and Drug Administration, Surgeon General’s Advisory on Alcohol and Pregnancy.  (FDA:  
Washington, 1981) Drug Bull. 11.9-10.   In 1981, in the landmark Surgeon General’s Advisory on 
Alcohol and Pregnancy, women in the United States were advised to avoid all alcohol during pregnancy. 
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Similar conclusions regarding effectiveness of treatment and cost-benefit analyses 
formulated for ASDs would be applicable to FASDs.   Parental affidavits concerning 
effectiveness of treatment methods should be equally convincing for FASDs as for 
ASDs.  When dealing with human subjects, particularly children, rigorous scientific 
methods, including random assignment to experimental or control groups, where 
effective treatment may not be available, may be ethically inappropriate as all subjects 
are in need of effective, early intervention.  Expert opinions as to best practices,454 
including Streissguth’s longitudinal study identifying protective factors,455 could 
supplement parental affidavits as evidence of effectiveness of treatment.  In the case of 
FASDs, the Crown may contend that existing health, early intervention and special 
educational services do meet the standards of adequate accommodation to the point of 
undue hardship.   However, services generally available do not meet the standard 
recommended by experts, no more than they meet the standards required for most 
ASDs, and, therefore, presumably would not meet the standard of accommodation of 
the disability to the point of undue hardship. 
 
In conclusion, neither for ASDs nor FASDs, would the denial of funding for specialized 
treatment recommended by medical experts likely be considered a reasonable limitation 
of the right to equality under the Charter, based on the enumerated ground of disability.   
The case for FASDs is more compelling, given the state-causal factor, the constitutional 
breach of the treaty alcohol ban, and the breach of the duty to warn effectively.  Only 
                                                 
454 Supra note 134. (Best Practices, Health Canada) 
455 Supra note 12.  (Streissguth, Barr et al, 1996[unpublished] cited in Fetal Alcohol Syndrome:  A Guide 
for Families and Communities) 
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effective treatment can reduce the marginalization and exclusion of ASDs and FASDs 
from mainstream society.   Social inclusion, the essence of substantive equality under s. 
15 of the Charter, is at stake for ASD and FASD affected individuals, absent the 
specialized treatment they require. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3.1  Section 24(1) Remedies 
 
Section 24(1) of the Charter provides remedies for anyone whose rights have been 
unjustifiably infringed or denied: 
24(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have 
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to 
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances. [Italics added] 
 
 
There are myriads of discretionary options available as remedies under s. 24(1)—any 
the court considers “appropriate and just in the circumstances”.  However, the need for 
remedy must be established on an individual appellant basis under s. 24, as the term 
“anyone” in the provision implies.  Accordingly, in Auton, each claimant’s award of 
compensation was unique according to his/her circumstances.  The remedies under s. 
24(1) of the Charter ordered by the B.C.C.A. in Auton include:  
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• a declaration that the Crown discriminates against petitioners contrary to s. 
15(1) in failing to accommodate their disadvantaged position through the 
provision of effective treatment for children with autism; and 
• a direction that the Crown fund early intensive behavior therapy for children 
with autism;456 as well as  
• leave for parents to appeal for reimbursement of such funding (note:  only 
symbolic damages had been awarded at the BCSC).457   
 
Early Intensive Behavior Intervention therapy (IBI) was held to be a scientifically 
proven treatment for symptoms of autism.  The fact that autism was incurable was not 
considered a reason to withhold such treatment, as other conditions, such as cancer and 
cerebral palsy, are not denied treatment because they may be incurable.458  
 
Streissguth’s four year longitudinal study of a cohort of 451 individuals ages 6-51 
indicated early diagnosis and access to disability services among the critical protective 
factors, the presence of which attenuate the development of harmful secondary 
disabilities for FASDs.459  Courts may consider Streissguth’s study460 as threshold 
evidence to justify the funding of accommodation, in line with the best  
                                                 
456 Note that the particular form of IBI, Lovass autism treatment (LAT), was not included in the Court’s 
direction to the Crown. 
457 Supra note 106 at para. 94-100.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
458 Ibid. at para. 28.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA). 
459 Supra note 12.  (Streissguth, 1996) 
460 Ibid.  (Streissguth, 1996) 
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practices recommended by medical experts in the field.461  Only when a plan is 
implemented can further evidence of what constitutes parameters of effective treatment 
be established. 
 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Section 33 Override 
 
Section 15(1) of the Charter is subject to a potential section 33 legislative override. 
Section 33 provides: 
33(1)  Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an 
Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a 
provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 
2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
 
However, the declaratory remedy used in Auton462 and Eldridge,463 and contemplated 
for use with FASD claimants, is unlikely to be subject to such s. 33 Charter override.  
Public sympathy for people with obvious disabilities such as autism, deafness, and 
organic brain impairment militates politically against legislative limitation of their 
rights.  However, readily apparent physical disabilities such as deafness are more likely 
to evoke public sympathy than less readily apparent mental disabilities, like pFAS,  
 
                                                 
461 Supra note 134.  (Best Practices) 
462 Supra note 106, at para. 100. (Auton, 2002, BCCA).   
463 Supra note 345, at para.  95-96. (Eldridge) 
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FAE, or ARND.  This is especially true if public awareness has not been raised about 
such less obvious conditions.   
 
  
 
 
3.2.3.3  Section 32(1), Charter Jurisdiction and Deference to the Legislature 
 
Further, pursuant to s. 32(1), the Charter applies to a range of federal and provincial 
legislative and governmental actions, giving the Court the jurisdiction it requires, in 
contrast to the situation in L.E.K.,464 where a Charter application had not been made.   
Section 32(1) reads: 
  
32(1) This charter applies 
(a)  to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within 
the authority of Parliament including matters relating to the Yukon 
Territory and the Northwest Territories; and 
(b)  to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters 
within the authority of the legislature of each province. 
 
 
Section 32(1) initiates the debate whether or not an impugned discriminatory action 
involves a governmental actor, and, if it does, raises the further concern of judicial 
deference to the legislature in framing remedies.  The delayed declaration used in 
Eldridge helped allay concern over interference with the legislature, as it left the 
specifics of how to rectify the infringement of s. 15(1) of the Charter in the 
                                                 
464 Supra note 279.  (L.E.K.). 
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government’s hands (the government being the creature of the legislature), and it 
allowed the government six months to bring its actions into line with the Charter.  In 
this way, the Court was able to respect legislative autonomy, while at the same time, 
upholding Charter rights.   Eldridge dealt with the concern whether or not a 
governmental actor was involved by way of a determination that the Charter may be 
infringed, not only by legislation per se, but also by the actions of a delegated decision-
maker in applying such legislation.  No piece of legislation prohibited the funding of 
SLI to the deaf.   However, the medicare review committee declined to fund the service.  
In Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,465 the delegated decision-maker was an 
adjudicator under the Canada Labour Code,466 who, in making his order, was not 
allowed to violate the employer’s freedom of expression.  Eldridge and Slaight 
exemplify the principle that, while in such cases the legislation remains valid, a remedy 
is ordered for the unconstitutional action taken thereunder.467  As the Charter applies 
not only to legislation, but also to action taken under statutory authority,468  the denial 
of access to medical services in Eldridge is action falling under Charter scrutiny for it 
involves a decision taken under such authority.469  Similarly, the denial of necessary 
treatment for those with ASD or FASD is action taken under statutory authority, and 
falls under Charter scrutiny. 
 
 
                                                 
465 Supra note 432 at p. 1078. (Slaight)   
466 R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1. 
467 Supra note 345 at para. 20-22. (Eldridge) 
468  Ibid. at para. 24.  (Eldridge) 
469  Ibid. at para. 46-51. (Eldridge) 
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In the respondent parents’ cross-appeal, Madam Justice Saunders affirmed the 
continuing jurisdiction of the B.C.S.C.470  This continued jurisdiction was for the 
purpose of entertaining an application for an order of mandamus against a public officer 
(for instance, the Minister of Health).  Such order would be required were the court’s 
declaration of breach of the children’s equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter not 
honoured, nor its subsequent direction to the government to fund early IBI not effected.   
The order of mandamus would compel the Crown to execute or perform its legal duty, 
i.e., to fund early IBI for the child plaintiffs.  The B.C.C.A. upheld the B.C.S.C.’s 
continued jurisdiction and limited supervisory role.  Were the government not to 
implement a timely and effective program, the child applicants could readily renew 
their application for mandatory relief.471  Without this continued jurisdiction, child 
applicants would have had to commence expensive litigation anew should the 
government not comply with the court’s declaration.  Similar retention of jurisdiction, 
in the s. 23 Charter context, after issuance of general and delayed declarations, was 
overturned by the Nova Scotia Appeal Court in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia,472 on 
the grounds that the Court was functus officio, and had lost jurisdiction to exercise such 
                                                 
470 Supra note 106 at para. 129. (Auton, 2002, BCCA) 
471 Supra note 106 at para. 100.  (Auton, 2002, BCCA).  Note:  In Clough (Litigation guardian of) v. 
Ontario, [2003] O.J. No. 1074, a request for an injunction compelling the Ontario government to provide 
funding over and above what they had been providing for early intensive behavior therapy for autistic 
children, was denied, as it did not meet the compelling nature of the legal tests for such an injunction.  
Clough can be distinguished from Auton, as IBI funding had been provided in Clough.    
472 Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia [200] N.S. J. No. 191, (T.D.); rev’d [2001] N.S. J. No. 24 (C.A.); 
leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 459.  Just before printing of this thesis, Doucet-
Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] S.C.C. 62, was released and restored the trial 
judge’s order, holding that s. 24(1) of the Charter requires courts to issue effective remedies that 
guarantee full and meaningful protection of Charter rights, and in particular, that the enforcement of s. 23 
rights may require novel remedies.  The Court of Appeal erred in striking down the portion of the trial 
judge’s order in which he retained jurisdiction to hear progress reports on the status of the province’s 
efforts in providing school facilities by the required dates.  At least in the context of s. 23 of the Charter, 
s. 24(1) remedies include the authority of the trial judge to retain supervisory jurisdiction. 
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a supervisory function.  Ultimate resolution of the issue of continued jurisdiction 
remains moot until decided by the Supreme Court, leave to appeal having been granted 
in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia. 
 
 
 
 3.2.3.4  Appeal of Auton to the Supreme Court and Implications for FASDs 
 
Auton is also under appeal.473  At issue during the appeal may be the adequacy of the 
evidentiary basis for effectiveness of treatment.474  The Supreme Court of  
Canada may not be as dismissive of the importance of extensive cost-benefit analyses, 
whether in s. 1 jurisprudence, or even, perhaps, in s. 15(1).  Either to establish a 
substantive right to fund specialized treatment, or in the alternative, to forestall the 
Crown from justifying limitation of that right to treatment, there must be evidence as to 
the effectiveness of the treatment, and its cost must be justified by the improvement 
which the treatment renders.   
 
                                                 
473 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 510.  In 
addition, a number of related cases are under appeal in Ontario:  Clough (Litigation guardian of) v. 
Ontario, [2003] O.J. No. 1074 (OntSupCtJus.), and Lowrey (Litigation guardian of) v. Ontario, [2003] 
O.J. No. 2009 (OntSupCtJus).  In these cases the guardians of ASD children are requesting interim relief 
in the nature of continued IBI funding for their children.  Lowrey, at para. 25, orders a mandatory 
injunction requiring the Ministry to continue to fund IBI therapy, which is to remain in effect until the 
earlier of the decisions of Kiteley J. in  the Wynberg and Deskin cases that are about to start and that 
involve a large number of petitioners.     
474 Supra note 413. The evidence the BCCA relied on was the parent petitioners’ affidavits of the 
effectiveness of the LAT on their children.  The parents were neither experts nor disinterested parties to 
the determination of effectiveness of the treatment. (Greschner, G. and Lewis S., “Medicare in the Courts:  
Auton and Evidence-Based Decision-Making,” publication pending in the Canadian Bar Review.) 
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The B.C. courts in Auton may have erred in construing the s. 15 right too much through 
the lens of access to medical services, where complex balancing is applied to determine 
comprehensiveness of coverage, potentially limiting the access of some groups under 
s.1 justification.  The fuller duty to accommodate disabilities outlined in Eldridge may 
have been a hedge against such limitation.  Nevertheless, accommodation would 
involve access to medical services to a considerable extent.  The petitioners’ application 
in Auton was directed at the Ministry of Health, at least initially,475 and regardless of 
whether or not some of the services would be under the aegis of education or social 
services, the largest pool of funding available is through health.476  Notwithstanding the 
hegemony of health services in the panoply of accommodation needs of disabled 
claimants, and the broadening of the definition of health per se, something may be lost 
without fuller consideration of education and social services, such as the recognition of 
the multi-disciplinary nature of the treatment required. 
 
A further critique the Court may consider in relation to the section 1 justification test 
applies to the Crown.  Courts may require governments to be explicitly transparent 
about their complex balancing procedures and evidence-based decision making in 
determining which groups receive access to medical care coverage.477  Only if such a 
standard were met would the Court consider justifying a s. 1 violation of a s.15 Charter  
                                                 
475 Supra note 383. (Auton, 2000) 
476 Supra note 428. (Medicare in the Courts) 
477 Ibid. (Medicare in the Courts) 
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right under the enumerated grounds of disability.  Undoubtedly, such considerations, 
even if met, would be less applicable to a Charter claim for funding of treatment for 
FASDS, due to the Crown’s complicity in contributing to the condition, and the special 
rights and protections surveyed that are associated with many of that class of claimants.  
Such special rights and protections include the Treaty Alcohol Ban, the ancient parents 
patriae jurisdiction, and relevant provisions in international treaties and conventions 
that promote the right to health care, including special health care for disabled children, 
as well as community-based treatment for child offenders. 
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 4.  CONCLUSION 
 
The focus of the research includes the legal and policy issues that present impediments 
to obtaining holistic, community-based treatment for offenders with FASDs.  How to 
acquire such treatment through policy reform and legal redress is also considered.   The 
discourse situates the history, ideology, case law, and statutory and constitutional 
provisions in the context of community-based treatment for such FASD offenders, 
many of whom are Aboriginal.  Before contact, Aboriginal people had developed a 
restorative justice approach in community-based settings.478  Colonizers disrupted the 
restorative approach, imposing their retributive system of justice, together with 
destructive assimilative influences such as the whiskey trade (an aspect of the fur trade) 
and residential schools.479  Resultant intergenerational effects include FASDs among 
Aboriginal peoples.  A restorative approach, consonant with an Aboriginal perspective 
of healing within the community, is more culturally appropriate than are carceral 
options for FASD offenders.480 Considering the nature of this spectrum of disorders, 
characterized by involuntary organic brain impairment originating from alcohol 
                                                 
478 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.  Special Report, Bridging the 
Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal People in the Criminal Justice System, Part I, Aboriginal 
Concepts of Law and Justice—The Historical Realities (Ottawa:  Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at     
1-25; and R. G. Green, Justice in Aboriginal Communities:  Sentencing Alternatives (Saskatoon, SK:  
Purich Publishers, 1998) at 32-34. 
479Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.  Special Report, Bridging the 
Cultural Divide, Part 2, Current Realities:  The Failure of the Justice System; The Root Causes of Over-
Representation and Aboriginal Crime (Ottawa:  Supply and Services Canada, 1996), 39-53, at 47-52. 
480 Supra note 478. 
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exposure in utero, restorative justice seems a tenable position, and one now endorsed by 
the judiciary. 
 
Significant analytical threads and nexus have been woven through areas of history, 
ideology, criminal law, health law, international law, and Charter and Treaty remedies, 
to create a diverse tapestry and framework through which to begin to restore community 
healing for offenders with FASDs.  Such a synthesis is likely to be achieved through a 
combined approach of policy reform and legal redress. The methodology has been 
broad-based and inductive, more consistent with Indigenous research methodologies, 
than are deductive and syllogistic approaches.481  A related concern with Indigenous 
methodologies and values involves the totality of the context, consistency with values 
of respect, and a focus on long range, big picture solutions,482 rather than mere tinkering 
with the existing system in a fragmented manner.  
 
In the mainstream (or dominant) criminal justice system, FASD offenders may be 
characterized as having a mental disorder. Some view such characterization as further 
stigmatization and victimization, preferring to rely instead on systemic factors as 
interpreted in Gladue.483  As mentally disordered, however, FASD offenders potentially 
become subject to such threshold and specialized provisions of the Criminal Code as 
being declared unfit to stand trial or being excused from punishment on the basis of not 
                                                 
481 L. T. Smith, Decolonizing Methodoloies:  Research and Indigenous Peoples (New York:  Zed Books 
Ltd., 2001) p. 116-142.   
482 The Seven Generations’ Rule.  Aboriginal people traditionally consider the effects of any major 
decision on the next seven generations of their people. 
483 Supra note 258. (Gladue) 
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having criminal responsibility due to their mental condition.  In addition, mental 
disorder or disability may function as a mitigating factor, along with systemic factors as 
in Gladue, in consideration of reduced sentences, especially probation and community-
based sentences. An example is conditional sentences, with treatment options. One 
problem with all of these provisions, threshold or otherwise, is the dearth of therapeutic 
facilities in hospitals, clinics, or other community-settings.  Because of this shortage the 
risk that untreated FASD offenders can pose to society acts as an aggravating factor, 
rendering them subject to carceral dispositions.  Replacing shame and denial of mental 
disorders and disabilities with open acceptance, coupled with accommodation, tends to 
lessen the stigmatizing aspects of distinctions or differences, and brings affected 
individuals under the ambit of a potentially powerful Charter remedy. Regrettably, 
unjustified fears of stigmatization have been a barrier to development and 
implementation of effective treatment programs.   
 
The crux of the inquiry has been on the legal and policy issues that are impediments to 
community-based treatment.  Ideological and historical underpinnings have been 
analyzed, revealing that retribution and incarceration are not “natural” to society, but 
have evolved in response to state centralization of power, much as globalization 
seemingly is transforming our contemporary life along more coercive patterns.  
Customary law of some non-centralized societies seems akin to the system of law found 
in Aboriginal societies, in that both view wrongdoing as a personal or civil matter, to be 
resolved among and between individuals and families within the community.   
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 Tragically, retributive, carceral consequences that dominate in our society impact 
disproportionately on disadvantaged groups, including enumerated groups based on 
race, class and disability.  In our centralized, majoritarian nation, Charter rights, 
designed to protect such disadvantaged “discrete and insular” minorities, include 
equality rights.  These rights ideally serve as a “sword” to advantage FASD offenders, 
who suffer social, political, legal, and historical or pre-existing disadvantage.  Absent 
such Charter initiated accommodation appropriate to their disabilities, carceral 
dispositions may be their fate.  Charter equality rights buttressed by various 
international law covenants may also serve as a “shield” against state justification of 
limitation of rights, particularly the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of a 
mental disability such as an FASD, and the right to have that disability treated and 
accommodated.   
 
In addition, treaty beneficiaries of the alcohol ban can frame policy or contextualized 
Charter arguments for the provision of holistic, community-based services on that 
basis.  Resultant treatment programs developed would undoubtedly advantage affected 
individuals, regardless of whether they were treaty beneficiaries of that particular 
provision, or whether they were Indian, Inuit, Metis or Non-Aboriginal.   Treaty 
remedies, moreover, have the benefit of not relying solely on stigmatizing aspects of 
designation of disability or mental disorder, although risks do present in exposing treaty 
rights to potential judicial limitation if pursued on their own merits.   
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Essentially, the Charter is the remedy of choice for acquiring holistic, community-
based treatment for FASDs, as not only does it replace shame, guilt, and stigmatization 
with open recognition of the disabilities faced by affected individuals, but it also 
attempts to accommodate the actual characteristics that comprise the disability, enabling 
affected individuals to participate more fully in society, rather than finding themselves 
excluded, institutionalized, incarcerated or otherwise marginalized.  In addition, 
Charter analyses are contextual, interdisciplinary and holistic, incorporating into the 
analyses of infringement of Charter rights and their remedies as many relevant factors 
as possible, including: the treaties with the Indians, international law conventions, 
systemic factors of racism and marginalization, and the history of colonization, 
including the whiskey trade.  A narrow, reductionist or positivist approach is eschewed, 
consonant with Charter equality jurisprudence, with the complexity of the problems 
surrounding FASDs, and with respect for diverse cultural ontologies involved.  Charter 
arguments voiced to policy makers may be sufficient to lead to the implementation of 
services required for all individuals with FASDs.  On the otherhand, actual litigation of 
Charter issues may be necessary to acquire the full complement of specialized, 
interdisciplinary, community-based treatment recommended. 
 
Without some provision of holistic, community-based services, through Charter 
remedies, if necessary, any strategies adopted, including conditional sentences, a less-
restrictive version of proposed hospital dispositions, or a resort to mental health courts, 
will be circumscribed.  It is imperative that disabled members of our society, such as 
individuals with FASDs, receive the treatment they require.  Otherwise, by default, 
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exposed to harsh penal settings, facing further deterioration of their mental states, and 
continued systemic discrimination, their lives may be an endless cycle of crime. For 
seven generations the colonizer’s alcohol and its effects, combined with other 
destructive influences of colonization, have devastated many Aboriginal people.  It is 
time to lay a foundation to ensure that all members of the next seven generations 
(including non-Aboriginals) will be healed, empowered, and transformed.  The Charter 
is a vehicle which has the potential to assist with this goal, imbued as it is with 
contextualized processes and richly principled approaches, not the least of which is 
substantive equality premised on upholding the individual dignity of those who have 
suffered disadvantage.    
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The "Hospital Orders" Provisions of the Criminal Code, S.C. 1995, c. 22, s. 6 (not yet in force)  
747. In this section and sections 747.1 to 747.8,  
 
 
"assessment report" means a written report made pursuant to an assessment 
order made under section 672.11 by a psychiatrist who is entitled under the laws 
of a province to practise psychiatry or, where a sychiatrist is not practicably 
available, by a medical practitioner; 
 
 "hospital order" means an order by a court under section 747.1 that an offender be detained in a treatment facility;  
 
...  
 
 
"treatment facility" means any hospital or place for treatment of the mental 
disorder of an offender, or a place within a class of such places, designated by 
the Governor in Council, the lieutenant governor in council of the province in 
which the offender is sentenced or a person to whom authority has been 
delegated in writing for that purpose by the Governor in Council or that 
lieutenant governor in council. 
 
 
      747.1  (1)  A court may order that an offender be detained in a treatment 
facility as the initial part of a sentence of imprisonment where it finds, at the 
time of sentencing, that the offender is suffering from a mental disorder in an 
acute phase and the court is satisfied, on the basis of an assessment report and 
any other evidence, that immediate treatment of the mental disorder is urgently 
required to prevent further significant deterioration of the mental or physical 
health of the offender, or to prevent the offender from causing serious bodily 
harm to any person. 
 
 
      (2)  A hospital order shall be for a single period of treatment not exceeding 
sixty days, subject to any terms and conditions that the court considers 
appropriate. 
 
 
 
      747.2  (1)  In a hospital order, the court shall specify that the offender be detained in a 
particular treatment facility recommended by the central administration of any penitentiary, 
prison or other institution to which the offender has been sentenced to imprisonment, unless the 
court is satisfied, on the evidence of a medical practitioner, that serious harm to the mental or 
physical health [page821] of the offender would result from travelling to that treatment facility 
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or from the delay occasioned in travelling there. 
      (2)  Where the court does not follow a recommendation referred to in subsection (1), it shall 
order that the offender be detained in a treatment facility that is reasonably accessible to the 
place where the accused is detained when the hospital order is made or to the place where the 
court is located. 
 
   
 
      747.3  No hospital order may be made unless the offender and the person in 
charge of the treatment facility where the offender is to be detained consent to the 
order and its terms and conditions, but nothing in this section shall be construed 
as making unnecessary the obtaining of any authorization or consent to treatment 
from any other person that is or may be required otherwise than under this Act. 
 
 
       
747.4  No hospital order may be made in respect of an offender 
 
 
(a) 
 
who is convicted of or is serving a sentence imposed in respect of a 
conviction for an offence for which a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for life is prescribed by law; 
 
(b)  who has been found to be a dangerous offender pursuant to section 753;  
(c)  where the term of imprisonment to be served by the offender does not exceed sixty days;  
(d) 
 
where the term of imprisonment is imposed on the offender in 
default of payment of a fine or of a victim fine surcharge imposed 
under subsection 737(1); or 
 
(e)  where the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the offender is ordered under paragraph 732(1)(a) to be served intermittently.  
 
       747.5  (1)  An offender shall be sent or returned to a prison to serve the portion of the offender's sentence that remains unexpired where  
 
(a) the hospital order expires before the expiration of the sentence; or  
(b) 
 
the consent to the detention of the offender in the treatment facility 
pursuant to the hospital order is withdrawn either by the offender or 
by the person in charge of the treatment facility. 
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       (2)  Before the expiration of a hospital order in respect of an offender, the 
offender may be transferred from the treatment facility specified in the hospital 
order to another treatment facility where treatment of the offender's mental 
disorder is available, if the court authorizes the transfer in writing and the person 
in charge of the treatment facility consents. 
 
 
      747.6  Each day that an offender is detained under a hospital order shall be 
treated as a day of service of the term of imprisonment of the offender, and the 
offender shall be deemed, for all purposes, to be lawfully confined in a prison 
during that detention. 
 
 
 
      747.7  Notwithstanding section 12 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, an 
offender in respect of whom a hospital order is made and who is sentenced or committed to a 
penitentiary may, during the period for which that order is in force, be received in a penitentiary
before the expiration of the time limited by law for an appeal and shall be detained in the 
treatment facility specified in the order during that period. 
 
 
      747.8  Where a court makes a hospital order in respect of an offender, the court shall cause 
a copy of the order and of the warrant of committal issued pursuant to subsection 747.1 to be 
sent to the central administration of the penitentiary, prison or other institution where the term 
of imprisonment imposed on the offender is to be served and to the treatment facility where the 
offender is to be detained for treatment. 
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